# The Early Exploration of Louisiana

By Isaac Joslin Cox, Ph. D.
*Instructor in History, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.*

3781
P41C
UNCLASSED
Dissertation
STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
WITHDRAWN

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/earlyexploration0000isaa



·—·—·—·—Lewis and Clark, 1804-1805.

. . . . . .Lewis, 1806.

— — — — —Clark, 1806.

o + o + o Pike and Wilkinson, 1806.

+ + + + Pike, 1805-1806.

o o o o o o Wilkinson, 1806.

Hunter and Dunbar, 1804-1805.

(—>(—>(—> Freeman, 1806.

# The Early Exploration of Louisiana.

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

By ISAAC JOSLIN COX, PH. D.,

Instructor in History, University of Cincinnati; Sometime Holder of the Harrison Fellowship in American History, University of Pennsylvania; Fellow of the Texas State Historical Association; Editor of "The Journeys of La Salle and his Companions", etc., etc.

1906

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI PRESS

CINCINNATI, OHIO

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PREFACE.

Chapter I.—The Title and Its Definition.

Chapter II.—Preparing to Expore the Missouri.

Chapter III.—Lewis and Clark on the Missouri.

Chapter IV.—Jefferson's Plan for Exploring Louisiana.

Chapter V.—The Hunter-Dunbar Expedition up the Washita.

Chapter VI.—A Leader and a Passport for the Red River Expedition.

Chapter VII.—Spanish Expeditions Along the Louisiana Border.

Chapter VIII.—The Bid for the Support of the Red River Indians.

Chapter IX.—Freeman's Red River Expedition.

Chapter X.—Pike on the Upper Mississippi.

Chapter XI.—Wilkinson, Pike, and the Southwest.

Chapter XII.—Opening the Santa Fé Trail.

Chapter XIII.—Pike on the Mexican Border.

Chapter XIV.—The Diplomatic Correspondence of Louisiana Exploration.

Chapter XV.—Summary and Conclusion.

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

MAPS.

(1) Map to Illustrate General Exploration of Louisiana. Frontispiece.

(2) Map of the Washita and Lower Red River. Facing Chapter V.

## PREFACE.

The work of which this present monograph is a result represents but one essential part of an extensive study of the frontiers of the Louisiana Purchase, during the years from its acquisition to its delimitation, following the Treaty of 1819. As in so many similar cases, I approached the subject with a view to make a study of the whole of the period above mentioned; but with the accumulation of material I was obliged to contract the field until the work assumed the present form and title. Despite the multitude of individual studies and general publications called forth by the centennial of the Louisiana Purchase, I believe that the following monograph will justify its appearance as a fairly exhaustive survey of some unfamiliar phases occurring in our expansion to the westward.

In approaching the subject of Louisiana Exporation, even from the restricted standpoint assumed, I have found it impossible to avoid extended treatment of the work of Lewis and Clark and of Pike; but, in view of the voluminous monographs devoted to these great pathfinders, I have endeavored to make this treatment a grouping of essential facts and an emphasis upon certain phases of their work, rather than a detailed resumé of their undertakings. With reference to the minor expeditions, of which the details are little known, I have adopted a somewhat different course, but in both cases I have attempted to suggest broad lines of national policy, rather than insignificant, though interesting details of frontier exploration.

In studying the careers of the three great explorers just mentioned, I have derived immense advantage from the previous labors of the late Dr. Elliot Coues and Dr. Reuben Gold Thwaites—an advantage to which my footnotes abundantly attest. In the study of Lewis and Clark I have unfortunately had opportunity to use only the first five volumes of the "Original Journals," which are now appearing under the editorship of Dr. Thwaites. For the Hunter-Dunbar expeditions I have had the use, not merely of the

recently printed Dunbar "Journal," but also of the manuscript journal of Dr. George Hunter, now in possession of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia. Through the kindness of the Secretary, Dr. I. Minis Hays, I was permitted to examine it.

One of the principal features of the present study is the view, as I believe, now first afforded, of the Spanish side of Louisiana exploration. Two important manuscript sources have been used, the *Bexar Archives* and the *New Mexico Archives.* The latter collection is now housed in the Library of Congress, where it is readily accessible to students. The former collection is much more extensive, but because of its location and unorganized condition has heretofore been little known. It is now in possession of the University of Texas, Austin, Texas, and is being classified under the direction of Professor George P. Garrison. At present, however, it is impossible to make more exact citations than are used in this work. Although I have personally worked upon this collection, most of the material herein used was furnished by my friend and co-worker, Dr. Walter Flavius McCaleb, who has thus emphasized his friendship and interest in historical production.

In addition to these two important collections, I have likewise made use of the *Claiborne Correspondence,* six volumes of manuscripts in the Bureau of Library and Rolls of the State Department; the *Wilkinson Papers,* through the courtesy of the Board of Directors of the Chicago Historical Society; and the *Jefferson* Papers, now in the Library of Congress. To a limited extent only, because the various expeditions provoked comparatively little diplomatic correspondence, I have also profited by an examination of the files of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives in the State Department. I have also made use of certain material from the *Archivo General* of the City of Mexico, a valuable collection almost unknown to the historical world. The bibliography, as well as the footnotes, will make mention of other minor manuscript sources.

It is hardly necessary to mention the long list of libraries, both public and private, from which, during the past two years, I have received courteous attention and valuable aid. It is but just to acknowledge the personal interest of Professor J. B. McMaster and the timely suggestions and assistance of Professor H. V. Ames—both of the University of Pennsylvania. From Professor

Merrick Whitcomb, of the University of Cincinnati, I have received innumerable courtesies in preparing the work for the University Press. To my pupil and friend, F. J. Goldenberg, I am indebted for the maps, adapted from those accompanying Pike's *Account of an Expedition.*

ISAAC JOSLIN COX.

University of Cincinnati, January 16, 1906.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE TITLE AND ITS DEFINITION.

The title of this monograph, "The Early Exploration of Louisiana," calls for a concise interpretation of its time limit and its geographical setting. Our first task, then, will be to discuss briefly these essential points.

The name "Louisiana" has been applied to an uncertain territorial claim, to an equally ill-defined colonial jurisdiction, to the largest territorial acquisition of the United States, to a territory comprising the greater portion of this acquisition, and finally to a State of the American Union. In its widest extent it embraced nearly a third of the North American contient; in its most restricted use—that which is current at the present day—it embraces a relatively small fraction of our Union. Naturally such a term requires a careful definition, both as to place and time, in order to be carefully understood. At the outset it may eliminate confusion to state that the writer intends to confine his present study to the years 1803 to 1807, inclusive, and that he will accordingly use the term "Louisiana" with the signification that it ordinarily bore during that period. For the most part, the people of that day regarded the name as applicable to the whole of our great purchase from France. It is true that, in 1804, the portion comprising almost all of the present State of Louisiana was set apart as a separate territory, under the name of Orleans, while the rest of the purchase retained the original name. But this division, for political purposes merely, did not for many years destroy the unified view with which President and people regarded our great acquisition.

The name "Louisiana," then, will be used to designate the whole of that vast territorial expanse acquired from Napoleon in 1803; but even a statement apparently so simple as this does not remove every difficulty of definition. Statesmen and historians from Jefferson's day to the present time have never agreed concerning the exact limits of the Louisiana Purchase. Although it

is not scientific to adopt an arbitrary interpretation without stating the reasons that have led to it; yet, as the limits of this study will not permit such a detailed statement, while clearness requires rigid definition of the terms used, the writer ventures to give his opinion in a negative and somewhat arbitrary form. According to his interpretation, the "Louisiana Purchase" does not include Texas, West Florida, or any territory west of the Continental Divide.[1]

The history of Spanish, French, and English settlements and explorations for some two and a half centuries previous to our acquisition supports this interpretation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the vast region drained by the Mississippi formed part of that uncertain domain which Spain claimed as "Florida." From the southeast discoverers of this nation had approached and crossed this mighty river, while from the southwest others had reached some of its important tributaries; but there was no effective occupation of any portion of the great central valley. Finally, in the midst of this native wilderness, deserted by the inefficient Spaniards, appeared the intrepid La Salle, and aroused them, in a measure, from their lethargy. But it was too late to preserve intact the region that sloth had been content to leave to native barbarism. From the north La Salle pressed the wedge of French occupation, thrusting Florida apart from the base of effective support on the mainland, and destroying the cherished plan of making the Mexican Gulf a closed sea. This event marks the first step in that continental expansion which finally deprived Spain of her colonies and divided her territories among the nations.

The early years of the eighteenth century beheld the French firmly established upon the Gulf coast and in control of the Mississippi River. Within three decades their colonial officials had settled the problem of neighborhood with their Spanish rivals. In the east, the Perdido, a small stream midway between Mobile and Pensacola, was observed by the local authorities as the limit of their respective jurisdictions. In the west, the Arroyo Hondo, an unimportant bayou west of Natchitoches, answered the same purpose. Neither of the home governments formally ratified the

1. See map, *Frontispiece.*

work of its subordinates, nor did this local delimitation affect, in any measure, the vast interior watered by the Mississippi and its tributaries. By 1720, the French had begun to advance up the Missouri. This movement provoked the Spaniards to send from New Mexico a counter expedition, which met an overwhelming defeat at the hands of the Pawnees.[2] This repulse left the French in undisputed control of the fur trade of the lower Missouri.

Before another score of years elapsed these adventurous fur traders passed to the upper course of the Missouri, in the vicinity of the Mandan Indians; and breaking a new pathway to the southwest, they penetrated from the Missouri and Platte to Santa Fé.[3] These incursions, however, were in no way adequately followed up; so that at the close of the French règime in Louisiana, neither they nor the Spaniards had effectually occupied the interior, while near the Gulf coast a few straggling settlements formed all that was tangible of two uncertain colonial jurisdictions, separated by tentative lines of little legal or diplomatic significance.

When in 1763, Spain and England divided the bulk of the American continent, the former obtained the major portion of what the French had claimed as Louisiana. This acquisition the Spanish crown regarded as separate from the rest of its colonial dominions in America, and proceeded to treat it as such. Its evident purpose was to use the new territory as a buffer between its English neighbors and the more important interior provinces of Mexico. Accordingly, during this period, we find that those Spanish writers who treat the subject at all, emphasize the former local barriers, which, in their estimation, still continued to separate Spanish and French Creoles.[4]

For a few years the westward tide of English migration attracted but little notice and called forth but few warnings; but when, with the waning of the century, the English tide became an Anglo-American flood, a far different problem confronted the lethargic Spanish officials. In the north the stream of British

2. *Historia* 43, *Opusculo I*, Par. 15, 55, Archivo General, Mexico City; Bandelier, A. F., *Papers of the Archaelogical Institute of America*, V, 179-206.

3. Margry, *Découvertes et Établissements des Francais*, etc., VI, 426-464; 598-611.

4. Cf. *Historia* 43, *Opusculo I*, Par. 30; *Ibid*, *Document LXXIII*, Par. 18, 19.

fur traders, pushing steadily to the west and southwest, by 1790 rendered the control of strategic positions on the Pacific a matter of international importance. The work of these same traders upon the headwaters of the Mississippi and of the Missouri was much less noticeable, but it served to present another problem to the new possessor of Louisiana, when that province finally passed into American hands. The Spaniards made some futile attempts to control the fur trade, and the allegiance of the natives as well, along the middle course of the Missouri and its tributaries; but even in this region, before the close of the century, British industry was beginning to obtain a foothold. At this period, then, from a British base in the north and a Spanish base in the south and southwest, there emanated two opposing currents of influence that passed from one Indian tribe to another until finally they met near the head waters of the Missouri. Here the first representatives of a third and finally controlling factor—the American—encountered them on their journey to the Pacific.

Meanwhile, the stream of American migration that was beginning to sweep through Louisiana and to threaten Texas, by way of the Red and Washita Rivers, became more disquieting to Spanish officials, because less understood and harder to control. The leading spirits of this movement became managers of plantations, owners of cattle ranches, horse-traders, and Indian factors, and in many other ways urged the development of the natural resources of the country. But the suspicious Spaniards saw in them only the first tide of an American invasion, destined ultimately to sweep over all Mexico.[5] It is to be confessed that in the actions of Philip Nolan, the chief representative of this movement and a protege of General James Wilkinson, of unsavory reputation, there was abundant justification for the fears of these Mexican officials. Oddly enough Jefferson, Wilkinson, and Dunbar, who later figure so prominently in the following pages, first approach the subject of Louisiana exploration through this early pioneer, Nolan.[6]

So it happened that when in 1803, Jefferson at length began,

5. Gayarré, *History of Louisiana*, III, 183, 407, 408.

6. Wilkinson, *Memoirs II*, App. II, *passim*. Some interesting letters concerning Nolan are printed in *Texas Historical Quarterly*, VII, 308-317.

in a fairly adequate manner, the subject of trans-Mississippi exploration, the outskirts of the great district of Louisiana had been lightly fringed by Spanish, French, and English influences. But of the great interior there existed no definite knowledge; and it was into this interior that he was privileged to send the first expeditions for the scientific exploration of Louisiana—a Louisiana very slightly limited, as we have already stated, by two and a half centuries of ineffectual colonial influence.

The time element of our subject next requires some explanation. What definite period is meant by the term "Early Exploration"? It was not until January, 1803, that a plan for western discovery under government auspices promised any degree of success. It was in July, 1807, that Pike returned from his famous Mexican tour. The intervening three and a half years, then, comprise the period of this study—the period during which Lewis and Clark, Pike, Hunter and Dunbar, Freeman, and Sibley recorded their names in the annals of Louisiana exploration. This was the period not only of "early" exploration, but of the most important work in that field, so far as the government was concerned. With one important exception, it was the only time for two decades after the purchase that the government encouraged direct public exploration at its own expense within its new acquisition. Between 1807 and 1820 practically all western exploration, merely for its own sake, was done by individual scientists or fur traders; and the former were in most cases dependent upon the latter for their opportunities.

Thus the brief period selected for this study embraces nearly all government effort at exploration, before our treaty with Spain gave a definite western limit to our new acquisition. It is needless to say that this fact gives the period a certain additional unity, if such were necessary to justify its selection.

The personal element in this early exploration requires a somewhat detailed treatment. To say that Jefferson's name is indissolubly linked with the Louisiana Purchase is but to repeat a historical truism. His connection with the famous Lewis and Clark expedition is almost equally well known; although the comparatively slight connection in the beginning between this expedition and the Purchase is but just beginning to be poularly understood. Jefferson's connection with Pike's exploits, though

remote, has at least been pointed out by interested students. Very few, even the latter, know of his intimate connection with the explorations of Hunter and Dunbar, of Sibley, and of Freeman, on the Washita and Red Rivers; or of the importance in the President's mind of the work of these men, and of the part their efforts were to play in his far reaching but never realized plan of exploration.

If it is not necessary to give here a detailed summary of Jefferson's connection with Louisiana exploration, it is needful to differentiate the work of the men who, in a partial degree at least, performed this task. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark were engaged to explore a route from the Mississippi to the Pacific coast. All plans were formed and instructions given before the official tidings of the purchase reached Jefferson. Louisiana exploration, as such, formed with them only a secondary task. Dr. John Sibley, of North Carolina, migrated to Louisiana early in 1803, and while the country was still a Spanish possession, made a personal investigation of the Red River as far as the vicinity of Natchitoches, for the purpose of selecting a suitable spot to locate as a ranchman. After the transfer he received an appointment as Surgeon's mate in the army, and later as Indian agent; and as public official, turned into government channels the information he had gained for private ends.

William Dunbar, George Hunter, and Thomas Freeman participated in Jefferson's special plan for the exploration of Louisiana—a plan directly conceived by the President and urged by him and his supporters for the express purpose of learning about our new territorial acquisition. Although this plan was apparently the least successful of all in point of view of actual achievement, yet this is not to be regarded as a reflection upon the originator or his agents. Finally, there are the two expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike, a young lieutenant acting as the agent of the notorious James Wilkinson. The latter as commander in chief of the American army was immediately responsible for Pike's work; but in important details it was in accord with Jefferson's general scheme, and the latter virtually assumed the position as sponsor for it.

Among the important explorers of this period, then, there will be found but three who were directly authorized by the President

for the express purpose of exploring Louisiana, and these three are by no means the leading members of the group. Nevertheless, the efforts of all contributed to the same end, and the aggregate of information acquired was considerable, and at the time, of the utmost importance. It is interesting to see how these expeditions, differing so greatly in plan and in personnel, were all used by Jefferson to serve his particular purpose. It is this genius for the utilization of the efforts of divers men and of differing occasions, for the gathering of scientific grapes from the thorns of apparently fruitless explorations, that constituted the great service of the President, and made both the conception of the plan and its inadequate but well-advertised realization his peculiar work.

Furthermore, each man who was engaged in this task of frontier exploration knew that while actually working in his particular field the President had an intense personal interest in him, and would read with avidity each scrap of information that he furnished. This interest, which never flagged until the published results were given to the world, identified the President with the individual explorer, and in a double measure with the sum total of the exporation for the period.

It was but natural that work undertaken under such varying auspices should fail to produce the thorough results at first expected. Nevertheless, in addition to the geographical and kindred knowledge acquired, in addition to the impression—all too uncertain—made upon the Indians visited, these various expeditions pointed out the three main currents of American migration to the westward. Lewis and Clark may be regarded as the originators of the Missouri-Columbia trail which afterward became the more important Missouri-California pathway. Pike emphasized, although he did not point out, the Santa Fé trail—the second important highway to the far Southwest. The others participated in the opening flow of that human torrent which was later to sweep over Texas; whose first tiny filibustering rivulets were to be dissipated in inhospitable deserts, but whose later currents were to swell to a flood sweeping the whole Southwest irresistibly towards annexation. It was something to have defined these three great currents of western migration, and this was one important accomplishment of early Louisiana exploration.

## CHAPTER II.

## PREPARING TO EXPLORE THE MISSOURI.

Although intimately associated with the Louisiana Purchase, the famous Lewis and Clark Expedition owed its existence to motives of a far different source. Its inception was due to Jefferson's zeal in the pursuit of scientific studies, and its realization to an important change in the Indian trading policy of the national government. Thus science and commerce, philosophical speculation and practical business joined hands in promoting this, the most important and most successful exploration in our country's history.

Jefferson early became interested in the exploration of the northwest coast of America. On December 4, 1783, he wrote to George Rogers Clark,[1] suggesting the overland route from the Mississippi to the Pacific as a field for his ambition, with a view to forestall possible British rivalry. Three years later, while Minister to France, he impressed upon John Ledyard[2] the possibility of opening communication with the Missouri from the Pacific, and that adventurous Connecticut traveler almost spanned the eastern continent before Catharine II. igominiously forced him him to retrace his steps from Kamtchatka. As a member of Washington's cabinet, Jefferson was the official supporter, in behalf of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, of André Michaux's scheme to visit the Missouri and the Oregon (Columbia), and issued instructions to the French botanist[3] that greatly resemble those given ten years later to Lewis. Michaux, however, was turned from his purpose to assist in the intrigues of Genet for the invasion of the Spanish colonies; and with the recall of that French Minister passed to other fields of exploration.

For a decade Jefferson allowed his scheme to slumber, but did not forget it. At last the opportunity came to voice his interest

1. Thwaites, *Rocky Mountain Exploration*, 68.
2. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, I, 94-96.
3. Ford, VI, 158-161.

in the great northwest, in the confidential message of January 18, 1803.[4] The immediate occasion for the expression of his views was the act to continue government trading houses among the Indians. Because of its policy in furnishing goods to the natives at actual cost, the government was supposedly a competitor of private individuals.[5] Jefferson suggested that if Congress voted to continue the policy, the attention of these might profitably be turned to the Missouri, then monopolized by British traders. He diplomatically pointed out that to inaugurate this policy with success, a small force must be sent to make a thorough exploration of the country as far as the Pacific, and to form treaties with the Indian tribes along the route. By utilizing enlisted men an appropriation of $2,500 would cover the expense of the expedition, and the title "An act for the purpose of extending the commerce of the United States" would screen its purpose from public notice. The fact that the nation (Spain) claiming the territory would regard it is a literary pursuit, might save it from her jealousy, even if the decadent state of her interests in that quarter did not render her opinion a matter of indifference.

Congress having authorized the expedition agreeably to Jefferson's wishes, he gratified the boyhood ambition of his private secretary, Meriwether Lewis, by making him its guiding spirit.[6] The months that followed were busy ones for the young explorer. In April[7] he was at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, to superintend the construction of a special iron frame boat and the manufacture of arms for his party; later he went to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and received from Andrew Ellicott, the surveyor of the southern boundary of the United States, special instruction in the handling of astronomical instruments. At the same time he took steps to gather recruits from the various western posts, and to engage a guide in Cincinnati. May and June he passed in Philadelphia, in

---

4. Ford, VII, 192-202.

5. In reality, because of its necessary "cash" policy, the government was almost a negligible factor in the Indian trade.

6. Lewis at the age of 19 had asked for the position planned for Michaux.

7. For the movements of Lewis until he reached camp at Wood River, cf. Coues, *History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition* 1, XXII-XXV, Note 7. Also *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10; Series 2, Vol. 51.

consultation with the eminent physicians, Rush, Barton and Wister (to whom he showed the first draft of his instructions regarding the scientific details of his work), and in collecting maps and other geographical data. The industry and foresight that Lewis displayed in his preparations, and the success that crowned his undertaking, afford abundant justification for the confidence the President reposed in him and for the eulogium he subsequently wrote.[8]

It will be observed that Jefferson proposed this exploration in a message penned before Monroe set sail for Europe to assist Livingston and Pinckney in obtaining the Floridas and the Island of New Orleans—not the whole of Louisiana. Such an extensive purchase was far from the President's view, although Livingston at Paris, at this very time, was suggesting to Talleyrand[9] that France should cede to the United States all that country above the Arkansas River, as a barrier between Louisiana and Canada. The first draft of the instructions to Lewis was composed in April when Monroe had barely reached Paris; and the final copy was signed and delivered to the explorer on June 20, before authentic news of the transfer arrived. Thus in motive and essential preparation the expedition had nothing whatever to do with the Louisiana Purchase.

An expedition so conceived must be managed with considerable secrecy and deception. Not only did the act conveying the appropriation bear a misleading title, in order to avoid public attention (and the "public" referred to the American people as well as to British fur traders); but the prejudices of the Spaniards, the actual possessors of the territory—so far as it was then occupied—were to be met by assurances of the purely "literary" character of the expedition. This "literary" subterfuge apparently satisfied the representative of Great Britain, whose traders were in a position to oppose most successfully the progress of the party up the Missouri, and of Napoleon, then the legal owner of the territory; but it signally failed to quiet the jealous fears of Casa Yrujo, the Spanish Minister at Washington, of Casa Calvo, the boundary

8. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, XXI and XXII.

9. Livingston to Talleyrand, Jan. 10, 1803, *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, II, 531.

commissioner at New Orleans, of Salcedo, the Captain-General of the Internal Provinces, or of the Madrid Government itself.[10] Lewis bore passports from the British and French ministers, but none from the Spanish. It is true this only forced him to pass the winter of 1803-04 upon soil already in our possession, but it boded ill for any other American expedition that should come within striking distance of the tottering but resolute Spanish colonial power.

Lewis parted from Jefferson at Washington on July 5th, just after the news of the transfer of Louisiana arrived. This permitted him to throw off the cloak of deception under which the real purpose of the expedition had been concealed,[11] and to hope for assistance from our new citizens in Louisiana. He now could increase his force above the ten or twelve men first suggested, and could enter openly into trade relations with the Indians; for in the language of the President, "their late fathers, the Spaniards," had "agreed to withdraw all their troops from all the waters in the country of the Mississippi and Missouri and to surrender all subjects, posts and lands." He added that "henceforward we become their fathers and friends, and that we shall endeavor that they shall have no cause to lament the change."[12]

From Washingon Lewis forwarded to his friend, William Clark, the frank offer to share with him the hardships and honors of his journey. With a sense of added importance and responsibility resting upon him as the first official explorer of the new national domain, he passed rapidly over the mountains to Pittsburg, where until the last of August, he alternately persuaded and threatened the drunken and inefficient workmen who delayed the completion of his boat. Evidently disappointed in not receiving Clark's reply here, on the 26th of July, he wrote Jefferson recom-

10. See page 23.

11. Lewis had written of the real object of the expedition under the injunction of secrecy, to a certain John Conner (or Connor) of Cincinnati, who was engaged as a guide, but whose engagement was afterward cancelled. Under Jefferson's advice he generally gave out the idea that he was to explore the upper Mississippi. Wheeler, *The Trail of Lewis and Clark*, I, 32; *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 51, Nos. 97, 104.

12. Jefferson to Lewis, Jan. 22, 1804, quoted in Wheeler, *The Trail of Lewis and Clark*, I, 43, 44.

mending his friend, Lieutenant Hooke, then stationed at Pittsburg, as his colleague, in case Clark should decline.[13] Finally, at seven o'clock on the morning of August 31st, the boat was ready, and by ten the impatient young officer was off, despite advice not to attempt navigation while the river was so low. Before reaching Marietta, September 13th, he was occasionally forced to use horses or oxen to drag his boat over the shoals, and found them "the most efficient sailors in the present state of the navigation of the river." From Cincinnati, on October 3rd, he communicated the pleasing news that Clark had accepted his offer, although his interpreter, Conner, had declined.

While at Cincinnati Lewis was evidently troubled by the fact that Congress was about to assemble in special session, and that he had nothing tangible to show for his busy months of effort. Accordingly he asked Jefferson to authorize him to make a rapid side trip up some river, perhaps the Kansas, and to send Captain Clark elsewhere on a similar excursion. The suggestion reminds one of Dunbar's later proposal, under very similar circumstances.[14] Jefferson, however, was not minded to risk the failure of his long cherished plan by any side issue, and wrote in reply[15] that the single object of Lewis's mission—to find the direct pathway to the Pacific—was "of major importance, and therefore not to be delayed or hazarded by any episodes whatever."

At Louisville Lewis was joined by Clark. The only task now to delay the leaders was the selection of recruits from the volunteers who presented themselves. Such was the high standard insisted upon that this was by no means a speedy task. Finally fourteen soldiers were chosen from the garrisons of Southwest Point, Massac and Kaskaskia, and nine Kentuckians were enrolled as privates and added to the party. By this time the tenth of December had arrived, and the whole force, including Clark's negro servant, went into winter quarters at the mouth of the Du Bois River, opposite St. Louis. Although Louisiana now belonged to the United States, the Spanish military officer at that post had not received official notice of the fact, and refused to

---

13. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, LXX, Note 5.
14. See page 55.
15. Nov. 16, 1803. See page 40.

permit the expedition to enter the territory. Had the explorers been able to follow the original plan to encamp at La Charette, the highest white settlement on the Missouri, they would have been but a few miles farther along on their journey; while by remaining near an army post they could obtain government rations and need not intrench upon their modest approapriation. On the whole, it was well that Lewis did not reach the mouth of the Missouri by August 1st, as he at first expected.

The work before the young officers, as outlined in Jefferson's instructions[16] may be summarized as follows. First, they were to determine the most feasible route, from the Mississippi to the Pacific, by way of the Missouri and some "interlocking" western stream. Their second task, and one of scarcely less importance, was to make and record accurate observations concerning the various Indian tribes along the route, with a view to open up future commercial relations. According to the original plan, this subject of commerce was to be introduced in a sort of clandestine manner, so as to avoid open opposition from possible rivals; but following later instructions [17] they were to require from alien and Indian alike the respect which was due to owners of the soil, and in return to promise friendship and protection. Third, the travellers must take careful observations of the soil, animal life, natural products, and climate of the regions traversed. Fourth, as a sort of indefinite politico-geographical assignment, they were to obtain such knowledge as was possible concerning the Rio Grande and the Colorado, with the distances from the sources of those streams to that of the Missouri; the source of the Mississippi and its position relative to the Lake of the Woods; the path by which the British traders passed from the mouth of the Wisconsin to the Missouri; and the possibility of deflecting the fur trade from Nootka Sound to the head waters of the Missouri. This information would assist the government authorities in determining the limits of their new possession and its relation to contiguous territory.

After the main instructions had been delivered, Jefferson gave

16. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 196 ff.; Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, XXIV-XXXIII.

17. Jefferson to Lewis, Jan. 24, 1804, quoted in Wheeler, *The Trail of Lewis and Clark*, I, 43, 44.

Lewis a most effective Fourth-of-July token in the form of a comprehensive letter of credit, to be used in obtaining subsistence for the party in case it should be desirable and possible to return by sea.[18] As long as the members of the party remained within the reach of the mails these instructions were supplemented by other suggestions as they occurred to the President, or were made necessary by new developments. In this connection it may be well to state that one writer hazards the conjecture[19] that Jefferson designed this expedition to strengthen our claims to Oregon territory. These claims were based upon the discovery of Gray, and it was advisable to learn more of the real character of the region in order to provide for future diplomatic complications. The acquisition of Louisiana not merely lessened the apprehension felt by the principals because of possible interruptions from other powers, but as Jefferson recorded,[20] "increased infinitely the interest we feel in the expedition." By the middle of November Jefferson spoke of this interest as general. When, in the following January, he forwarded to Lewis a map of the Missouri as far as the Mandans, prepared by a certain Welshman named Evans, he added:[21] "The acquisition of the country through which you are to pass has inspired the country generally with a great deal of interest in your enterprise. The inquiries are perpetual as to your progress. The Feds. alone still treat it as a philosophism, and would rejoice at its failure. Their bitterness increases with the diminution of their numbers and despair of a resurrection. I hope you will take care of yourself and be the living witness of their folly." Thus the objects of an almost paternal concern to Jefferson had become figures of interest to the whole country, now that their mission had assumed the proportions of our "national epic of exploration."

18. Wheeler, *The Trail of Lewis and Clark*, I, 41, has a facsimile of this letter. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, II, 720, 721, thinks that Jefferson should have sent a ship to meet the explorers on the Pacific coast, if he really expected this letter to be effective, but that he was fearful of arousing Spanish prejudices by so doing.

19. Wheeler, *Ibid*, 47.

20. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, XXXIV.

21. Coues, *Ibid*, XXIII, note. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, No. 1. Evans was permitted by the Spanish government to explore the Missouri for traces of certain "white" Indians supposed to be of Welsh descent.

Despite the President's confidence in his "literary" subterfuge[22] no passport for Lewis was forthcoming from Casa Yrujo, the Spanish minister. On the contrary, that diplomat and Casa Calvo, the boundary commissioner at New Orleans, immediately advised their home government to take measures to detain the Missouri expedition under "Captain Lewis Merry Whether."[23] Upon receiving these communications Cevallos, the Spanish Secretary of Foreign Affairs, brought the matter before the Junta of Fortifications and Defense of the Indies. The report of that body stated the claim of Spain to both banks of the Missouri and empowered Cevallos to instruct Casa Yrujo to protest against the expedition as an invasion of Spanish territory. Casa Yrujo had already represented the expedition as a violation of the *status quo* in the disputed territory, and reported the fact to Captain-General Salcedo, at Chihuahua.[24] When the Mandan letter of Lewis, together with the accompanying specimens, became known to Casa Calvo at New Orleans, he insisted still more strongly that the expedition should be stopped immediately; but as time wore on and the prospect of successful opposition seemed less likely, he used this fact to justify the passport issued for Dunbar's expedition.[25]

Don Nimecio Salcedo, the Captain-General of the Internal Provinces, needed little urging to take additional precaution against an expedition whose results he already foresaw. On October 2d, 1805, he wrote Iturrigaray,[26] the Viceroy of New Spain, that the Americans were leaving nothing undone to gain the friendship of the Indians, and added:

"I have notice of an American expedition under command of Captain Merri (sic) provisioned and maintained for three years, that is directed up the Missouri upon the pretext of discovering its source, but with the additional object of giving gifts to the Indians."

22. See page 17.

23. Casa Calvo to Cevallos, July 18, 1805. *MSS., New Mexico Archives*, Library of Congress.

24. Resolutions of Junta, Madrid, March 17, 1804 (1805), *New Mexico Archives;* Salcedo to Governor of New Mexico, June 11, 1806, *Ibid;* Casa Yrujo to Madison, March 12, 1805, *MSS. Spanish Notes I*, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State.

25. *New Mexico Archives*, July 18, 1805. Cf. also *Annals 9 Congress*, 2, 1078 ff.

26. Salcedo to Iturrigaray, Oct. 2, 1805. *MSS. Bexar Archives*, see page 7.

A few days later, in writing of Dunbar's proposed expedition, he stated to Casa Calvo[27] that this, in connection with the expedition of "Mr. Merri," would serve to familiarize the people of the United States with the Indians. This fear formed the theme of his later correspondence with the Viceroy, and becoming more impressed with the danger, he issued orders, February 11, 1806, to the Governor of New Mexico[28] to stop the Missouri expedition if it had advanced within the Spanish territory. It was a long reach from New Mexico to the upper waters of the Missouri, and Lewis and Clark never knew what suggestions were being made to thwart their undertaking; but that these utterances of the Captain-General were not pure bombast is shown by the measures that he took to win the Missouri Indians to Spanish allegiance.[29]

27. *Bexar Archives*, Oct. 8, 1805.
28. *New Mexico Archives.*
29. See Chapter VII.

## CHAPTER III.

## LEWIS AND CLARK ON THE MISSOURI.

Meanwhile, despite good and evil reports, the members of the expedition left their camp at the mouth of the Du Bois River, May 14, 1804, and passed up the Missouri, wintering at the Mandan villages near Bismark, North Dakota. Crossing the mountains and descending the Columbia, the party passed the second winter on the Pacific coast. Retracing their steps the following spring and summer, they reached St. Louis September 23, 1806. The details of their daily life, of the unusual harmony between the commanding officers, of the sympathy between the men and leaders, of the divers kinds of life experienced, and of the remarkable success that attended the whole undertaking have already been too well described to need repetition. It is the province of this study merely to emphasize certain political and geographical features of their journey from the Mississippi to the Great Continental Divide which separates the Louisiana of their day from the Oregon of the morrow.

Up to and even above their first wintering place among the Mandans they everywhere encountered traces of recent and of remote French occupation. The name of the last civilized settlement, La Charette,[1] recalled a former régime, even while one of its occupants, Daniel Boone, bespoke an American pioneer movement that had outstripped national possession. Near the middle of June they passed the site of old Ft. Orleans, above the mouth of Wakenda Creek, in the present state of Missouri, and early in the following month a second fort, vestiges of which still remained, near the present site of Ft. Leavenworth.[2] Trading posts, still in

1. Thwaites, *Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, I, 29.

2. Thwaites, *Original Journal Lewis and Clark*, I, 49, 65. The first of these was near the Osage and Missouri Indians and the second near the Kansas. The second was an important center for furs in 1757 and some islands near were utilized for live stock.

use or recently abandoned, were more numerous. On the Neshnabotna a St. Louis merchant, two years before, had a small factory where he carried on an extensive trade with the Ottoes and Pawnees, and below this a few French families had formerly made a temporary settlement. Farther on, just above the Nebraska line, was a post where one of the party (Cruzatte) had spent two years in trade with the Mahas (Omahas). On August 13, near the Omahas, they found the place where, in 1795-96, James Mackay established the trading post to which he gave the name Ft. Charles.[3] A much more pretentious establishment was the combined fort and trading house on Cedar Island, where, during the preceding winter, a certain Loisel (Louiselle) had carried on a trade with the Sioux.[4] In the present Stanley County, North Dakota, they passed the small factory of a certain Jean Vallee.[5] These various establishments clearly showed that the French had laid a thorough foundation for the Missouri fur trade, upon which either an American or British superstructure must be erected.

Aside from these more or less permanent buildings other evidence pointed to a considerable amount of irregular trading and prospecting upon both sides of the Missouri. As early as June 12, they met men with loaded rafts returning from the Sioux, and hired one of them, Durion, a man who had lived among those Indians for twenty years, to accompany them as an emissary.[6] Two days later they met a raft returning from a trading expedition among the Pawnees, and tried without success to hire another man for a similar purpose. On July 9 they passed the place where their bowman, with several Frenchmen, had encamped two years before. On reaching the Platte, they learned that another of their party had wintered up that river. Mackay's presence has already been mentioned. The trader, Vallee, had spent the preceding winter up the Cheyenne, amidst the Black Hills. Their interpreter, Dorion, could give them a fair description of the Yankton. Their engagé secured at the Mandans, Chaboneau, had encamped with a party of natives several days' journey above those Indians; and

3. *Ibid*, I, 65, 72, 78, 99, 109.
4. *Ibid*, I, 160. The island is below White River in Presho Co., S. D.
5. *Ibid*, I, 175, 176.
6. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 21.

one of the party, La Page, with a single companion, had been a few miles farther along the river. Four days before reaching that spot they had overtaken a party of three Frenchmen bound for the Yellowstone. The name "Roche Jaune," Lewis and Clark readily adopted and translated into the English "Yellowstone," thus unconsciously following David Thompson, who had used this name in 1798.[7] This name seems to imply that the French were familiar even with the upper courses of this river; for there is reason to believe that the term is French rather than Indian in its origin.[8] These instances would seem to show that the upper waters of the Missouri and its most important tributaries were already familiar to a few choice but unlettered spirits, who had braved its dangers for one of its most characteristic products. In this sense the Lewis and Clark Expedition, at least within the confines of Louisiana, was not an original exploration.

One of the most important tasks of the young officers was the acquisition of geographical knowledge—not merely as a result of their own personal observation, but also by questioning the traders, hunters, Indians—in short, by insistently interviewing all who would be likely to add to their scant store of knowledge. As already shown in their instructions, they were not to restrict themselves to what Jefferson later regarded as the undoubted limits of Louisiana,[9] but also to extend their inquiries to include the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers. We have already seen the efforts of Lewis, aided by Jefferson, to obtain all available data, in the shape of maps, traders' journals and printed works of travel, and the record of the expedition bears witness to the continuance of this same policy.

On reaching the mouth of the Osage River the travelers devoted their descriptions largely to the Indians of that name, residing upon its banks and upon the Arkansas. In speaking of the Kansas Lewis ventured the assertion that although its course was not well "ascertained," it "heads with the Del Noird in the Black Mountain, or ridge, which divides the waters of the Kansas,

7. Thwaites, *Original Journal Lewis and Clark*, I, 48, 72, 86, 175, 307, 339.

8. Dellenbaugh, *The Breaking of the Wilderness*, 164.

9. For Jefferson's opinion of the limits see Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 249, 261.

Del Noird and Callardo." One of their boatmen had passed a winter on the Platte, and gave them considerable information of the river and some of its tributaries. The halt at the mouth of the river afforded them an opportunity to give a description of the Ottoes, Pawnees, Kiowas and other tribes in the vicinity. Their Sioux interpreter, Durion, told them the principal points of information concerning the Little Sioux and its relation to the Des Moines, near which it rose. When later in the same month they passed the mouth of the Big Sioux, Durion supplied them with similar information concerning that river and its relation to the St. Peters (Minnesota). In passing the mouth of the Yankton they described it briefly from the information furnished by a certain Mr. Gravelines, and spoke of its peculiar position in connection with the St. Peters and the Red River of the North. The trader, Vallee, gave them information of the Cheyenne, and informed them that the Indians along the upper courses of that river were accustomed to steal horses from the Spaniards, who lived a month's journey away.[10]

During their winter at the Mandan villages they took occasion to interview the native French *voyageurs* and British fur traders concerning the surrounding country. The French could tell them of the region as far as the Yellowstone, and the Indians supplemented this information with regard to the upper courses of the river and the mountains in which it rose. The British traders, with whom their relations were for the most part very friendly, told them of the country occupied by their posts on the Assiniboin and of the region between the Missouri and the upper Mississippi. One of the British traders recorded the fact that the Americans found all the observations of their explorer, Thompson, inaccurate. He further gave the interesting boundary claim made by the Americans of a line due west from the Lake of the Woods till it struck the River Qui Appelle (Marias, or Milk River?), a tributary of the Missouri, and thence to the Pacific. They claimed that a due west line would not strike the the Mississippi, and accordingly this should be drawn to reach one of its tributaries,[11] in this case a tributary of the Missouri.

10. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, I. 37, 60, 86, 103, 115, 175, 176.

11. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, I, 238, 246, note.

Above the Mandans this secondary information became more scant, and likewise of less importance. Several of the northern tributaries they erroneously supposed to rise above the forty-ninth parallel, in the vicinity of the Saskatchewan. The statement is usually made that they first gave the Yellowstone its English name, but this honor, it seems, belongs properly to David Thompson. They recorded their belief that this river rose near the Missouri, Platte, and in all probability some branch of the Columbia. They spoke of some of its tributaries, and recommended the establishment of a post at its mouth. On June 3 they reached the mouth of Marias River. Lewis believed that this river, named for his cousin, was destined to become an object of contention in the adjustment of the northwestern boundary, because it flowed through a fertile country and one in which Great Britain enjoyed a monopoly of the fur trade. This river bore more than a sentimental and political interest to the members of the party, for they spent several days in exploring the vicinity, to determine whether it were the main fork of the Missouri. Fortunately for the success of the expedition, the leaders came to a decision that it was not.[12]

The explorers, from the report of former travelers and of their hunter, Le Page, recorded their impressions of the Black Hills, which they regarded as forming a ridge from the source of the Arkansas to the Saskatchewan. Lewis criticized the map of Arrowsmith, which represented the Missouri as entering the Rockies south of the forty-fifth parallel. In the vicinity of the falls of the Missouri they were detained several days in the construction of boats, and accordingly prepared a fairly elaborate description of this natural curiosity. Passing up the principal of the three forks of the Missouri, they soon reached the head of navigation. Crossing the great divide, Lewis, among the Shoshones, discovered horses bearing Spanish brands, thus revealing communication with the people from the far south. Upon the Lemhi River, Lewis, in addition, received information from the Shoshones that certain of the southern branches of the Columbia headed with the River of the Apostles and the Colorado, and thus

12. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, I, 328, 329, 339, 363; II, 81, 113.

afforded a way of communication to the Vermilion Sea (Gulf of California); but this was regarded as too far south for their purpose. The Indians also said that they could pass in ten days, by way of the Yellowstone, to the Spaniards, with whom the natives did not seem to be on good terms, because those people would not furnish them with fire-arms.[13]

Beyond the mountains, however, there is little in their discoveries of direct concern, aside from their unfortunate theory regarding the source of the Multonomah (the lower Willamette). They believed this to rise somewhere near the headwaters of the Rio Grande and Missouri, and decades passed before this idea was dissipated.[14] Upon their return from the Pacific the expedition temporarily divided to permit Lewis to examine Marias River and Clark to traverse part of the Yellowstone, and thus they obtained some additional information concerning these rivers, although not so complete as they desired.

In the accomplishment of their second important task—the opening of relations with the Indian tribes along their route—Lewis and Clark may be regarded as reasonably successful, especially in view of their relatively small equipment, which was little likely to command the respect of savage minds. On August 3 they held their first conference at the mouth of the Platte with some representatives of the Ottoes and Missouris. These received in a becoming manner the speech of the youthful leaders, announcing the change in government, accepted gratefully the trifling presents given, requested traders to be sent to them, and asked for mediation between themselves and the Mahas. From this incident the spot took the name of Council Bluff.[15] During the last days of the month, through the efforts of their interpreter, Durion, they held important conferences with the Yankton Sioux. Late in

13. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, II, 67, 132, 147-226. One is tempted to speculate on the way history might have been changed had Lewis attempted this southern route.

14. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, III, 976; Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, IV, 233, 239, 240, 308, 339; V, 320; Gass, *A Journal of the Voyages and Travels of a Corps of Discovery*, 194. This idea was not dissipated till the publication of Gallatin's *Synopsis of the Indian Tribes of North America*, in 1836. See Chittenden, *The History of the American Fur Trade*, I, 307.

15. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 64; Wheeler, *Trail of Lewis and Clark*, I, 156-158. This was not the site of the present city.

September they had a conference with the Teton Sioux, the "pirates of the river," and came very near a hostile clash, before they were permitted to proceed. Upon the Arikara Indians the notables of the party, especially Clark's servant, York, made a very favorable impression, which led one of their chiefs to visit Washington the following year. Their winter-long sojourn among the Mandans gave them an opportunity to make a lasting impression, despite the clearly-felt but unexpressed hostility of British fur traders.[16] From Ft. Mandan as a center both explorers, but chiefly Lewis, despite the almost insuperable difficulties of interpretation, made use of the winter months to extend diplomatic relations among the Indians whom they visited or who visited them. Although uniformly successful in making a strong impression upon those who met them, and in some cases securing an influence as arbiters in intertribal disputes, an English trader, Henry, later reported that some of the neighboring Indians were disgusted at the high-sounding and patronizing language used by the American captains in their "big talks."[17]

From the Mandan villages to the Rockies they encountered no Indians, except the Minnatarees, already met, and beyond the mountains the fortunate relationship of Sacajawea, the "Bird Woman," to the Shoshone chief, enabled them successfully to accomplish their journey to the Pacific.[18]

Upon their return, Lewis, along Marias River, had that unfortunate encounter with the Blackfeet, when occurred the only shedding of blood by the members of the party. On this occasion the Indians were clearly the aggressors, and retreated as rapidly as did Lewis and the small band with him, and their tribe treasured up little resentment against the Americans, until the latter allied themselves with their enemies, the Crows. Upon their return to the Mandan villages, Lewis and Clark found the Mandans and the Sioux again at war, and with the utmost difficulty persuaded one

16. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, I, 129-31, 164 ff, 183, 184, 288 ff. The explorers had previously given them a corn mill which the natives received with pleasure, but afterwards demolished to barb their arrows. Thwaites, I, 211; Coues, *Journals of Alexander Henry*, I, 329.

17. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, II, 213, 223, 229; Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, III, 1192; Coues, *The Journals of Alexander Henry*, I, 350.

18. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, II, 350-362.

of the chiefs, Big White, with his family, to accompany them on a visit to Washington. Although this was in keeping with Jefferson's instructions, the chief became an elephant on the hands of the government officials, before they succeeded in returning him to his home through the hostile Sioux and the Arikaras.[19]

When the American party reached the Mandans they found there an Irish free-lance trader, then in the employ of the North-West Company, and by him sent a letter, dated October 31, 1804,[20] to Charles Chabouillez, the company's factor upon the Assiniboin River. This letter mentioned the desire of the American officers to live upon terms of amity with all traders, and enclosing a copy of the passport from the British minister, diplomatically extended their protection to all well-disposed individuals. They also requested a mutual exchange of geographical information. Late in November the Indians told them that a party of seven traders had lately arrived at the villages, and that one of their interpreters, La France, spoke slightingly of the Americans. Lewis and Clark immediately informed the Indians that they could no longer receive such "simbles" as medals and flags from others than Americans, without displeasing their new father at Washington: and later when the leaders of the party, Larocque and McKenzie, called upon the American officers, the latter complained of the conduct of the British interpreter and spoke of the unfavorable results which might follow, if such actions did not cease. Larocque, who had neither medals nor flags, readily heeded these warnings, and declared that his party had no intention of tampering with the natives. One other incident of like nature was later reported of a Hudson's Bay Company agent, located at a post some ninety miles away.[21]

In general, the decisive stand taken by the young explorers seems to have aroused the respect of the British traders. The above party remained in the vicinity for several weeks, and their relations with the Americans became so cordial that Larocque finally proposed to accompany them when they moved westward.

---

19. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, III, 1097-1107; 1183-85. Chittenden, *Hist. of American Fur Trade*, I, 119, 139, 714. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, V, 205 ff., Ch. XXXII, *passim*.

20. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 187, 88 gives the letter in full.

21. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 227, 228, 248.

For obvious reasons, the Americans declined this proposal. Larocque believed that the Americans had made a good impression upon the Mandans and the neighboring tribes, but McKenzie believed the Indians far from truthful, and mentioned that they were especially mystified at the attempt of the Americans to record their vocabularies. Larocque thought that both Americans were pleased to receive their visits, although Clark was more affable and displayed none of the inveterate prejudice against the British which Lewis could not wholly conceal.[22]

On December 1st they were visited by a Mr. Henderson, a representative of the Hudson's Bay Company, bound for the Minnetarees. Later in the same month Chabouillez sent by a certain Hugh Henney, his reply to Lewis and Clark's communication, offering to show the travelers every courtesy in his power. Henney gave them much useful geographical information; but Corporal Gass recorded what was doubtless the well-founded suspicion of the whole party, that these visits were simply to satisfy their curiosity regarding the Americans, and to spy out their dealings with the Indians.[23] At any rate, the leaders discovered toward the close of the winter that some one, possibly of the Hudson's Bay Company, had been tampering with their interpreter, Chaboneau, the husband of the "Bird Woman." A little plain-speaking and a few days for reflection cured the recalcitrant.[24] The Americans also received notice that a certain Murdock Cameron, a British trader on the St. Peters (Minnesota) was selling liquor to the Indians of that vicinity, stirring up the Sioux against the Chippewas, and endeavoring by his influence to break up the Missouri fur trade, in favor of the establishments on the St. Peters.[25] The incident simply illustrates one of the results of an unscrupulous trading policy, but unfortunately neither the small

---

22. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour. Lewis and Clark*, 227, 252, 277, note.

23. *Ibid*, I, 206, 207. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 212, note 37. On his return journey Clark tried to enlist Henney's services to induce some of the Sioux to visit Washington and even hinted at a possible appointment as Indian agent. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, V, 282-286.

24. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour. Lewis and Clark*, I, 271, 275. Wheeler, *Trail of Lewis and Clark*, I, 256.

25. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 239. *Expeditions of Pike*, I, 66. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, V, 286.

force with Lewis and Clark, nor any other sent out by the government for many years to come, was able to deal effectually with the problem.

In general, one may say that Lewis and Clark were fairly successful in their double task of inducing the Indians to recognize nominally the new sovereignty now placed over them and of leading the British representatives of that section to respect this new arrangement. Of course, a mere idle assertion of an authority, unsupported by other supplementary steps, would be as vain as the previous Spanish expeditions through portions of Louisiana. For some years the policy of the United States government in following up the work of Lewis and Clark was almost as nerveless as that of the vice-regal court of New Spain; but, fortunately, our government had in its unofficial service a class of citizens that New Spain lacked after the age of the *Conquistadores*. The years immediately following 1806 belong especially to this class, of whom the most typical representatives were found among the Missouri fur traders.

The explorers had met with a few of these on their way up the river, but their number seemed more than doubled as they passed down. Some distance above the Mandans, they met with two Illinois traders bound for the Yellowstone, and their man Colter joined them.[26] On September 3, above the Big Sioux River, they met with a Mr. James Aird, of a Prairie du Chien trading house, who bore a license to trade with the Sioux. Mr. Aird very handsomely told them the latest news and presented them with tobacco and flour—both very acceptable gifts.[27] Near the Little Sioux they met a boat belonging to Auguste Chouteau, from which they obtained another desired article, whiskey—the first since July 4, 1805. This boat was bound for the Yankton River. Below the Nemaha, on September 10, they fell in with two boats, one with four men bound for the Pawnee Loups on the Platte, and the other with seven men bound for the Mahas. From the latter they first learned of Pike's expedition to the southwest.[28] Two days later

26. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, V, 329, 341, note.

27. For the meeting with these and the following trading parties, see Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, III, 1202-1213; Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, V, 337-395.

28. See Chapter XII.

they met with a second boat belonging to Auguste Chouteau, likewise bound for the Platte, and another bound for the Mahas. Later the same day they met a Captain Robert McClellan, who had with him two interpreters employed by Lewis and Clark at the Mandans. One of these, Gravelines, had been sent the preceding year to accompany the Arikara chief to Washington. Unfortunately the chief had died, and now Gravelines, with Captain McClellan and Durion, already familiar for his services in 1804 among the Sioux,[29] was returning to the Arikaras with a speech and presents from the President. He was also to attempt to introduce agriculture among the Sioux and to get some to visit Washington.

Just below the old Kansas villages they met three more trading boats bound for the Yanktons and Mahas; and on the 16th of September two more bound to the Mahas and Pawnees. The second of these parties bore a suspiciously loose license, and Clark was for a time inclined to take its members into custody, but finally let them go after warning them "not to degrade the American character in the eyes of the Indians." Above the Grand River they met with Captain John McClellan, of the United States Army, who was on the way to open up a new trade with the Indians. He planned to establish himself on the Platte, and after entering into trading relations with the Ottoes, Pawnees and Comanches, to persuade some of the chiefs to accompany him to Santa Fe, where he hoped to open up a lucrative trade with the Spaniards. If he secured the desired permission to trade, he wished to transport his goods from the banks of the Platte to some point in Louisiana convenient for resort for the New Mexican merchants,[30] and then effect the necessary exchange. Even at La Charette they met with two of Aird's Canadian employees, who were about to set out for the Osages and Ottoes. This continuous procession of traffic met by the returning expedition formed, in the words of a recent writer,[31] "one of the most deeply significant circumstances in the whole narrative." "It showed which way the 'course of empire' was already taking—that way which Lewis and Clark had been, first of all our countrymen."

---

29. See page 26, 28, 30.

30. McClellan seems to have tried to gain the good will of the Lewis and Clark party, for in the language of Gass he "gave all our party as much whiskey as they could drink." This plan of McClellan's was supported by Wilkinson, for the Captain bore from him an introductory speech to the Pawnees and Ottoes. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour.*, V, 387.

31. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, III, 1206, note 8.

## CHAPTER IV.

### JEFFERSON'S PLAN FOR EXPLORING LOUISIANA.

Early in July, 1803, Jefferson received definite news of the Purchase of Louisiana, and immediately began the process of collecting information relating to this almost unknown territory. As the first step, he submitted a list of seventeen questions to Daniel Clark, our consul at New Orleans; to William Dunbar, the scientist of Mississippi, and to William Charles Coles Claiborne, the youthful governor of that territory. Of these questions, four related to maps of Louisiana, its boundaries, and the distance from the mouth of the Mississippi to various points to the westward.[1] The resulting correspondence with the above gentlemen summarizes in a fairly complete fashion existing public knowledge in the southwest concerning Louisiana.[2]

Jefferson's query regarding maps of Louisiana failed to elicit anything definite. Claiborne, who was a comparative stranger in the Southwest, wrote that he believed there were no maps extant that could be depended upon. He had been told that there were two partial maps of the country prepared by Romans and by Gould,[3] and that the former was the better. Of this he hoped to obtain a copy. He was also informed that Spanish officers had taken a number of partial but accurate sketches of the country, but their government had prevented the publication of these. When the French possessed the territory they undertook a general geographical survey, but never completed it. "An ingenious correspondent" of Claiborne's (Dr. John Sibley) was just completing

---

1. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 253, 254.

2. These letters are in *Claiborne's Correspondence* (MSS.), Vol. I, and Vol. IV, Bureau of Rolls and Library, State Department, and *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 17, No. 38; Vol. 76, No. 5.

3. Gould, George, *A General Description of the Sea Coast, Harbors, Lakes, Rivers, etc., of the Province of West Florida*, 1776. MSS., Library of the American Philosophical Society, Phila. Romans, Bernard, *A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida, etc.*, New York, 1775.

an accurate map of the country between the Mississippi and the Rio Grande, and he hoped soon to be able to forward this, together with a copy of Romans's.

Clark wrote with much greater definiteness regarding the cartography of Louisiana. He knew of no exact maps of the western part of the province, for such as were extant depended upon ideas derived from the period of French occupancy. With regard to the portion east of the Mississippi, he referred the President to Andrew Ellicott, the former surveyor of the Southern Boundary, whom Clark had supplied, when in New Orleans, with the best manuscript maps. Moreover Ellicott had personally surveyed portions of the Floridas, and the Mississippi from the mouth of the Ohio. Thomas Hutchins[4] had also published a map of the same region. One of the best maps of the Gulf coast, although on too small a scale, was that of Don Juan de Langara, published in 1799.[5] None of the published maps gave a correct idea of the coast between the Mississippi and the Sabine. Clark referred to excellent maps of Mobile and of the Missouri region which he had already forwarded to the State Department, and supplemented his remarks by a sketch prepared at his request. His report upon the point of cartography was so satisfactory that Dunbar forbore to do more than add a brief comment.

The remaining one to direct Jefferson's attention to the lack of definite information concerning his new purchase, was an interesting character, resembling those often forging to the front amidst pioneer conditions. Dr. John Sibley,[6] a veteran of the Revolutionary War, had been forced by domestic difficulties to migrate from Massachusetts to Fayetteville, North Carolina. Here it was reported that he attempted to remarry—at any rate, it became desirable to move again, this time to Louisiana, then under Spanish domination. He arrived in the country in March, 1803,

4. Hutchins, Thomas, *Historical, Narrative, and Topographical Description of Louisiana and West Florida*, Phila., 1784.

5. This map gave the Sabine as the boundary between Louisiana and Texas. Talamantes criticised this as "purely a maratime map and prepared at a time when the question of limits was of no interest." *Historia*, 43, *Opusculo*, I, Par. 71, *Archivo General*, Mexico.

6. The facts concerning Sibley are found in *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 1, Vol. 10; Ser. 2, Vols. 17, 19, 76.

and on his way formed the acquaintance of Claiborne, upon whom he seems to have made a good impression. The Governor began a correspondence with him regarding the information Jefferson desired. The communications between the two aroused the suspicion of a local Spanish commandant, Vidal by name, who reported Sibley to the Governor-General as a dangerous character. This fact caused Claiborne to doubt if Sibley at this crisis could be of any assistance to him or to the President. Finally, by careful questioning and working at night, the Doctor succeeded in completing his sketch, and in sending it, with many admonitions regarding secrecy, to Claiborne. Sibley had no previous map to guide him, but in his sketch, which he considered fairly accurate, he represented the principal rivers between the Mississippi and the Rio Grande, with some description of the course of each and of the surrounding country. The Red he described in some detail, especially the soil and productions of its lower course, and dwelt upon the importance of Natchitoches as the gateway to the Mexican provinces. This part of his description was largely overdrawn, and many of his geographical statements were incorrect; but the letter, as a whole, evidently won for Sibley the favorable regard of the Jeffersonian administration.

What was true concerning the cartographical knowledge of Louisiana as a whole was equally true of the more precise questions of distances and of limits. Claiborne and Sibley were inclined to acquiesce in the administration position that West Florida was included in the purchase. Dunbar and Clark unquestioningly accepted the later Spanish position that it was not. With reference to the western boundary none of the four reported in favor of a claim west of the Sabine; while Clark expressly scouted the idea of any such based upon La Salle's settlement. He wrote at length of the former Franco-Spanish line at the Arroyo Hondo, between Natchitoches and the Sabine. In the latter feature Dunbar supported his position. Above the Sabine Clark mentioned certain early French establishments on the Missouri, and emphasized the fact that the Nootka Sound episode had resulted in a definite division point on the Pacific. Dunbar wrote of an uncertain line from the Sabine to the mountains, dividing the eastern waters from those of the west, and Sibley vaguely suggested the same thing. None of them proposed a definite line in

the west, while Dunbar even expected a transfer to Spain of the territory west of the Mississippi, in exchange for the Floridas.

It will readily be perceived that from a geographical standpoint the information furnished by these gentlemen, though practically all obtainable, was pitifully meagre. It is not surprising, therefore, that in his report of November 14, 1803,[7] upon our new territorial acquisition, Jefferson said very little concerning boundaries or allied topics. Another reason for the President's silence may have been the fact that the information received was almost entirely opposed to his own opinion—an opinion derived from an examination carried on in his library at Monticello.[8] Their reports, moreover, supported Ellicott's view, as expressed in the preface of his *Journal*[9] published during this year, that West Florida was not included in Louisiana.

Jefferson evidently formulated plans to explore Louisiana, *as a territorial acquisition,* almost as soon as he began to gather the scant information concerning it. On August 11, 1803, he wrote to one of the government surveyors, Isaac Briggs,[10] that "Congress would probably authorize the exploration of the principal streams of the Mississippi and Missouri," and an accurate determination "of given points in the highlands inclosing the waters of those rivers, which highlands constitute the exterior boundary of the acquisition." When he received the information summarized above, he probably already realized the truth of Clark's suggestion that the boundary question with Spain was not one for geographical determination, but for diplomatic discussion and mutual compromise. In such a discussion our government would be greatly handicapped by its lack of accurate knowledge, while Spain had an unlimited store of documentary material at its disposal.[11] It was

7. *Annals 8 Cong.*, 2, 1498 ff.

8. *The Limits and Bounds of Louisiana,* a memoir published in *Documents Relating to the Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana,* Boston, Houghton, Miflin & Co., 1904.

9. Andrew Ellicott, *Journal * * * of late Commission on behalf of the U. S., etc.*, Phila., 1803.

10. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 1, Vol. 9, No. 121.

11. That the Spanish government possessed such material, even if its representatives made little use of it in the succeeding negotiations, is abundantly shown by the vast documentary treasures of the Mexican Archives, just beginning to be exploited. Cf. *Texas Historical Quarterly*, VI, 103-112; VII, 196-213.

hardly to be expected that Jefferson would enter upon such a negotiation blindly, and accordingly he determined upon a more thorough exploration of our new western frontier.

Jefferson's plan for the exploration of Louisiana, and the distinction which he wished to preserve between the expedition of Lewis and Clark and those he now had in mind, is best shown in his letter of November 16, 1803, to Meriwether Lewis.[12]

"The object of your mission is single, the direct water communication from sea to sea formed by the bed of the Missouri, and perhaps the Oregon. I have proposed in conversation, and it seems generally assented to, that Congress appropriate ten to twelve thousand dollars for exploring the principal waters of the Mississippi and Missouri. In that case I should send a party up the Red River to its head then to cross over to the head of the Arkansas and come down that. A second party for the Panis and Padouca, and a third perhaps for the Morsigona and St. Peters (13). This [exploration] will be attempted distinctly from your mission which we consider of major importance and therefor not to be delayed or hazarded by any episodes whatever."

In a letter to Dunbar[14] he elaborated the details of his plan. The surveyor general for the district north of the Ohio was to be authorized to explore the upper Mississippi. Upon obtaining the probable authorization of Congress he proposed to send an expedition up the Panis and down the Padoucas, exploring the entire course of both rivers, and another for the Arkansas and the Red. Each party was to take careful astronomical observations at the source of each river explored, and from the data thus secured it would be possible to construct a skeleton map of Louisiana, which in contour and main features would be perfectly correct, and whose details could be filled in at leisure. For information of the country north of the Missouri, upon which stream Lewis and Clark were about to embark, he expected to depend upon British fur traders and explorers.

The result of Jefferson's quiet personal work among the mem-

---

12. Jefferson, *Works*, Memorial Edition, X, 431 ff.

13. Jeffery's "*American Atlas*" (London, 1776), shows these last four rivers with somewhat modified spelling. Their equivalents are as follows: "Panis" = "Platte"; "Morsigona" (Moingona) = "Des Moines"; "Padouca" (Padoucas. Radoncas)="Kansas"; "St. Peters" ="Minnesota". The name "Padoucas" also given to north fork of the Platte. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 60.

14. Washington (Editor), *Writings of Jefferson*, IV, 539.

bers of the Eighth Congress appeared in a report, dated March 8, 1804, from the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures.[15] After hazarding a surmise that the new territory extended to the Pacific, the report touched upon previous explorations of the Mississippi and of the Gulf Coast by Hutchins and Ellicott, mentioned the plans for penetrating the upper Mississippi and Missouri, and closed by advocating the Red and the Arkansas as affording the next most favorable field for exploration. For this purpose the government should utilize the services of private individuals wherever possible, and in addition should grant an appropriation to supplement such efforts.

A few days later Jefferson wrote Dunbar[16] of his plan, and asked him to direct the expedition up the Red and Arkansas, in case Congress authorized the required appropriation. The preparations for the expedition were to be made at New Orleans and Natchez, and the collector of customs at the former place would honor all drafts for this purpose. The instructions to the leader were to be similar to those issued to Lewis and Clark, with such additional suggestions as Dunbar should think necessary to add. "Still, this is a matter of speculation," added the President warningly, for Congress was hastening matters to bring its session to a close, "and in that case all I have said will be as if I had not said it." The action of this legislative body was but partially favorable, for its hurried appropriation was only $3,000, barely sufficient for one party. This Jefferson determined to send upon the more interesting of his two proposed explorations; and without waiting for Dunbar's acceptance, he again wrote,[17] asking him to superintend the expedition up the Red and Arkansas, and to select its leader. For this position he suggested a Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, or a Mr. Gillespie, of North Carolina, both of whom had served under Ellicott. He mentioned the fact that a George Hunter, of Philadelphia, would accompany the expedition. Doctor Hunter's "fort," the President wrote, "is chemistry, and in the practical part of that science he is supposed to have no equal in the United States." He warned Dunbar that Hunter might

15. *Annals 8 Congress*, I, 1124-1126.
16. Washington (Editor), *Works of Jefferson*, IV, 539.
17. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 60.

attempt to turn the expedition into a prospecting tour for gold and silver mines, and that the Doctor must not be allowed thus to defeat the main purpose of the expedition.

In his replies of May 15 and June 1 Dunbar[18] tempered his expression of gratification over the fact that Congress had authorized the expedition, by wishing that that body had displayed more liberality. The House Committee in its report had seemed to take it for granted that scientific men would be led by patriotism to undertake this work of exploration. While many might be influenced by such a motive, yet in the case of a talented man of limited means, it would be at the expense of precious time; and when a great empire spoke of compensation it should be adequate to the importance of the task. It would be difficult to find the proper man in the vicinity of Natchez. Of the two men mentioned by Jefferson, Gillespie was the better educated, while Walker, then serving in the Spanish army, possessed the greater natural talent; but neither had any particular qualification for the work aside from a knowledge of surveying. He believed they must choose a man possessing the requisite geographical knowledge and that they might consider themselves fortunate if he knew anything of natural history, botany, or mineralogy. If a man of "only moderate talents" was needed, he suggested that Doctor Hunter should command the expedition.

The instructions[19] for the director of the expedition, who was to act under Dunbar's orders, accompanied the President's letter of April 13, 1804. In general they followed closely those previously issued to Meriwether Lewis. From Natchez, the point of departure, the leader was to conduct the party to the remotest source of the Red River, and thence to the highlands dividing the waters of this stream from those of the Bravo (Rio Grande) and the Pacific. After making a careful exploration of these highlands, he was to descend the Arkansas, noting upon this river, as upon the former, the important natural features and taking numerous astronomical observations. With regard to the Indians, he was to tell them, in accordance with the later instructions to Lewis, that the Spaniards had agreed to withdraw all their troops "from

18. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 28, Nos. 62 and 63.
19. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 59.

the Mississippi and Missouri and from all countries watered by any rivers running into them."[20] Thus he would emphasize the Jeffersonian idea of the extent of Louisiana. In view of the prospective withdrawal of these garrisons and the change in allegiance of subjects residing upon these tributaries, they were to suggest the advantage of trade relations with the United States and to confer upon the establishment of trading posts. In connection with his suggestions upon relations with "those people," he warns the leader of the party not to persevere in his exploration, if threatened by a superior force, "authorized or not authorized by a nation." The lives of the members of the expedition were too valuable to be exposed to probable destruction, and with the loss of the party would follow the loss of all results from the expedition. The fact that this warning, as in the case of the instructions to Lewis, follows the paragraphs devoted to the Indians, seems to imply that the President anticipated the use of this alternative only as a result of savage opposition. Yet as a matter of fact it was only used in yielding to the Spaniards.[21] It was probably an expedient of Jeffersonian diplomacy to avoid direct mention of possible Spanish opposition.

Meanwhile, during the month of May, 1804, Dr. George Hunter, acting under the instructions of the Secretary of War, had busied himself in Philadelphia in the purchase of provisions, Indian presents, medicines and instruments for the proposed expedition up the Red River.[22] On the 27th of May, the Doctor and his son set out on horseback for the overland journey to Pittsburg. After eight days they arrived at the latter place, where, with better success than Lewis had the previous year, they spent only two weeks in superintending the construction of a flat-bottomed boat

---

20. In view of developments during the Freeman expedition (see Chap. IX) this statement would hardly arouse additional respect for American authority.

21. See Chapter IX.

22. For his movements until the expedition started from Natchez, the 16th of the following October, my authority is the *Manuscript Journal of George Hunter up the Red and Washita River with Wm. Dunbar, 1804, by order U. S. and up to Hot Springs.* This manuscript is in the possession of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, where, through the courtesy of Dr. I. Minis Hays, I was permitted to examine it.

to convey themselves and stores to Natchez. The details of their journey to the latter town furnish a most interesting picture of pioneer travel upon the Ohio and Mississippi, but are not directly connected with our subject, and so may be omitted. The Doctor records, "with a feeling of relief," that on the 24th day of July they made fast to the shore at Natchez.

Although Hunter had consumed nearly two months on the trip from Philadelphia, he speedily learned from Mr. Dunbar that no preparations had been made for the expedition. Lieut. Col. Constant Freeman, the commandant of the garrison at New Orleans, was to furnish the boat and military escort, but had deferred all measures until Hunter's arrival. Dunbar suggested that the Doctor should proceed with his boat to New Orleans, and if no better one could be procured, have some alterations made in it, buy the necessary stores, and return as soon as possible with the military escort. Accordingly Hunter was obliged to spend the next two months in the trip to New Orleans and return, and in repairing his boat, which, although constructed for use on a large river, was the only one procurable, and must perforce serve for the navigation of the smaller streams that they planned to explore. With a far from efficient crew, composed of a sergeant and twelve enlisted men from the New Orleans garrison, and with his makeshift boat, Hunter, in the latter part of September, again reached the proposed starting point of the expedition, St. Catherine's Landing, just below Natchez. In general, one gains the impression from the pages of the Doctor's journal that only a very moderate degree of alacrity was displayed in following out the details of the President's plan.

During Hunter's stay in New Orleans there had been an entire change in the plan itself. On the 17th of July Jefferson wrote Dunbar[23] that on account of the defection, two years before, to the Arkansas of a part of the Little Osage Indians the expedition was to be postponed until the following spring. The significance of this Indian movement had but just been explained to the President by Pierre Chouteau, then on a visit to Washington with White Hairs, the noted Osage chief, and some of his companions. Chouteau was to visit the Indians during the winter and endeavor

23. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 124.

to heal the schism, so that the Indians might not merely refrain from hindering but even actively aid the expedition. "In the meantime," added the President, "we shall be able to remove the Spanish impediments." Dunbar, however, was authorized to make use of the men and stores for a shorter excursion; while as a result of the delay he could select a fully qualified leader. The President also suggested that Dunbar should try to forward the account of this preliminary trip in time for effective use with Congress.

In his reply[24] Dunbar announced that the expedition had fortunately not started, that no geographer had been engaged, and that no one, unless it were Doctor Hunter, could feel disappointed because of the postponement. He and the Doctor together would visit the Hot Springs at the headwaters of the Washita. This was a region of great natural interest, which the main party in the spring would be unable to visit, and he would doubtless obtain much available information from the hunters who lived at the post on the Washita. He added another reason for postponing the main expedition in the fact that the Spaniards would probably have stopped it a little above "Nakitosh." As Don Nimecio Salcedo, the Captain-General of the Internal Provinces of New Spain, had, in the preceding May, issued orders from Chihuahua[25] that no American should be permitted to approach the Texas frontier, or to mark the boundaries of Louisiana, Dunbar's surmise appears to be well founded. The Washita offered the advantage of having its head waters protected from incursions of the predatory Osages by a group of rough elevated hills, and it was likewise remote from the Spanish outposts. While not so important as either the Red or the Arkansas, the river promised to support a large future population, whose pioneer elements were already settling upon its banks, and its exploration was necessary to complete the chart of our new territorial acquisition. These considerations to a certain extent compensated for the postponement of Jefferson's more comprehensive plan of frontier exploration.

24. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 28, No. 64.
25. Salcedo to Governor of Texas, May 3, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*


FREEMAN STOPPED HERE.
CONCHO PATH
DIVIDING LINE OF LOUISIANA TERRITORY
WASHITA RIVER
FORT MIRO
NATCHEZ
FORT ADAMS
NACOGDOCHES
ROAD FROM NATCHITOCHES TO THE INTERIOR PROVINCES
SABINE RIVER

## CHAPTER V.

## THE HUNTER-DUNBAR EXPEDITION UP THE WASHITA.

The route of the Hunter-Dunbar expedition was so prudently chosen that no untoward event occurred to render it memorable. On the afternoon of October 16, 1804, the start was finally made from St. Catherine's Landing, near Dunbar's plantation, "The Forest." The *personnel* of the party consisted of Sir William Dunbar, George Hunter and his son, a sergeant and twelve enlisted men, and Dunbar's negro servant. The route covered the distance to the mouth of the Red River, up that stream to the Black or Washita,[1] to the Hot Springs near the source of the latter, and thence the return by the same streams—the whole occupying some four months Naturally the major part of the details of such an expedition consists of scientific descriptions of the country traversed and the trivial incidents of life in the wilderness. Except as tending to throw light upon the general methods of frontier exploration, these details are now relatively unimportant. Yet their observations upon the contemporary life encountered along the river banks and such experience as they gained for the use of succeeding expeditions more than repaid the cost of the attempt.[2]

1. The journals describe the Black as flowing into the Red, and the Washita into the Black.

2. At this point it may be well to indicate the sources for information concerning this expedition. In addition to the manuscript journal of Dr. George Hunter, mentioned above, Mr. Dunbar kept a separate journal which was published by Houghton, Miflin & Co., 1904, under the title, "*Documents Relating to the Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana. The Exploration of the Red, the Black, and the Washita Rivers*", by William Dunbar. A summary evidently based largely upon Dunbar's journal, was published in *Annals*, 9 Congress, 1110 ff. If one should attempt a brief characterization of the two journals he would probably say that Dunbar's is the more scientific, but Hunter's the more readable. As a picture of frontier life at the opening of the nineteenth century the latter well merits publication. A legend on the title page of the Hunter Journal says that an abstract of it was published by order of the United States Government, but this evidently refers to the summary mentioned above. The legend further states that this abstract was also published as an appendix to one of the volumes of Brown's Literary Magazine, of Philadelphia. From the incomplete copy in the library of the Pennsylvania Historical Society the writer judges this to be a reprint of the same government publication.

The population along the river was a never-failing source of interest, especially to Dr. Hunter. The greater part consisted of Canadian French "of few wants and as little industry." There were a number of Spanish and French Creole families, apparently of the same general character as the Canadians, but interspersed with them were a few of a higher order of industry and intelligence. Mingled with the elements surviving from the previous régime were a few German, Irish, and American settlers of the frontier type, and the soldiers of the post on the Washita. About this post were grouped some 150 families of this nondescript population. A few scattered cabins above and below this place, with an occasional house of more pretentious appearance, constituted the settled portion of the country. The upper sources of the river were marked only by an occasional hunter's lodge or "cache," used by the inhabitants, white and Indian, during the autumn hunting. The deer, bear, and wild fowl of the swamps and forests afforded the greater portion of the food supply of the region; but this was supplemented by an occasional patch of Indian corn and by a few wild cattle, kept for beef rather than for dairy purposes. Two large land grants, affording a fertile field for future litigation, were located upon the Washita. That of the Marquis of Maison Rouge was located below Fort Miró. The more recent one to the Baron de Bastrop, soon to be connected with Burr's ambitious filibustering project, extended twelve leagues square above it. The greater part of the inhabitants appeared to be satisfied with the sway of Lieutenant Bowman, the commandant at the military post.

The ordinary method of propelling the boat forward was by rowing, all twelve of the soldiers being employed at once at this work. Occasionally the wind permitted the sail to be used, or good walking on the banks offered an opportunity for "tracking" (towing). Each day the attempt was made to start before sunrise, but the dilatoriness of the soldiers generally prevented this. Long halts were made at eight A. M. and at noon, to prepare meals, take observations, and permit the men to rest. Owing to the size of the boat and the laziness and insubordination of the men, they were seldom able to make more than one and a half miles an hour. Frequent shoals, logs, and trees lodged in the bed of the river; occasional rapids, "chutes," and rocky ledges; and the gradual subsidence of the river, added to the difficulty of the

ascent. Upon their arrival, on November 6, at Fort Miró, some 196 miles from the junction of the Red and the Mississippi, they exchanged their boat for a smaller one and hired a guide. This change, as Dunbar wrote Jefferson,[3] was rendered necessary because Hunter's boat, "constructed on his Chinese model," proved to be "an unprofitable vessel." A little well advised encouragement from Mr. Dunbar gave the soldiers, who really were glad to escape the fever-tainted atmosphere of New Orleans, an enthusiastic interest in the success of the expedition. The journey above Fort Miró, though more difficult, was a marked improvement over the first part of the way.

At the Island of Mallet the travelers discovered, in taking the observation of November 15, that they were within half a minute of the new boundary line of Orleans Territory—the thirty-third degree. Here they lost the Spanish moss of the lower courses of the river, left the alluvial swamps for higher land, and observed other marked changes that differentiated the country above and below the new limit. A week later they passed the Caddo "trace" leading from the Red to the Arkansas, and a little above this the Ecor(e)s de Fabri, some sand hills where tradition, detailed by the the guide, reported that leaden plates once marked the boundary between the French and Spanish colonial possessions. Naturally they found no vestige of these plates.[4] From occasional parties of hunters they learned many facts concerning the Red and

3. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 28, No. 66.

4. This incident affords an opportunity to contrast the style of the two explorers. Dunbar records in a matter of fact way, "It is reported that a line of demarcation run between the French and Spanish provinces, when the former possessed Louisiana, crossed the river at this place; and it is said that Fabri, a Frenchman, and perhaps the supposed engineer, deposited lead near the cliff and in the direction of the line; we could not, however, obtain any authentic account of this matter, and it is not generally believed." (Dunbar's *Journal*, page 59). Hunter gives more zest to his story, "Our pilot, an illiterate man, not remarkable for good judgment or veracity, mentions, as a report, which he has heard, that this Fabri, now dead, was said to have buried a piece of lead near here, as a line mark, of the division of territory between the French and the Spaniards. That the only person said to be present when this was done immediately disappeared; that hunters who encamp near this spot still hear a voice in the night calling out, Fabri! Fabri! The whole story, no doubt, is equally well founded. By what I can learn, there never was any line of division traced out between these two nations this way; nor is there the least reason to suppose that a division line for that purpose could run within a great distance of this place. It must go very far to the westward."

Arkansas, Missouri and Platte rivers, the Indians living upon them, and the vast plains through which they flowed.

In a measure this method of procuring information answered the purpose of Jefferson's extended plan. Far greater service was rendered in the acquisition of practical experience for the guidance of future expeditions of this sort. It was speedily discovered that a special boat was needed to navigate the shallow waters of these interior streams. It was likewise noted that the discipline of a detail of enlisted men could not be maintained simply by a non-commissioned officer. More important still was the result of the experiment in transferring some baggage from the head of navigation on the Washita (the Fourche de Chalfat), to the Hot Springs. Though the distance was less than nine miles and the loads carried by the soldiers purposely made very light, they complained bitterly, and as Dunbar thought, with justice, of the difficulties of this method of transporting baggage. The experiment led Dunbar to consider the vastly increased difficulty of using this scheme for a much larger company, between the head waters of the Red and the Arkansas, especially when they were wholly uncertain of the distance. In accordance with Dunbar's suggestion, the President modified this feature of his original plan.

The voyagers reached the head of navigation on the Washita on December 6, and started on their return journey on the 8th of January. The interval was employed in observations and excursions in the vicinity of the Hot Springs. The snows and rains of this period increased greatly the volume of water in the river, and facilitated their descent. On the 16th they were at the post on the Washita where Dunbar left the party to return overland to his home. On the 31st Hunter brought the boat to St. Catherine's Landing, and on the 9th of the following month delivered the escort, safe and sound to a man, to Lieutenant-Colonel Freeman at New Orleans.

In summarizing his work upon his return[5] Dunbar could report nothing of great importance. The Hot Springs were a great natural curiosity, but the season was unfavorable for botanical work. The expedition had afforded some experimental knowledge that might later prove useful. He wished to prepare a brief

5. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 28, Nos. 67 and 68.

abstract of the excursion, to be forwarded before the close of the session of Congress, but this was rendered impossible on account of the bad weather, the irregular mails, but above all by the loss of a month on account of their boat. Dr. Hunter's ideas in its construction were entirely wrong. Dunbar's unfortunate colleague had meanwhile taken passage at New Orleans for Philadelphia, where he arrived April 1, 1805. His practice had suffered by his absence, and he regretted that his medical knowledge had really been of so little service on the expedition. His son in Philadelphia and Dunbar in Natchez entered upon the tedious process of calculating their respective observations. After considerable delay their original journals and their summarized contents found appropriate resting places in the vault of the American Philosophical Society and in the documents of the Ninth Congress, where their lot was a century of almost uninterrupted repose. At this centennial period it is only fitting that the names of William Dunbar and George Hunter should be enrolled among those who played a prominent part in the exploration of the Louisiana Purchase.

Although the Hunter-Dunbar expedition did not explore the Red River, as originally intended, the President, during this winter of 1804-05, received from another source some information concerning that stream. Dr. John Sibley was evidently emboldened by his correspondence with Claiborne to communicate directly with Jefferson, and he rightly approached by the scientific channel. His letter of March 20, 1804,[6] after opening with a few personal details, was devoted to a description of the bow-wood tree. In closing, he begged leave to tender his services in any capacity the President might think proper to command. His reward came very quickly, first in the appointment as surgeon's mate for the troops stationed at Natchitoches, and later as Indian agent for Orleans Territory and the region south of the Arkansas.[7]

Sibley was evidently a past master in the art of attracting public attention. One of his letters to a Raleigh friend written during 1803, found its way into print in the East.[8] A similar one

6. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 76, No. 6.
7. See page 14.
8. *The Literary Magazine and Annual Register*, Vol. 8, 173, 174.

describing the Red River, was later published in Kentucky, and was followed the next year by another.[9] Possibly these letters strengthened Sibley with the administration, but they aroused against himself a storm of personal abuse, coupled with severe criticisms of his accuracy and veracity. His personal reputation was not wholly proof against the former, while his tendency to exaggeration often laid him open to the latter; yet for the time being he was the sole medium for geographical information from the Red River. Late in 1804 the President appointed him a member of the governor's council, and this act resulted in local protest, not only against Sibley, but indirectly against the administration. Claiborne was constrained by this fact to express a doubt of the wisdom of the appointment, considering the Doctor's private reputation; but Jefferson did not believe the charges sufficiently proved, nor that they should weigh against the assurances of others and the Doctor's unquestionable good sense and information.[10]

When Sibley forwarded to Dearborn his first Indian report,[11] he, perhaps unwittingly, selected the most favorable method of gaining the President's good graces. Having once discovered Jefferson's taste for the literature of the aborigines, he kept him supplied with Indian vocabularies, and so retained his good will and that of his immediate successor.[12] This impression he heightened by a description of the Red River Valley,[13] based upon his own travels, in 1803 and 1804, along the settled portion of the river, and the testimony of others, particularly his interpreter, Francis Grappe. Although the latter was well acquainted with the Louisiana Texas frontier, the fact that he was at this same time in Spanish pay[14] would tend to vitiate his testimony, in the same measure that the Doctor's exuberant imagination often made his own statements untrustworthy.

Dr. Sibley was in no sense a trained scientific observer, so his

9. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 76, newspaper clipping.
10. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, No. 300.
11. See Chapter VIII.
12. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 76, Nos. 9-12.
13. *Annals*, 9 Cong. 2, 1089 ff.
14. *Annals*, 9 Cong. 2, 1088; Salcedo to Iturrigary, Aug., 1806, *Bexar Archives*.

description was largely confined to subjects that would appeal to the casual traveler or prospective settler. He mentioned the names of the various settlements upon the banks of the river, such as Rapide, Avoyelles, Natchitoches, Campti, and also of the more important isolated establishments. He described the chief affluents of the Red, either from personal observation or from the reports of others, and from his practical agricultural standpoint, gave a fair representation of the river system, the soil, and its productions. But he made predictions regarding natural products that succeeding years have not wholly verified. His description of the population was interesting, as he showed the numerous elements that composed it, and that the more progressive were non-native. In this particular the Red simply repeated what others had observed on the Washita. Natchitoches, the most important town, was only a miserable settlement, containing less than half a dozen notable structures, and was in a worse economic condition than in 1762. All of the industries that were important were apparently in American hands, and that, too, while Spain still controlled affairs. His report, even if it added little to scientific knowledge, was a most effective commentary upon four decades of Spanish government.

## CHAPTER VI.

## A LEADER AND A PASSPORT FOR THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

The results of the Hunter and Dunbar expedition, in connection with the reports from Sibley,[1] afforded the first fairly satisfactory picture of the southern portion of our new acquisition, and apparently stirred up Jefferson to signalize his second administration by its exploration, as he had signalized his first by its acquisition. March 12 he wrote Dunbar[2] that as Congress had appropriated $5,000.00 additional, the expedition must immediately be set on foot. One of the most important questions before them was the selection of the proper scientific men to direct it. Doctor Hunter concluded not to go, nor could Dunbar leave his private business. Jefferson first mentioned a Mr. Perse, of the Post Office Department, and as a possible second man a Parson Wiley, of a Washington academy.[3] C. S. Raffinesque had made some inquiries concerning the botanical work of the expedition, but the place was not judged worthy of his attention.[4] None of these men proving available, Jefferson suggested to Dunbar a certain George Davis, but the Mississippian rejected him on account of his unfortunate personal disposition.[5] Finally, to avoid further delay, a Mr. Thomas Freeman, whom Jefferson had previously mentioned as a suitable person for an assistant, and who had for a time served under Andrew Ellicott, was selected as its official head, to serve, however, under the supervision of Dunbar. Freeman was to manage the astronomical work, but needed the assistance of a botanist, and mentioned[6] Dr. Carret Pendergast and Dr. Fred Seip, both residing near Natchez, as suitable men for this position. It was not until the 12th of January, 1806, that Jefferson wrote

1. *Annals*, 9 Congress 2, 1097 ff.
2. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 268.
3. *Ibid*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 271.
4. *Ibid*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 202.
5. *Ibid*, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, No. 301; Ser. 2, Vol. 28, No. 69.
6. *Ibid*, Series 2, Vol. 34, No. 48.

Dunbar:[7] "We hope we have procured a good botanist to accompany him" (i. e., Freeman), in the person of Dr. Peter Custis. There still remained an assistant for Mr. Freeman. Dunbar first tried to obtain Lieutenant E. P. Caines, but as he could not leave his post, he finally selected Lieutenant Humphrey, a "young officer of considerable talents," to whom Mr. Freeman seemed "already particularly attached."[8] This selection was not made till the latter part of April, upon the eve of the departure of the expedition. The difficulty in securing proper officers will readily account for the long delay in getting it started. Scientific men, possessing the requisite physical stamina for frontier exploration, were hard to find in America at the opening of the nineteenth century.

The long delay in selecting a leader for the Red River expedition imperiled the success of Jefferson's plan, not merely because of the threatened falling of the waters of that river with the advance of the season, but also because of the ebb of Congressional enthusiasm, owing to the non-appearance of tangible results. Evidently such a possibility appealed to Dunbar as it had previously to Lewis,[9] for on December 7, 1805, he wrote Jefferson,[10] proposing a brief excursion with a corporal and four men, up the Little Missouri, a tributary to the Washita. The party of the previous year had been unable to explore this stream on account of the presence of hostile Indians, and it was reputed to drain a country rich in iron mines. There was no occasion, however, to put this scheme into operation.

Jefferson's new instructions to Dunbar,[11] dated May 25, 1805, show one result derived from the preliminary expedition of the previous year. On account of the difficulty of transporting baggage from the head of the Red River to that of the Arkansas, and because of the dangers to be apprehended from the Osages, the President determined to confine "the ensuing mission to the ascent of the Red River[12] to its source, and to descend the same river

7. *Ibid*, Series 1, Vol. 11, No. 95.
8. *Ibid*, Series 2, Vol. 28, No. 74.
9. See page 20.
10. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 28, No. 72.
11. Washington, *Writings of Jefferson*, IV, 577 ff.
12. As late as March 28, 1806, Jefferson gave Dunbar the option of exploring the Arkansas first, if he so desired. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 1, No. 167.

again." Dunbar was also to write Governor Claiborne, of Orleans Territory, to secure from the Marquis of Casa Calvo, the Spanish boundary commissioner, a passport for the party. The fact that they were empowered to trade with the Indians should guarantee a favorable reception from them, and the members of the expedition were to do everything in their power to attach them to the United States government, especially in view of the state of its affairs with Spain. In the latter part of this letter Jefferson thus touched upon two factors—Spanish frontier officials and neighboring Indians—that were to elevate this expedition to international importance.

On the following day, in order doubly to insure the success of the expedition, Jefferson gave more minute directions to Claiborne[13] concerning the passport he wished to obtain from Casa Calvo. He was to assure the Marquis that the expedition would go no farther than the sources of the Red River; but as even within this limit they might meet unexpected opposition from parties of Spanish citizens, a passport would prove a precautionary measure to prevent irresponsible breaches of peace. Claiborne was to emphasize the scientific character of the expedition, and as proof of this, to offer to receive one or two Spanish representatives as members of the party. Claiborne should furthermore call attention to the fact that the western boundary was still unsettled, as an additional reason for exploring the disputed region. As each nation, according to Jefferson, had an equal claim to the country, each likewise had an equal right to obtain information in behalf of its claim. If the Marquis should refuse to appoint a representative, or to give a passport, Claiborne was to intimate as diplomatically as possible that the Spanish government would be held responsible for any violence offered the party.

The Marquis of Casa Calvo had been a governor of Louisiana under the Spanish régime, and came to the province a second time in April, 1803, to act as one of the commissioners for Spain in its transfer to France. After its delivery to that power, and, later, to the United States, he still continued at New Orleans in he capacity as commissioner to mark the limits between the possessions of His Catholic Majesty and those of the United States.

13. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 300.

Due notice of his new appointment was given to the American officials and to those of the Internal Provinces as well.[14] He speedily became an object of suspicion to the American authorities, who distrusted his motives in remaining at New Orleans; and likewise was viewed with jealousy by his fellow colonial associates in Texas and Chihuahua. As his later correspondence showed, both had cause for their respective attitudes. In June, 1804, he wrote Juan Bautista Elguezabal,[15] then governor of Texas, that he had definite information of Jefferson's intention to send an expedition up the Red River; and he assured the governor that the mere reading of this information should lead him to take urgent and immediate measures to hinder or even destroy such expeditions, in order to preserve in their integrity the vast and rich possessions of His Majesty. At least the law of nations, he suggested, would permit the governor to delay, in the beginning, the progress of this dreaded enterprise. During the same month, and also in the following September, he communicated dispatches of similar tenor to Don Pedro Cevallos, the Spanish Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,[16] in the course of which he recommended measures not merely to prevent the exploration of the Arkansas and Colorado (Red), but also to impede the progress of Captain "Lewis Merry Whether" up the Missouri.

Accordingly, a year later, when Claiborne approached Casa Calvo[17] for a passport for the Dunbar party, the Marquis was not a little embarrassed to know what to do. In his request, Claiborne closely followed his instructions, and dwelt upon Dunbar's skill, reputation, and services for both governments, and the similarity of this undertaking to Humboldt's well-known tour. In addition Claiborne's request was endorsed by Andrés Lopez Armesto, the former secretary of the province and the present secretary of Casa Calvo's boundary commission. In his perplexity the Marquis determined to grant the passport and appoint some one to represent Spain, but at the same time not to compromise himself nor interfere with the action of Captain-General Salcedo.

14. Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 26, May 13, 1804. *Claiborne Correspondence*, I. Salcedo to Governor of Texas, May 3, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

15. Casa Calvo to Elguezabal, June 27, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

16. Casa Calvo to Cevallos, July 18, 1805. *New Mexico Archives.*

17. *Ibid.*

Casa Calvo believed the scientific object of the expedition to be a simple pretext to hide the President's territorial ambition. But in view of the fact that the Americans possessed the right bank of the Mississippi and the mouths of the Red and Arkansas, they could hardly be prevented from navigating those streams, especially as the true limits of the two countries were not accurately defined. Moreover, because of the progress already made by Captain Lewis, it would be impossible to restrain the Americans short of actual hostilitie s. He believed war to be inevitable and, accordingly, did not wish to lose this opportunity to learn, not merely the character of the country that would be the probable seat of action, but also the plans and real knowledge possessed by the Americans. So he answered Claiborne[18] with apparent cordiality, expressing his belief in the scientific character of the expedition. At the same time he added that as the upper part of the rivers in question bordered on Texas and perhaps on the provinces farther in the interior, he must give due notice of the expedition to Captain-General Salcedo, to enable the latter to take such measures as his instructions required. Armesto then wrote the General[19] concerning the situation and left him to do what he judged necessary. Casa Calvo's whole course seems directed with a view to avoid giving offense to the American authorities, who might cut short his stay at New Orleans; to establish himself firmly with the administration at Madrid; and to throw upon Salcedo the final decision in the matter of the exploring expedition.

If Casa Calvo was unwilling to assume this responsibility, the case was far different with the bluff soldier who then ruled at Chihuahua. In his reply[20] to the Marquis he bluntly informed the latter that, although the expedition bore his passport, he, as Captain-General, understood the interests of his government and should protect those interests against the proposed incursion. He professed to see in the expedition and in that of "Mr. Merri" along the Missouri, simply an attempt to gain military knowledge of the country or to tamper with the allegiance of the Indians. The Spanish government needed no geographical knowledge of the

18. Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 18, 1805. *New Mexico Archives.*

19. Andrés Lopez Armesto to Salcedo, July 15, 1805. *New Mexico Archives.*

20. Salcedo to Casa Calvo, Oct. 8, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*

country, already thoroughly explored by its traders; and if the Americans wished to obtain such knowledge, he would cheerfully furnish it upon proper application to his department. In view of the danger to their Indian allies, all expeditions from the United States must, for the present, be suspended; and to this regulation Dunbar's expedition must conform.

Just six days before this, Salcedo had written Iturrigaray,[21] the Viceroy of New Spain, complaining of the expansion policy of the American government, especially noticeable in their exploring expeditions and Indian negotiations, and expressing a fear that a new expedition was to be introduced under Casa Calvo's passport. When surmise became reality, it is not at all strange that his reply to the Marquis was not more gracious, or that he took occasion to make his conduct the object of serious complaint at Madrid.[22] He immediately ordered[23] the new governor of Texas, Antonio Cordero, to detach a force from the frontier posts of Texas to watch the Colorado (Red) and Napestle (Upper Arkansas) for the Dunbar expedition. If encountered, the members of the patrolling force should compel it to remain under their "opportune protection" until it withdrew. The Spaniards should especially observe the intercourse of the expedition with the Indians; and by cleverly utilizing their own native allies, they might cut off its provisions and thwart it at the beginning.

It was not merely the explorers bearing duly attested passports that were causing the Captain-General uneasiness, but likewise spies, and the equally unacceptable trappers and general traders, whom love of adventure or of gain lured into the far Southwest. With reference to operations of the first class, Salcedo and his underlings were by no means free from censure. From the Louisiana frontier, they were kept well informed of American movements, through the activity of Felix Trudeau,[24] the former Spanish commandant at Natchitoches and now a resident of that community; of Samuel Davenport and Edward Murphy,[25] naturalized

21. Salcedo to Iturrigaray, Oct. 2, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*
22. Coues, *Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, II, 612, 613.
23. Salcedo to Cordero, Oct. 8, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*
24. Roderiguez to Cordero, Dec. 18, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*
25. Turner to Claiborne, Aug. 30, 1804. *Claiborne Correspondence*, I.

Spanish subjects and fur traders, who from their occupation were prepared to furnish information to both sides; and of Francis Grappe,[26] who apparently with equal readiness acted as Indian interpreter for Sibley or for Salcedo.

In view of this fact there is some justification in the Americans adopting a like policy, and we have some indications that they did. On February 26, 1805, Dearborn wrote Wilkinson[27] that in view of reported Spanish movements in "Louisiana and vicinity" it was highly desirable to learn the purport of any such in the country between the Rio Bravo and the Red, and particularly "to know what was doing in St. Antonio and the St. Bernard Bay." Trappers and hunters were the proper persons to employ in this service, for which they were to be paid while in government employ. Early in the following September Wilkinson, from St. Louis, reported[28] concerning a certain Captain Stillé, that he "had been again despatched to the westward, and I hope he may before this reaches you, have been able to ascertain and apprize for you the disposition of the Spaniards at the Orcoquisanes (Orcoquisac =Trinity) and Matta Gorda. Captain Turner, too, may I hope from a [reconnaisance?] which he was instructed to make have been able to give you information of the dispositions at Nacodoches (*sic*) and St. Antonio."

These references show that there was a readiness on the part of the American authorities to counteract with their own peculiar methods the efforts of their border rivals. The greater part of the information they acquired in this way seems to have been through the Indians, and was of suah a character as to lead them to exaggerate the strength of their opponents and to misinterpret their movements.

Still more troublesome to the Spaniards appeared the threatened irruption of unauthorized trappers and traders. On July 16, 1804, Captain Edward Turner informed Claiborne[29] of a typical

26. *Annals*, 9 Cong. 2, 1097; Salcedo to Cordero, Aug. 13, 1805. *Bexar Archives*.

27. Dearborn to Wilkinson, Feb. 26, 1805. *MSS. Wilkinson Papers II*. For use of these papers I am indebted to the courtesy of the Board of Directors of the Chicago Historical Society.

28. Wilkinson to ———, Sept. 7, 1805. *MSS. Wilkinson Papers*.

29. Turner to Claiborne, July 16, 1804. *Claiborne Correspondence*.

instance of this sort. A certain American named Sanders had penetrated some 500 miles up the Red River to the Pawnees, and found them anxious to trade with the Americans. Sanders was pursued by the Spaniards, but managed to elude them, and arrived safely at Natchitoches. This adventurer preceded Jefferson's proposed expedition by some two years, and probably penetrated farther than Freeman finally reached.[30] The Spanish authorities rightly feared such attempts far more than a regular expedition that moved forward openly under governmental responsibility. The latter was subject to diplomatic pressure; no amount of frontier precaution could circumvent among Indian allies the subtle influence of the ambitious trader and errant trapper. In the far Southwest the peril from these became especially threatening during this period, and added not a little to the anxiety with which the Captain-General watched American aggression, which he was too weak to check with efficiency.

30. See Chapter IX.

## CHAPTER VII.

## SPANISH EXPEDITIONS ALONG THE LOUISIANA BORDER.

The notice of the appointment of Marquis Casa Calvo as boundary commissioner was communicated to the Spanish officials in Texas; and on May 3, 1804, General Salcedo, writing to that effect to the governor of Texas,[1] ordered that no American should be permitted to approach its frontier or in any way be allowed to mark alone the limits of Louisiana. Two months later Jose Joaquin Ugarte, who commanded the Texan frontier, dutifully wrote the governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Bautista Elguezabal,[2] that, in accordance with instructions, he should permit no Anglo-Americans to approach Spanish territory, for fear they would mark the boundary unmindful of Spanish interests.

A French traveler, C. C. Robin, who chanced to be in Louisiana at the time of its transfer to the United States, rendered most efficient service to Casa Calvo. A few days after the ceremony of transfer he passed up the Mississippi, the Red, and the Washita, and finally arrived at the post on the latter river a few days before its transfer to Lieutenant Bowman, of whom, because of his youth, he seems to have formed an unfavorable opinion.[3] After recording his observations concerning the extremely mixed population of the region, he returned to New Orleans, where he had an interview with Casa Calvo, and explained to him the value of the country lying between Louisiana[4] and Mexico. This strip of territory, 250 leagues from east to west, and extending from the Gulf to the Arctic Ocean, was coveted by the Americans, and their threatened occupation formed a menace to the frontier lands and mines of Mexico. To avoid this danger the Spaniards must people

1. Salcedo to Governor of Texas, May 3, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

2. Ugarte to Elguezabal, July 4, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

3. Robin: *Voyages dans L'Interieur de la Louisiana, etc.*, II, 298, 328, 384.

4. His memoir, shows that in his opinion, Louisiana included very little territory beyond the Mississippi.

this intervening strip. This could easily be done, for, under Spanish control, immigrants would flock in from Europe and America, as was clearly shown by the conditions on the Washita. The fur trade and other industries would thus pass into the hands of Spanish subjects. The American government, he believed, was doing nothing to advance American settlement. The forest Americans (back-woodsmen) were not comparable to the robust French as emigrants, while the American government, ready to make sacrifices to preserve the peace, would never adopt a policy of warlike expansion. It was a most favorable opportunity for Spain to seize a strategical position to resist American advancement.[5]

Although Robin was not greatly mistaken in saying that the American government did little to advance settlement to the westward, it is needless to point out that he was entirely wrong in his judgment of the fitness of American citizens, and especially the backwoodsmen, for colonization. Nevertheless, he seems to have impressed Casa Calvo with his reasoning, and the latter and his secretary, Armesto, requested him to favor them with his opinion upon the limits of Louisiana. He departed from New Orleans upon a second tour to the westward; and after consultation of documents and of the best informed persons in the province, he prepared a memoir and forwarded it to the Marquis from Attakapas.[6]

The memoir of Robin strongly justified the later position of the Spaniards towards American explorations. Following this, on July 6, 1804, Casa Calvo issued a passport to Juan Minor, a resident of Natchez, to visit Bahia and San Antonio, in Texas, upon necessary royal business, of which the character was not stated.[7] This, however, was given in a letter of instructions sent by Captain-General Salcedo at Chihuahua to Governor Elguezabal of Texas. This letter stated that Minor had been commissioned by Casa Calvo to pass from Natchitoches to mark the

5. Robin, III, 117, 118.

6. The memoir begins on page 141 of Volume III of his *Voyages*.

7. Passport to Juan Minor, N. O., July 6, 1804. *Bexar Archives*. Minor had served with Ellicott as Spanish representative upon the Southern Boundary Commission. Later he was an important friend of Aaron Burr.

boundary line of Louisiana, after a due examination of the rivers and of the coast. Salcedo instructed the governor, upon the appearance of Minor, to examine closely his commission, orders, and instructions; to have him state clearly what he had thus far done; and to show his means for carrying his plans into execution. He was especially to declare his citizenship; if he claimed to be a subject of the king, he was to be furnished a guard to Chihuahua, if of the United States, he was not to be permitted to enter the province. In his reply[8] the governor echoed his superior's suspicions regarding Minor, and promised to obey his injunctions.

On the 4th of September Ugarte, at Nacogdoches, reported to Elguezabal[9] that he was watching closely the movements of Minor. On September 13, Minor presented himself at Nacogdoches, but he claimed that he had merely verbal instructions to pass from that place to the Trinity, to descend this river and explore the neighboring creeks and bays, and make a map for Casa Calvo.[10] Later, the governor of Texas[11] advised Ugarte to detain him at Nacogdoches, to await Salcedo's pleasure. On the 21st of the following November the governor again informed Salcedo[12] that Juan Minor and two others, one of whom was Hugo Coyle, an Irish surveyor, had directed written petitions asking to be admitted into Texas; but that he had ordered Minor to await Salcedo's determination. Evidently it was well that he did so, for he later learned from Salcedo that the latter withdrew the permission given Minor to survey the boundary.[13] The attitude of Salcedo from the very first emphasized the fact that the Texas officials were jealous of Casa Calvo, and were going as far as they dared in thwarting his plans.

The next move of the Spaniards on the frontier seemed religious rather than political, for it was a pastoral visit paid by the Bishop of Nuevo Leon, in whose diocese Texas belonged, to the town and garrison of Natchitoches, where he was respectfully

8. Elguezabal to Salcedo, August 29, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*
9. Ugarte to Elguezabal, September 4, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*
10. Ugarte to Elguezabal, October 1, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*
11. Elguezabal to Salcedo, October 10, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*
12. Elguezabal to Salcedo, November 21, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*
13. Governor of Texas to Salcedo, Dec. 5, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

received by Captain Turner, as the Bishop himself reported[14] "with the honors of a general." The Bishop further added that although he himself was very reserved and politic in his conversations, the French complained unceasingly of their situation under the new government. The malcontents expressed the desire to emigrate to Texas, which "those republicans" (the Americans) already claimed as far as the Rio Grande. Governor Claiborne, who was deeply impressed with the fact that the Bishop kept a journal in which he recorded the latitude of many of the places visited and the results of his minute inquiries regarding the geography of Louisiana, and that upon leaving Natchitoches he took the most direct route to the City of Mexico, characterized his visit as political rather than ecclesiastical.[15]

In the loyalty of the Indians the Captain-General at Chihuahua had a far more important frontier object to occupy his attention than a mere uncertain boundary line, and he was determined to lose no time in useless explorations while this object remained unattained. Acting upon his suggestion, in the fall of 1804, the governor of New Mexico despatched a force of fifty-two men, under Pedro Vidal and José Calvert, to visit the Panana (Pawnees), Lobos (Pawnee-Loups), and Ottoes, dwelling upon the Missouri, Napeste (Napestle=Arkansas), Kansas, and Chato (Platte?). The express object of this visit was to make peace with them and to prevent them from trading with the Americans. Early in November the expedition returned, because attacked near the Arkansas by a large force of Indians. Although the Spaniards did not know to what tribes the attacking party belonged, they reported their suspicion that their opponents had been seduced by American gifts. Undeterred by this failure, Salcedo planned for the next year a second and larger expedition.[16]

The matter of presents for the Indians on the Missouri reap-

14. Bishop of Nuevo Leon to Viceroy, June 20, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

15. Claiborne to Madison, June 6, 1805. *Claiborne Correspondence*, III. In 1836, the Mexican Minister to the United States, claimed this visit was evidence that Spain still exercised political jurisdiction as far as the Arroyo Hondo and Red. Cf. *Documentos para la Historia de Mexico.* Ser. 1, Tomo VI.

16. Salcedo to Governor of New Mexico, Oct. 24, 1804; Jan. 16, 1805. *New Mexico Archives.*

peared in Salcedo's correspondence during the year 1805, while the determination to break up any commerce between them and the Americans became strengthened by the arrival in New Mexico of several French and American trappers, who had drifted from the valley of the Missouri to that of the Rio Grande.[17] On November 27, 1805, a second expedition of twenty-five men, under Juan Lucero, left Táos, to carry on the work undertaken by Vidal the year before. In eleven days they reached the Cayguas (Kiowas), whom they found disposed to make peace with the Spanish authorities, and through this tribe they took measures to make peace with the Comanches also, and for this purpose to bring them to Santa Fé. In forming this alliance, Salcedo wrote that the New Mexican authorities should insist absolutely upon one condition—the Indians must not trade with the Americans or English. Measures should be taken to encourage the fur trade in the direction of Santa Fé and to send Vidal and Calvert again to the Pawnees to learn who had attacked them the year before.[18] Salcedo was thoroughly impressed with the advisability of gaining Indian support, and was determined to make each frontier expedition accomplish as much as possible in this direction.

The shifting motives and the jealousy that ruled among the Spanish officials at New Orleans and at Chihuahua is illustrated by the conduct of Casa Calvo and of Salcedo. Casa Calvo, to emphasize his function as boundary commissioner, sends a subordinate to gather data on the Texas frontier, while Salcedo's underlings refuse to admit him into the province. Salcedo, distrusting the fidelity of his native allies, gives his entire attention to gaining and retaining Indian support. The boundary commissioner, anxious for the success of his special mission, grants a passport to an American exploring party, for he may thus indirectly gain valuable information for himself. Salcedo, with the Indian problem looming up ever greater on his provincial horizon, refuses to honor his associate's passport, and takes immediate measures to thwart the exploration. In this see-saw of purpose and action may be seen one of the minor reasons for Spanish colonial inefficiency. Had it not been matched by official inaction

17. See Chapter XII.

18. Salcedo to Governor of New Mexico, June 16, 1806. *New Mexico Archives.*

at Washington—partially due, it is true, to diplomatic complications in Europe—Spanish power would then and there have disappeared from what is now our great South-West.

Owing to the rebuff offered to Minor the year before, Casa Calvo apparently determined that his next move toward his peculiar field of exploration should be a personal one. Accordingly, in October, 1805, he informed Governor Claiborne that he expected to make an excursion to the Sabine for the purpose of hunting, of ascertaining the latitude of the ancient Spanish establishments of Adaes, and of making inquiries concerning some stone posts that were supposed to mark the former division line between French Louisiana and Spanish Texas. Claiborne regarded the explanation of the Marquis very much as the latter, a few weeks before, had looked upon his representation of Dunbar's objects—as a simple pretext to conceal some underhand policy. Nevertheless, the Marquis had apparently accepted his explanation at its face value, granted the passport, and appointed his representative to accompany the Red River Expedition; so now Claiborne did not feel justified in opposing Casa Calvo's journey. But he took occasion to ask the Marquis to permit an American officer to join him on the frontier of Texas, and the latter readily agreed.[19]

On October 15, Casa Calvo left New Orleans, having previously promised, immediately upon his arrival at Adaes, to notify Ceptain Edward Turner, the American officer selected to accompany him. To this officer Claiborne issued the necessary instructions for ascertaining the geographical position of Adaes, and its former relation to the neighboring French, and for examining the supposed locality of the stone posts and their importance. He was to inquire if a line of demarcation, completely or in part, had ever been established between the French and the Spanish, and if any French settlements were formerly located upon the Red River beyond the places then held by the Americans.[20] These instructions were comprehensive enough, but Turner never had the opportunity to use them. The wily Marquis had no idea of allowing unwelcome members to join his party.

---

19. Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 14, 1805. *Claiborne Correspondence*, III; Id. to Id. Jan. 7, 1806. *Claib. Correspondence*, IV.

20. Claiborne to Turner, Oct. 14, 1805. *Claiborne Correspondence*, III.

A comparatively simple motive probably dictated the policy of Casa Calvo in making this journey. His reason for being in New Orleans was to act as boundary commissioner, and for this purpose he was drawing, for the second year, a comfortable allowance from the Spanish exchequer. Doubtless it occurred to him that it would be necessary to make some such excursion, in order to show his home government, as well as the United States officials, the necessity for his continued existence at New Orleans. Incidentally, he may have purposed to enter into some relation with the Indian tribes on the frontier, and to turn to the advantage of his royal master the discontent which was understood to exist among the Creoles of the territory. If possible, he wished to form a settlement of these people on the Trinity River in Texas.[21]

With regard to his main purpose, we find that Casa Calvo took especial pains to inform the other Spanish officials, including Casa Yrujo at Philadelphia. On the 8th of December he notified Governor Cordero, of Texas,[22] that he was beyond the Neches River for the purpose of making observations regarding the boundary line, and that he should in the course of his journey visit Orcoquisac, Nacogdoches, Adaes, and Natchitoches, and he requested a hundred animals for the transportation of his party and provisions. The governor sent this request to the Captain-General, Salcedo, who ordered him to be reasonably supplied within the limits of the royal treasury. Later in the month Salcedo wrote Cordero,[23] ordering him as above to furnish a reasonable supply of horses to the Marquis, while the latter was engaged in his boundary survey; but he must not permit too many to be taken from Texas into Louisiana. From these letters it would seem that the Texas authorities fully believed Casa Calvo to be engaged in some important undertaking concerning the boundary, or at any rate that they did not dare to refuse his personal request.

---

21. See *Claiborne Correspondence*, IV, Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 7, 1806, in which the former reports the failure of this plan on account of dissatisfaction with the lands in question. He also reports that measures were taken by Casa Calvo to establish his colony, and as the boundary was still unsettled, this was an unfriendly act and the President should take immediate steps to break up this settlement.

22. Casa Calvo to Cordero, Dec. 8, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*

23. Salcedo to Cordero, Jan. 7, 28, 1806. *Bexar Archives.*

Meanwhile rumors were current at New Orleans concerning very different purposes of the Marquis. He was believed to have taken with him a considerable sum of money for the conciliation of the Indians or for the payment of troops that were to meet him on the frontiers of Texas. The report of the discontent among the Creoles of the frontier and the arrival of additional Spanish troops at Nacogdoches[24] did not tend to remove these fears. Claiborne at first seemed to believe that he had no object hostile to the United States, but later that his taking many goods for the Indian trade had a probable national significance. The secretary of the territory, Graham, who was acting as governor during Claiborne's absence in Attakapas, voiced the prevalent fears and distrust in a letter to Madison, January 2, 1806. He stated that the Marquis was tampering with the Indians, and that he had not yet gone where he said, although he had been longer absent than they had been led to believe would be the case. While Graham did not wish to raise any improper suspicions against Casa Calvo, yet he believed that he and the other Spaniards lingering in the province were its most dangerous enemies, and should be gotten rid of as soon as possible. Three days later Claiborne returned, and on January 7 informed Madison that he was pleased to know of the President's determination to urge the Spanish officers to a final departure, and that he would endeavor to carry it out without discussion. The continued absence of Casa Calvo rendered his whereabouts uncertain; but he should endeavor to ascertain this, and by special messenger dispatch the order for his departure, to prevent his return through the city, where his enforced leaving might excite a commotion among his adherents. Two days later he reported an additional reason for hastening the departure of the Marquis, in the fact that while the latter was in La Fourche County he circulated the report that all the territory would soon revert to Spain, and thus unsettled the minds of the Creoles in that region.[25]

On January 17 Claiborne sent to Captain George T. Ross, of the New Orleans Volunteers, in search of Casa Calvo, to inform him of his dismissal from the province by order of the President

24. *Claiborne Correspondence*, III, Nov. 11, 1805.
25. *Claiborne Correspondence*, IV.

of the United States, as a measure of precaution following the failure to adjust existing differences, and in view of recent hostile preparations along the Louisiana frontiers. In addition, Claiborne instructed Major Porter, in command of the United States troops at Natchitoches, to prevent, if necessary, by force, the return of Casa Calvo through his jurisdiction.[26] Claiborne seemed fully determined to get rid of his unwelcome guest.

Meanwhile, from the Spanish officers came reports of Casa Calvo's expedition and its objects. Through Felix Trudeaux, the spy residing in Natchitoches, Sebastian Rodriguez, the Spanish commandant of Nacogdoches, learned that the Americans were closely watching Casa Calvo, then along the Orcoquisac (Trinity).[27] On January 18 Casa Calvo, in company with Rodriguez, left Nacogdoches for Natchitoches.[28] If we may credit the latter, it was during this period that Casa Calvo took occasion to suggest an immediate uprising of the inhabitants of Louisiana against the Americans, with the co-operation of the Spanish forces from Texas; and the Marquis seemed to have made a hearty convert of the Captain.[29] It will not do to lay too much stress upon this warlike attitude of all Spanish frontier officials, for we find that Rodriguez's advocacy of the plan and his accompanying of Casa Calvo to Natchitoches, led to his suspension from command for a year.[30] In general, the Spanish authorities were loath to assume an aggressively hostile attitude toward the United States. Of course, jealousy of Casa Calvo, in a measure, may have dictated this policy toward Rodriguez.

As late as April 9 we find an order sent to Viana, then in command at Nacogdoches, to permit Casa Calvo to take none of the horses furnished him into Louisiana, for the news had arrived that his functions as boundary commissioner had been suspended.[31] However, Casa Calvo had already left Nacogdoches; and in some way missing Captain Ross and failing to be detained

26. *Claiborne Correspondence*, IV.
27. Rodriguez to Cordero, December 19, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*
28. Viana to Cordero, January 18, 1806. *Bexar Archives.*
29. Rodriguez to Cordero, March 4, 1806. *Bexar Archives.*
30. See Pike: *Journal*, etc., 241, where he mentions meeting him in Chihuahua, in April, 1807.
31. Calderon to Viana, April 19, 1806. *Bexar Archives.*

by Major Porter,[32] he passed through Natchitoches and arrived in New Orleans on the night of February 4, 1806.[33] Two days later Claiborne informed him of the desire of the President to have him leave at once, and despite the indignant protests of the Marquis, followed a firm but urbane correspondence by transmitting a passport on the 12th, and this final hint necessitated the departure of the Marquis on the 15th.

Casa Calvo's desire to justify his expedition led him to send to Casa Yrujo a sketch of the important results of his visits to the Sabine and vicinity. The Spanish minister himself was then a *persona non grata* to the American government, and doubtless sympathized with his companion in distress. His summary of Casa Calvo's communication to himself was intercepted and, now reposing in the State Department, its language probably forms the best explanation of Casa Calvo's motive for exploring the Louisiana-Texas frontier:[34]

"Although I suppose the Marquis Casa Calvo has informed your Excellency of the results of his examination, lately made on the frontiers of Texas, yet as his despatches may have been miscarried, it appears to me proper to repeat to your Excellency the very important information which he has communicated to me from Pensacola, before his departure for Havana. It is that from documents which he has seen in the Mission of San Miguel de los Adayes, and from the book of the register of births, marriages, etc., it results that Spain has been in the uninterrupted possession of that territory for more than eighty-five years, and that the dividing line between old Louisiana and the Province of Texas has always been in the Arroyo Hondo. This is two and a half leagues to the west of Natchitoches. These documents prove the pretensions of the American Government to be unfounded and will show that in these pretensions, it has looked only to its proper convenience and in no degree to justice, as a Government which boast so much of its virtue ought to have done."

The letter strongly confirms Casa Calvo's statement of his purpose to Claiborne. It contains little to justify the latter's suspicions of inciting insurrection or the jealous fears of the Spanish officials that the Marquis sought to embroil the frontier garrisons

32. A report from a Lieutenant Burke of Mississippi, published in the *Baltimore Telegraphe and Daily Advertiser*, March 22, 1806, says that Porter ordered both Casa Calvo and Rodriguez out of the province.

33. Gayarré, *History of Louisiana*, IV, 131, 132.

34. Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, June 30, 1806. *Spanish Notes I*, Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

in hostilities with the Americans. Yet testimony against the Marquis is strong upon both of these points, and he may have desired, in the event of losing his position as boundary commissioner, to play a more important role in a border struggle which he himself had precipitated. Apparently he believed such a struggle inevitable, and he knew that his former rule had endeared him to the Creoles. By forcing the issue he would thus more surely attain future prominence.

We have already mentioned that Salcedo suggested a small expedition to the Pawnees in the spring of 1806. The threatened irruption of American traders and explorers caused the Captain-General to expand greatly his original plan. He must not only make peace with the Indians, but he must also make upon their minds a lasting impression that would efface any former contempt felt for the Spaniards, and overshadow any counter-demonstration of the Americans. In addition the expedition was to stop all exploring parties, or unauthorized traders and settlers, and to cause them to retire within the acknowledged limits of the United States. To accomplish this important double object he needed a more imposing force than the modest one that had accompanied Vidal or Lucero, and when his expedition did finally leave, it was one of the most important ever sent out from New Mexico.

About the middle of June, 1806, the expedition, consisting of one hundred regular troops from the province of New Biscay and five hundred New Mexico militia, under the command of Lieutenant Don Facundo Malgares, set out from Santa Fé for the Pawnee country. The commander of the expedition bore a triple commission. In the first place, despite the previous claim of Salcedo that the Spanish authorities were thoroughly acquainted with the territory as far as the Missouri, Malgares was directed thoroughly to explore this. A second and more direct commission was to intercept Freeman's party, if it should escape the force of Viana, sent from Nacogdoches to intercept it;[35] and to do the same with Lieutenant Pike's party, of which information had just reached Salcedo. Finally, and doubtless most important from Salcedo's point of view, he was to visit the Comanches, Pawnees, and the Kansas, impress them with the strength of the Spanish

35. See page 85.

arms, and make firm and lasting peace with them.[36] With his mounted force and extra animals, forming an imposing cavalcade of some 2,000 beasts, with provisions for six months, and with an intelligent and decisive commander of great wealth, liberality and experience, the expedition was well calculated to impress the untutored minds of the natives and forestall American intervention. The material contrast between this force of the expiring vice royalty and the modest American parties that were moving up the western rivers is suggestive of much that is typical of the two peoples.

Leaving the valley of the Rio Grande they descended the Red River (i. e., the Canadian), for a distance of 233 leagues, and on their way met and held conferences with important bands of the Commanches. The principal meeting with the savages must have been an impressive one. With 500 men, all mounted on white horses, and himself and two principal officers on jet black ones, Malgares and his troop were received by 1,500 of the Commanches, dressed in their gayest robes. Such a spectacle was calculated to impress the natives more than the apparently idle tales of Lewis or Pike about a great father at Washington, whose only representatives were a handful of nondescript frontiersmen and soldiers. Those of us who look back over a century of history can readily perceive the hollow mockery of the Spanish display, but the Comanches of the western plains could not then interpret its meaning.

After making a favorable impression upon the Comanches and sternly repressing an incipient mutiny among the New Mexico militia, Malgares struck across the country to the Arkansas. A wandering party of Pawnee-Mahas relieved him of part of his live stock, and he had to leave some 240 of his men with the lame horses, while with the remainder he pressed on to the country of the Pawnees. Here he held council with two of the tribes, and presented them with medals and flags. The Pawnees later told Pike that the Spanish leader said he was not empowered to make final treaties with them, but that in the following spring his supe-

36. For the details of the Malgares Expedition see Pike, *Account of an Expedition*, etc., 142, 143, 144, note. (1810 Edition); and Coues (Edition 1895) 410-414, 536, 537, 543, 583, 754.

rior would come for that purpose with a large force. Owing to the condition of his horses and the discontent of his men, Malgares did not press on to the other Pawnees or to the Kansas. Possibly, as Pike suggests, his men, now upon the scene of the massacre of Villazur's force in 1720,[37] could with difficulty be restrained from wreaking vengeance upon the descendants of the guilty Pawnees and thus defeating Salcedo's scheme for winning the support of these Indians. Evidently Malgares made some impression upon them, and promised to return and erect a town; but this impression was not lasting enough to lead them to obey his definite instructions to turn back Pike's party, if he should come thither, as he did a few weeks later.

After taking into custody a few American traders found among these Indians, Malgares retraced his route to Santa Fé, where he arrived the early part of October, and was obliged to remain, because his horses were used up. His *diario* was duly forwarded to Salcedo,[38] but it is doubtful if the partly executed task gave that chief any satisfaction. Thus ended the final important effort of a divided and decaying power to stem the tide of American expansion by means of Indian allies. Mutual jealousies, uncertain purposes, and inadequate resources wastefully expended—such form the final chapter of Spanish exploration upon the American continent.

---

37. Bandelier, A. F., *Papers of the Archaelogical Institute of America*, V, 179-206.

38. Allencaster to Salcedo, Oct. 8, 1806. *New Mexico Archives.* Pike afterward found at Natchitoches many of the American traders arrested by Malgares (Coues, *Pike*, II, 414).

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE BID FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE RED RIVER INDIANS.

While arranging the *personnel* of the exploring party and trying to tie the hands of Spanish frontier officials by means of Casa Calvo's passport, President Jefferson and his advisers were not unmindful of the third factor necessary to secure the success of the expedition—the good will of the Indians dwelling along the Red River.

Before the Americans took possession of Louisiana, Sibley reported the Caddoes as anxiously inquiring about their coming, for their presence meant higher prices for furs. A few months after they obtained possession, Captain Turner, the commanding officer at Natchitoches, wrote Governor Claiborne[1] that he had received a visit from the Caddo[2] Indians, who said that the Spaniards used to give them a present each year, and they wished to receive the same from the Americans. A few gifts from Turner satisfied them temporarily, but the request opened a problem of grave importance in American frontier policy. Claiborne reported the matter to Madison,[3] gave a brief description of the tribe, and said that he should invite them to New Orleans. A later letter from Turner informed Claiborne of the privilege enjoyed by Murphy and Davenport in trading with the Spanish Indians. As this trade included the privilege of supplying them with ammunition, the Americans, in case of difficulty with the Spaniards, might feel its evil effects. Accordingly, he recommended the immediate establishment of American factories to divert the Indians from the Spaniards.

While Captain Turner was approaching the subject of Indian

1. Sibley to Claiborne, Oct. 10, 1803, *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 76, No. 5. Turner to Claiborne, July 6, 1804, *Claiborne Correspondence*.

2. These Indians were the Caddadachos of the Spaniards and the Cadadoquis of the French.

3. Turner to Claiborne, Aug. 30, 1804, *Claiborne Correspondence*.

relations through Governor Claiborne. Dr. Sibley was making similar representations directly to the President, and was likewise giving a political bias to his communications. In his letter of September 2, 1804,[3a] he insinuated that, with but few exceptions, all of the civil and military officers of the United States in the new territory were not attached to the administration; and their openly expressed opposition had a bad effect upon its inhabitants. He especially charged "a deranged officer at this post said to enjoy the favor of the commanding officer" (Captain Turner) as guilty of this practice, as well as that of supplying necessities to the garrison at exorbitant prices.

With reference to the Indian trading company of Murphy and Davenport, all of the members of which had once been citizens of the United States, or were still, he stated that they carried on their operations through a Spanish officer at Nacogdoches, Texas. Naturally this company and the Spanish officer did all in their power to excite the Indians against the United States. If the trade could be turned into the proper channel, and be supplied from an American post on the Red River, the Indians, and especially the Pawnees and Comanches, might become fast friends of the Americans.

The necessity of some action of this sort was emphasized by later reports[4] that the Aish Indians of Texas, instigated by the Spaniards, were trying to persuade the Casados, a small tribe on the Sabine, to move over the river, and were threatening to exterminate them, if they did not. An American settler near the head of the same river was warned by the Cousate[5] to move from that locality, as the Spaniards were stirring up all the border Indians to hostilities. In view of these acts, it became increasingly important to attach the Caddoes to the American side. Claiborne made a vigorous representation to Casa Calvo, and the latter promised to report the facts to the Spanish commanders, although he was persuaded that they were merely exaggerated rumors of interested traders. Claiborne bade Turner use all possible means

3a. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 76, No. 7.

4. Turner to Claiborne, Sept. 9 and Oct. 13, 1804. *Claiborne Correspondence*, II.

5. The Aish were the same as the Aes and the Cousate, the Cushatta or Koasati.

to conciliate the Indians and to give small trifles to those who were honest and well disposed; but he could not confer authority to make greater presents. Still, Turner might regale the Caddoes to the extent of $200. Later an attempt of the Spaniards to summon a general Indian council failed, because of mutual disagreement and feeling of contempt which these Indians seemed to feel toward their former masters.[6]

Following Claiborne's representations, and Sibley's political *finesse*, and as a sequence to the creation of Orleans territory, in December, 1804, Secretary Dearborn forwarded to the Doctor[7] a request to act occasionally as agent for the United States in holding conferences with the various Indians of his vicinity. He was to attempt to keep them well disposed toward the American government by a judicious distribution of some $3,000 worth of merchandise.

The first effect of these changes seems to have been to unsettle Indian affairs, for Claiborne's new instructions did not permit him to interfere, while the functions of the new agent were greatly circumscribed. Traders passed to the Indian tribes with very little restraint, except from the frontier commandants, who attempted to keep the trade simply one in peltries with the Indians, and not a concealed horse trade with the Spaniards. Then, too, there was some question in Louisiana regarding Dr. Sibley's fitness for his position, but this was apparently explained away to the satisfaction of the Washington authorities. Early in the following spring Sibley produced the first result of his appointment in the form of a report upon the Indian tribes of his vast district. In his commendation of this report Claiborne again counseled him to pay particular attention to the Caddoes, who seemed to have influence over the others and were well disposed toward the Americans.[8]

On the 23rd of the following May, Dearborn expressed his gratification at the receipt of this report,[9] and added:

---

6. *Claiborne Correspondence*, II, Oct. 3, Nov. 3, 7 and 21, 1804.

7. Dearborn to Sibley, *Indian Office*, *Letter Book B*, 30, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

8. *Claiborne Correspondence*, III, Jan. 27 and 29, March 25, and June 10, 1805.

9. *Indian Office*, *Letter Book B*, 80. For Sibley's report see *Annals*, 9 Cong. 2, 1078 ff.

"At all times use all means to conciliate the Indians generally, and more especially such natives as might, in case of a rupture with Spain, be useful or mischievous to us. *None ought to engage your attention so early as those who reside in the immediate vicinity of the Bay of St. Bernard*, and from your description of their present temper and disposition, it will require no great exertion to draw them firmly to the interests of the United States. They may be assured that *they and all other red people within the limits of the United States*[10] will be treated with undeviating friendship as long as they shall conduct themselves fairly and with good faith towards the Government and the citizens of the United States."

This letter, significant for its territorial claims as well as for the Indian policy outlined, closed with the suggestion that Sibley prepare the minds of those Indians in the vicinity of the Red River, Attakapas, and Opelousas, for a proposed land survey by the United States government. If it should be necessary to run lines through their lands, in order to make the survey complete, they were not to be alarmed. "Not an acre will be taken," the Secretary affirmed, "except with payment and treaty under the auspices of the United States and free concession on their part." At the same time Jefferson wrote to Claiborne that "their rights and comfort would be sacredly cherished."[10a]

Not merely in the far Southwest, but also at St. Louis, the American officials devoted themselves to the policy of winning the native inhabitants of their new possessions. Dearborn impressed upon General Wilkinson,[11] as he had done upon Sibley, the importance of gaining the friendship and esteem of the Indians and of preserving harmony between them and the settlers and the soldiers. From St. Louis this implied a double task, not merely to win them from Spanish allegiance, but also to undermine the hold of the British traders of the north. In this latter and far more difficult task Lewis and Clark were doing royal service, in the winter of 1804-05, along the headwaters of the Missouri;[12] and in the following winter Lieutenant Pike won his first reputation in a

10. The italics in this extract are those of the author. In a letter of Oct. 17, 1805, giving Sibley a commission as permanent agent, Dearborn hopes that Sibley has made a "proper impression" upon the Indians near St. Bernard's Bay (*Indian Office, Letter Book B*, 2).

10a. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 300.

11. *Wilkinson Papers*, II, April 19, 1805.

12. See Chapter III.

like service on the headwaters of the Mississippi.[13] By May, 1806, Wilkinson reported[14] the Sioux, Pawnees, Kickapoos, and others as ready to enter into commercial relations with American traders, and to strengthen this impression he selected his protégé Pike for a second and more arduous expedition, leading him far within the Spanish sphere of influence.[15]

In the report mentioned above, Sibley estimated the fighting strength of some thirty tribes between the Arkansas and Rio Grande (not including the Comanches) at 2,800 warriors. The number and strength of the Indians surprised the President,[16] and doubly impressed him with the intelligence and industry of Sibley as an officer and the importance of retaining the friendship of these natives. Accordingly, October 17, 1805, Sibley was made a regular agent, furnished with the customary goods for trading, and urged to induce some of the principal chiefs, especially of the Caddoes, to visit Washington, or at least New Orleans.[17]

From the other side of the border, Salcedo had already issued instructions[18] to prevent the removal of Indians from Texas into Louisiana, and by every means possible to keep them faithful to Spanish allegiance. During the following year from each group of frontier officials came recriminations[19] against the unfair dealings of the other with the Indians, and of unauthorized incursions within the disputed territory. On the whole, the advantage in the contest for savage allies seemed to rest with the Americans; for, on the 16th of July, 1805, Salcedo wrote Iturrigaray[20] that he should need at least 150 extra men to cope with the Indian machinations of the "revolutionist, Dr. Sikbley," and in addition, he suggested that Casa Calvo should request the United States

13. See Chapter X.

14. *Wilkinson Papers*, II, May 27, 1806.

15. See Chapter XI.

16. Washington (Ed.), *Writings of Jefferson*, IV, 580-81; *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 10, No. 300.

17. *Indian Office, Letter Book B*, 122.

18. Salcedo to Governor of Texas, July 7, Aug. —, 1804. *Bexar Archives.*

19. See *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, 11, 690, 691; Salcedo to Iturrigaray, Aug. 20, 1805; Dionisio Valle to Cordero, Oct. 3, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*

20. Salcedo to Iturrigaray, July 16, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*

authorities to cease such proceedings. In later letters to the governor of Texas[21] urging that official to redouble his efforts to retain the friendship of the Indians, and outlining a policy of Indian trade on the Trinity, he gave vent to a most bitter tirade against the Indian policy of the new government of Louisiana Territory. "Only a declaration of war," he savagely concluded, "will reveal the perfidy of its emissaries among the Indians." If his anger and alarm were so strongly aroused by the course of affairs on the outskirts of his command, it is no wonder that he unhesitatingly refused to sanction an incursion far within what he regarded as the undoubted possessions of the Spanish king. Could he have known the exact tenor of Jefferson's instructions to Sibley and Dunbar, regarding their relations with the Indians, he would have been still more firmly convinced, upon that ground alone, of the rightfulness of his refusal to countenance the Red River expedition.

Meanwhile events in Louisiana were so shaping themselves as to nullify the moderate amount of protection afforded by Casa Calvo's passport. The action of Governor Claiborne in compeling the Marquis and his suite to withdraw from New Orleans[22] rendered that document useless. The Americans must now protect their exploration themselves, or else abandon it upon the first opposition. Dunbar had mentioned the probability,[23] if Casa Calvo should refuse the passport, that the expedition would be stopped a little above Natchitoches, at Bayou Pierre, a small post still in Spanish possession, although to the eastward of the Sabine. Upon suggestion from the President, Secretary Dearborn issued orders to the American patrol in the vicinity of Bayou Pierre to protect the expedition beyond that settlement.[24] For the remainder of its journey it must rely upon Spanish tolerance—an uncertain factor in view of the resentment felt at Casa Calvo's expulsion.

This resentment was still further increased by an event happening simultaneously on the Sabine frontier. During the pre-

21. Salcedo to Cordero, Oct. 8 and 22, 1805. *Bexar Archives.*
22. See Chapter VII.
23. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 2, Vol. 28, No. 69.
24. *Jefferson Papers*, Series 1, Vol. 11, No. 95.

ceding autumn small Spanish detachments had been thrown to the eastward of that river, and one of these had penetrated as far as the ancient Spanish post of Adaes, abandoned some thirty years before.[25] After attempting to get some assurance from the Spanish commandant at Nacogdoches that these forces would be withdrawn and no farther raids permitted, Major Porter, commanding at Natchitoches, ordered Captain Turner, on the 1st of February, to advance with sixty men to the vicinity of Adaes, where he would probably fall in with a "stationary body of armed Spaniards." This force he was to compel, if possible without bloodshed, to retreat beyond the Sabine. Turner fell in with a detachment of some twenty men under Ensign Joseph Maria Gonzales, who, after some altercation, agreed to take up his march for the Sabine and to send no more patrols on the east side of the river.[26]

Such a direct insult to the Spanish arms, coupled with the lack of consideration shown to His Majesty's commissioner and other officials, added to the jealous fears of the Spanish Captain-General the requisite desire for revenge. This combination of motives boded ill for any expedition venturing near the uncertain limits of the Internal Provinces, upon the double mission of frontier exploration and Indian negotiation. Salcedo furthermore took the precaution to order a second force from New Mexico, to intercept Freeman's party, in case the latter escaped that detailed by the governor of Texas.[27]

---

25. Gonzales to Rodriguez, Oct. 16, 1806. *Bexar Archives.*
26. *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, II, 798, 799.
27. Coues, *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, I, 412.

## CHAPTER IX.

## FREEMAN'S RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

As yet the Red River Expedition, planned for October, 1805, had not made a start. In a letter to Volney,[1] dated February 11, 1806, Jefferson regretted the unavoidable delay; and in his special message to Congress,[2] on the 19th, transmitting the report of Dunbar and extolling his services, he stated that the exploration of the Red River was but just commencing. It was two months later, however, before the expedition so hardly, and as events proved, so vainly planned for, cast off from Fort Adams and swung into the opposing current of the Red River. In addition to Mr. Freeman, Dr. Custis and Lieutenant Humphrey, already mentioned, the party consisted of Captain Richard Sparks, two non-commissioned subalterns, seventeen privates and a black servant—a total of twenty-four. Profiting by the experience of the previous expedition, the party was borne in two flat-bottomed barges and a pirogue, all of light draft It was the intention of the explorers to proceed on the Red to the supposed head of navigation among the Panis (Pawnee) Indians, and thence to take horses to the "top of the mountains" in which it was thought to rise, a few miles from Santa Fé. The return trip was to be made by the same river, using the same boats; and thus the toilsome difficulty of penetrating to the uncertain head waters of the Arkansas, and there reconstructing new boats, was to be avoided. It was hoped that the party would be able to bring a complete collection of specimens from the upper courses of the Red. Later the Arkansas was to be explored in the same way.[3]

1. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 426.

2. *Annals 9 Cong.*, 2, 1037.

3. The principal source used for the Freeman exploration is, "*An Account of the Red River in Louisiana, Drawn up from the Returns of Messrs. Freeman & Custis to the War Office of the United States, Who Explored the Same, in the Year 1806.*" (Washington, 1806?) This account is to be found in the Library of Congress, *Miscellaneous Pamphlets*, Vol. 861, No. 8. The Library also contains a manuscript copy. A summary of the exploration, evidently based upon the above, is given in *James's Account of an Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky Mountains, etc.*, Philadelphia, 1823, Vol. II, pp. 303-314.

Below Natchitoches the expedition traversed the region of which Dr. Sibley had already given a general description,[4] based upon his travels during 1803 and 1804. The voyagers upon this occasion simply noted the scientific data afforded by the peculiarities of the river, together with some observations concerning the white and Indian settlements upon its immediate banks. At Nachitoches they took on additional stores for Indian trade, and received a reinforcement which brought their number up to thirty-seven. Above this town they began to encounter that peculiar river formation of logs, brush and mud, to which the name of "raft" was given. On June 7th they encamped at the highest white settlement on the river, some forty-five miles above Natchitoches. On the next day, while forcing their way through a small raft, they were overtaken by an Indian messenger from Dr. Sibley, who brought word that a Spanish force had left Nacogdoches, in Texas, for the purpose of intercepting them. Later in the day the Doctor himself arrived, and held a consultation with the leaders of the party, after which they resumed their journey.

The country for some six or eight miles on either side of the river was now intersected with lakes and bayous forming marshes and swamps, through which a great part of the water of the river was dispersed. The main channel of the river was often choked with rafts, which became increasingly difficult to remove. On the 11th of June they reached the "Great Raft," through which for over fifty years no white or Indian canoe had penetrated. Upon the advice of their French guide they made a detour of about one hundred miles, passing through bayous, creeks, small lakes, and swamps, where the navigation at all times was difficult on account of shoals, rapid currents and rafts, and occasionally dangerous from the falling of decayed timber. The Indian or French guides were equally useless for discovering the best way, and as a result fourteen days of valuable time passed before the explorers again floated upon the undivided channel of the Red, some two hundred miles above Natchitoches. They felt gratified, however, in having passed the Great Raft, for the people below had laughed at the idea of their doing so with such boats.

4. *Annals 9 Cong.*, 2, 1089 ff. See pages 51-53.

Nineteen miles above the spot where they re-entered the river lay the village of the Coashutta (Coashatta, Coashatay) Indians. These, with their neighbors, the Caddoes,[5] were agriculturalists and in a stage of culture comparable to that of the Cherokees. From Natchitoches Sibley had sent out an Indian guide, Talapoon by name, to invite the Caddoes to meet the party at the Coashutta village. As the explorers were proceeding thither Talapoon and a companion met them, bringing information that a party of three hundred Spaniards were encamped a few miles back of the Caddo village, for the evident purpose of intercepting them. The officer commanding this party had asked the Caddo chief if he loved the Americans. To this question the chief replied evasively that he loved all men, and that the Spaniards must not spill blood on his land. The officer departed without replying, and the perplexed chief immediately despatched the messenger to Freeman.

On the 23rd of June they arrived at the Coashutta village, and three days later formally presented its chief with an American flag, in lieu of the Spanish standard with which he had desired to celebrate the expected arrival of the Caddoes. On July 1st the Indian guests arrived, and were received by the Americans with a salute and other formalities. This marked attention had its effect upon the savages, who were little accustomed to receive such deferential treatment. This effect was heightened by the skillful way in which Freeman explained the wishes of the President regarding the Indians, and the difficulties he and his party had already encountered in carrying out that policy. His speech pleased the chief, who in reply dwelt upon the previous good relations of his people with the French and Spaniards, and their determination never to shed the blood of white men. He was pleased with what he saw of the Americans, and wished them to visit all the tribes along the river, at the same time especially commending his friends the Panis (Pawnees), and warning the explorers against the Osages. On his departure, on the 3rd of July, he promised to keep Freeman informed of the movements of the Spaniards, and to forbid the latter to interfere with the Americans within a distance of fifty leagues above the ancient village of his people—some three hundred leagues farther up the river. The Americans en-

5. See page 75.

gaged three of the Caddoes to act as guides, spies, or messengers, and when these joined the Americans on the 10th, they brought word that the Spaniards had retired to the Sabine—a palpable ruse pointing to an attack farther up the Red.

Leaving the Coashutta village on the 11th, they passed through a most inviting region extending to the mouth of the Little River, 162 miles above. On the 25th they reached a prairie, upon the borders of which was the site of a former Caddo village, and also, so their guides reported, a French military post. Of the latter the explorers found no other traces than a few cedar pilings. On following day three Indian runners from the Caddo chief brought news that a force of Spaniards, estimated at 1,100, had entered their village, cut down the American flag, insulted their chief, and threatened to kill the Americans if they resisted their attempt to stop them. The Indians spoke of the Spanish leader as a "bad" man, and besought the Americans to return without encountering him. Upon Freeman's declaring that his instructions were to proceed until stopped by a superior force, the Indians chose to go with him, although they were certain they would not return alive.

On the following morning the explorers made a "cache" of some of their provisions, ammunition, instruments, and most important field notes, and then proceeded on their voyage, taking precautions to avoid a surprise. At nightfall on the 28th shots were heard along the river above, and the next morning their Indian scouts reported the presence of a large force of Spaniards. They now proceeded cautiously, with arms in readiness and with patrols moving ahead on each bank. The American force presently came upon a picket guard of some twenty-two Spaniards, who immediately fled. Another turn of the river brought into view the Spanish camp, on a bluff half a mile distant.

The Spanish force sent to intercept the Americans was under the command of Don Francisco Viana, adjutant and inspector of the Internal Provinces, who then commanded the garrison of Nacogdoches. A veteran of firm and unbending character,[6] he was eminently fitted for the task before him. Leaving Nacogdoches on the 12th of July, the force reached the Caddo village, as reported above, where they were greeted by the spectacle of an

6. Coues, *Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, II, 710.

American flag flaunting a welcome to them. As the Indians were somewhat tardy in removing it, Viana ordered it to be cut down,[7] possibly as an object lesson in the method he intended to adopt with the exploring force. In his determination to capture, kill or drive back the Americans, Viana pressed rapidly forward, and now, at a point some 635 miles above the mouth of the Red River, he awaited his expected prey.

The exploring party halted for dinner at the usual hour, but during the somewhat hurried preparation for this meal, they descried a large detachment of Spanish horse on the opposite bank, coming at full gallop toward them. The majority of the American force were ordered to take position in the canebrake and bushes that lined the bluff, in readiness to fire with the sentinels below. Here, concealed from view and in a place inaccessible to the cavalry, they were prepared to give the enemy a severe reception. In addition, a non-commissioned officer and six privates were so stationed as to be in the rear of the Spaniards when the latter crossed the river.

Through the river at full speed rode the enemy, and, disregarding the challenge of the sentinels, pressed toward the boats, drawn up on the beach. A second and more menacing warning caused them to halt and deploy in line, while their officers came forward to confer with Captain Sparks and Mr. Freeman. A parley of some three-quarters of an hour ensued. Viana stated that he had positive orders to stop the explorers, and to fire upon them if they persisted in advancing, before the limits of the two countries were defined. Freeman stated the instructions of the President to explore the river to its sources, and requested the Spaniard to give in writing his reasons for objecting to the passage of his party. Viana refused to do this, but asserted upon his honor that he was acting under direct orders from his government; and he peremptorily inquired when the Americans would begin their return journey.

It was evident that Freeman had met with the greatly superior force mentioned in his instructions, although it was Spanish and not native.[8] Moreover, the difficulties already expe-

7. Salcedo to Iturrigaray, Aug. 25, 1806. *Bexar Archives; Baltimore Telegraphe and Daily Advertiser*, Oct. 8, 1806.

8. See page 43.

rienced with their barges showed the impracticability of a farther ascent at this stage of the water. Nor was their supply of Indian presents adequate to procure enough horses from the Panis (Pawnees), two hundred miles above, to transport their party to the mountains. To crown all, they were confronted by an overwhelming force, outnumbering their own five to one, and although their position and spirit might make the outcome of a battle doubtful, their leader bore definite instructions from President Jefferson to avoid open hostilities at all hazards. Accordingly, after consultation with his fellow officers, Freeman replied that he would begin his retreat the following day. On the 30th the return movement began; on the 8th of August they were at the Coashutta village, and by the latter part of the month at Natchitoches.

Apparently President Jefferson's plan for the exploration of the Louisiana Purchase had utterly failed. The net results of two years of careful planning and of unusually liberal government expenditure were meagre enough. Dunbar and Hunter had made a fairly complete scientific exploration of the Washita. Freeman had penetrated the Red some six hundred miles, but this was barely as far as actual French occupation had extended, and by no means equalled the French explorations of the preceding century. Freeman had also established cordial relations with two minor Indian tribes, but by almost immediately yielding to Viana's force, he probably compromised in their eyes his government's reputation, especially if he had previously told them that the Spaniards had agreed to withdraw their garrisons from all the waters of the Mississippi.[9]

The incidents in connection with the stopping of Freeman's party gave added fuel to the heated correspondence that for a time threatened to stir up the whole Louisiana frontier.[10] In an aggressive communication August 26, 1806, Governor Claiborne informed Herrera, the Spanish commander, that Freeman and his associates were navigating waters wholly within the territory ceded by France to the United States. The fact that they were

---

9. See pages 41 and 42.

10. For the correspondence see *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, II, 801-804; *Mil. Aff.*, I, 205-206; *Wilkinson Papers*, II, Sept. 18, 1806.

compelled by force to return was all the more objectionable, because the aim of the expedition was wholly scientific and not in the least harmful to Spain. Moreover, its purpose had been explained to Casa Calvo, who gave it his passport, and by him should have been made known to the Texas authorities. The cutting down of an American flag in the Caddo village, which during the French occupation of Louisiana had been garrisoned by French troops, was a wholly gratuitous insult to the territory and government of the United States. In his reply Herrera denied *in toto* the territorial claims of Claiborne, although with little historical authority, and stated that the cutting down of the flag had been rendered necessary by the tardy obedience of the Indians. Claiborne immediately reiterated his former charges, which he claimed that the other had in no sense answered.

Herrera, unable to announce a final decision, transmitted the correspondence to Captain-General Salcedo. His answer of September 18 accepted the contention of Herrera, that the spot where Freeman was stopped never pertained to France. He also attempted, unfortunately for his historical reputation, to bolster up this claim by a reference to a Spanish expedition of 1630, which penetrated to the Empalizada (Mississippi), and to that of Teran, in 1691, which penetrated beyond the Caddoes to Mobile.[11] When he took up the subject of Casa Calvo's passport, Salcedo was treading more solid ground, and he speedily showed that he had refused to ratify Casa Calvo's action, and had offered to supply the American authorities with any necessary information regarding the Red, Arkansas, and Missouri. It is probable that the wily Marquis never apprised Governor Claiborne of this fact, but Salcedo was in no way responsible for the omission.

Brushing aside pretexts based upon territorial claims and useless passports, Salcedo passed to the broader field of international courtesy, and stated that no nation ought to break harmonious relations with another by introducing armed forces into its territory. It was a notorious fact that the Caddoes were Spanish

11. The best that can be said about the former expedition is that it is doubtful if it penetrated within several hundred miles of the Mississippi, and while the latter did reach the Red River, Teran did not penetrate beyond it. *Texas Hist. Quarterly*, V, 196.

Indians,[12] and accordingly, the American force had no business to be lingering there. The government of the United States, however, as was shown by Dr. Sibley's conduct and the introduction of parties along the Missouri, was sparing no means to draw the Indians from Spanish allegiance. Thus the conduct of its representatives was not in harmony with its general policy.

The incident regarding the flag, he continued, was capable of another interpretation than the one Claiborne put upon it. The Indians, after insulting the Spanish flag, had fled from their village upon the approach of the Spaniards, and it had been judged necessary to give them an object lesson. The flags of both nations had been used as articles with which to regale the Indians, and as such were open to other than the usual respectful treatment. He closed his letter, which was a strong *ex parte* statement, with a request for mutual peace pending the question of limits. We have no record that Claiborne sent a reply, for before this was received General Wilkinson was in command on the frontier.

In his sixth annual message of December 2, 1806,[13] Jefferson mentioned with a moderate amount of enthusiasm, the successful outcome of the Lewis and Clark Expedition and the valuable additions made to the knowledge of the Upper Mississippi by Lieutenant Pike. The attempt up the Red River, though conducted with meritable zeal and prudence, had not met with an equal degree of success. The President stated that after proceeding six hundred miles up the river, "nearly as far as the French settlement extended while the country was in their possession, our geographers were obliged to return without completing their work." Madison believed that this expression had the advantage of suggesting a plausible reason for not going on, but that it might also imply that the French settlements were the limit of the American claims.

The result of Freeman's expedition must have been a bitter disappointment to the President, despite his attempt in his annual message to gloss it over and persuade others that it strengthened

12. Dunbar (*Journal*, 64-66) says that the Caddoes "may be considered as Spanish Indians", and it was reported that the Spaniards stirred them up to enmity against the Americans.

13. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 482-495.

our claim to the Red River.[14] He recommended a small annual appropriation for the purpose of continuing the exploration, and a committee of the House, of which Alston, of South Carolina, was chairman, mentioned favorably the geographical results from the work of Lewis and Clark on the Missouri, of Pike up the Mississippi, and of Freeman up the Red. The report spoke of this work as furnishing materials for "commencing" a map of the region, pointed out the immense work still to be done in exploring the rmaining rivers and mountain ridges forming the western boundary, and heartily endorsed the President's plan;[15] but an unduly economical Congress took no action. The Neutral Ground Agreement between Wilkinson and Herrera,[16] doubtless led to an abandonment of the Red as the scene of exploration. For a time Jefferson cherished the plan of sending Freeman and Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, together with the naturalist Wilson, up the Arkansas in 1807, but afterwards, owing to a lack of funds, abandoned even this.[17] Thirteen years were to pass before the United States government sent its next formal expedition through any portion of the Louisiana Territory; although the President was shortly called upon to adopt and make his own the second expedition which Pike was preparing to make under Wilkinson's direction.

---

14. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 484, Jefferson to Dearborn, June 22, 1807.

15. *Annals 9 Congress*, 2, 193, 194. It will be observed that this report displays a better idea of the western extent of Louisiana than that of two years before. (See page 41).

16. McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy*, 142-163.

17. Coues, *Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, 827, 835; *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 3, Vol. 11, No. 47; Ser. 2, Vol. 29, No. 90.

## CHAPTER X.

### PIKE ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI.

Upon the division of the Louisiana Purchase into the territories of Orleans and of Louisiana, Brigadier-General James Wilkinson, the Commander-in-chief of the American army, was appointed governor of the latter, with headquarters at St. Louis. Possibly Wilkinson knew of the President's plan to explore the Upper Mississippi under the auspices of the Surveyor-General of the region north of the Ohio, and it is more than likely that he knew of the vigorous complaints, in Lewis and Clark's Mandan letter, of Cameron and other British fur traders on the St. Peters.[1] But when, without express order, he assumed the responsibility of initiating this exploration and regulating the fur trade, he selected as its chief figure an unknown young officer, little qualified by previous training for the task upon which he entered. This selection subsequently received Jefferson's tacit approval, but for the time being it seemed to set at naught his previous proposal, and for this reason arouses an inquiry concerning Wilkinson's ultimate object.

In the first place, by his own subsequent confession, Wilkinson for more than sixteen years had been reconnoitering the route to Santa Fé and the Mexican provinces, and in this task he had probably made use of Philip Nolan.[2] Moreover, during the summer preceding his Louisiana appointment Jefferson had invited him to meet Humboldt, then in Washington. Unable to accept the invitation, Wilkinson turned his letter of regrets to the President[2a] into a series of questions concerning the Internal Provinces, and routes to Santa Fé and Mexico City. Upon these points he desired Jefferson to obtain information from Humboldt.

The General's new situation afforded him an opportunity to

---

1. See page 33. Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, V, 286.

2. McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy*, 128; Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, II; *Appendix*, II, LXXVII.

2a. *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 85, No. 78.

renew his scheme, but he needed trusty and well qualified agents to carry out the details. Accordingly, in the summer of 1805, he selected two minor expeditions, apparently for the purpose of testing two of his young subordinates, in order to determine their fitness for his more important plan. Lieutenant George Peter, of the Artillerists, was sent to accompany Pierre Chouteau to the Osage Indians; and Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike, of the First Regiment Infantry, on the mission which forms the subject of this chapter. A sentence from one of Wilkinson's letters, detailing the progress of these two officers, is suggestive. "Independent of the immediate objects of these parties, they serve to instruct our young officers and also our soldiery, on subjects which may hereafter become interesting to the United States."[3] In view of Pike's later expedition, these "interesting subjects" would seem to be Indian negotiations and explorations on the Spanish border, both designed to pave the way for an extensive Mexican conquest in which Wilkinson should be the central figure. Peter and Pike then were being trained in the practical school of the wilderness, and in this prescribed course Pike speedily showed himself an apt and willing pupil, fit to undertake the more extensive task previously mapped out for Nolan.

Evidence to be brought forward in connection with Pike's second expedition will tend to strengthen this opinion. At this juncture the inquiry naturally arises: To what extent was Pike, the agent, acquainted with his principal's designs? His own denials and his subsequent career favor the assumption that he knew little more than that he was being tested for some great task in connection with our Spanish relations. That he knew this much appears from the letter which he directed to Wilkinson from Prairie du Chien, September 5, 1805.[4] In this letter there is an important lacuna, evidently referring to the posture of our affairs with Spain; then follows the significant paragraph:

"The above suggestion would only be acceptable under the idea of our differences with Spain being compromised; as should there be war, the field of action is the sphere for young men where they hope, or at least aspire, to gather laurels or renown to smooth the decline of age, or a glorious death. You see, my dear general, I write to you like a per-

3. Coues, *Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike*, I, 229, Note 5.
4. Coues, *Pike*, I, 225.

son addressing a father; at the same time I hope you will consider me, not only in a professional but a personal view, one who holds you in the highest respect and esteem."

While the paragraph is not as clear as one could wish, it readily lends itself to the interpretation that Pike, in time of peace, was ready to win such laurels as the southwestern field of exploration afforded; but that he preferred to convert this field into one of warfare, where still greater laurels might be his portion. At any rate, he recognized the fact that for the present his opportunities and ambitions were bound up with those of his general and patron; and as long as both were honorable, both could be served together.

The instructions to Pike issued July 30, 1805,[5] may be styled a summary of those previously given to Lewis, and strengthen the assumption that Wilkinson was familiar with the main details of the President's plan. Pike was to undertake the exploration to the source of the Mississippi, at the same time collecting all possible information of its main tributaries. He was also to attempt the additional task of Indian negotiation, with a view to learn more about the fur trade, to acquire suitable cessions for government forts and factories, and to make peace between the various Indian tribes. As a necessary corollary to his work as explorer and negotiator, Pike conceived it his duty to make a vigorous assertion of United States sovereignty over the trading establishments within our new acquisition, and his action made this the most important feature of his expedition.[6]

Pike's tripartite mission, lasting from August 9, 1805, till April 30, 1806, naturally suggests a comparison with Lewis and Clark's and with Dunbar's. It resembled the task of Dunbar, in that it followed as a direct result of the Louisiana Purchase, and was designed to add to our knowledge of a part of the new territory. In this it differed in concept from the Missouri expedition, which, as we have seen, was organized before the territory was acquired. It also differed from the latter in the fact that one bank of the Mississippi had, theoretically at least, been in our possession for a score of years, and thus the whole region should be much more

5. The instructions are given in *American State Papers, Misc.*, I, 942; Coues, *Pike*, II, 842-844.

6. See opinion of Gen. A. W. Greely, quoted in Coues, *Pike*, I, XLVIII.

familiar than the Missouri and its waters. That there was really little more current knowledge of the head waters of the former than of the latter was due to the fact that problems of other than a geographical nature had previously monopolized the attention of the American statesmen. Pike thus had the opportunity of rendering an important service to science. The most important fact, however, which separated this and Pike's subsequent expedition from others of the period, was that they were not directly authorized by the President. Jefferson later accepted and made use of the results of Pike's labors, and his Secretary of War publicly expressed his approbation of the young explorer. Moreover, Congressional committees reported in his favor, even while they withheld the material rewards given to Lewis and Clark and their followers; yet Pike suffered in contemporary private estimation because of his connection with Wilkinson, and has, in a measure, since suffered from the ignominy which overtook his principal.

The geographical results of Pike's voyage are creditable, but not particularly brilliant. In point of natural talent, he seemed less favored than either Lewis or Clark, and as regards scientific equipment he bore no comparison to Dunbar or Hunter. Nevertheless, he was energetic and measurably resourceful; and by his energy and determination, aided by the knowledge derived from others, he succeeded in amassing material that really added to popular knowledge of the Upper Mississippi. Besides the stray observations scattered through the text, he summarized his geographical work in a special treatise.[7] This embraced not merely an account of the river itself, and of its banks so far as traversed, but also some description of the principal tributaries, derived from Indians or British traders. With regard to the latter, Pike seems to have occupied a more favorable position than did Lewis and Clark, and his information is consequently more complete and accurate. This is particularly true with regard to the Fox-Wisconsin trading route from Michillimackinac to the Mississippi.[8]

At the Des Moines Rapids, at Dubuque's lead mines, and at

---

7. Pike, *Expeditions*, App. to Pt. I, 41-56; Coues, *Pike*, I, Chapter VII.

8. Coues, *Pike*, I, 295-303.

Prairie du Chien, Pike found small settlements, but for the most part the savages and traders dominated its banks as completely as those of the Missouri. The falls of St. Anthony did not afford an adequate comparison with those of the Missouri, nor was Pike there in as favorable a season as Lewis and Clark experienced in the vicinity of the latter. Pike's excursions about the Mississippi headwaters were restricted to sledge journeys in the vicinity of Sandy, Leech, and Upper Red Cedar lakes. He wrongly thought Leech Lake to be the source of the Mississippi, but in so thinking he was but following the opinion of traders who had spent years in the vicinity. Pike did not pass beyond the valley of the Father of Waters, although he approached very near the sources of some streams flowing into the Red River, and gave some description of that important drainage system. Pike's geographical observations were not important, being entirely superseded after some two decades; and such as they were, were rendered still less valuable by the imperfect instruments his hasty start forced him to take, the multifarious duties he was compelled to perform while on his journey, and the brief interval before his second journey during which to prepare his report.

In his Indian negotiation, Pike fared as well as might be expected. Part of the Indians with whom he had to deal had been living within United States territory for more than twenty years, although the British had retained posts among them till the past decade, and still dominated their fur trade. These Indians felt the greatest respect for certain individual American leaders, whose prowess they had reason to remember; but they distrusted the government at Washington, whose power they could but dimly comprehend and were utterly unable to appreciate the significance of the territorial transfer across the river. Doubtless the British traders in the midst of them did little to enlighten their ignorance, even if they did not try to render it more dense. On the western bank of the Mississippi, where, under nominal Spanish sway, British trade likewise predominated, the fierce Sioux and treacherous Chippewas also obtained their introduction to their new "great father" at Washington, through his beardless representative with a handful of enlisted followers. If, under the circumstances, Pike's mission did not leave any lasting impression upon the untutored or falsely-tutored savage mind, the fault lay not so

much in his lack of willingness or of talent, as in his meagre resources and the failure of the Washington government to pave the way for him or to follow up adequately what he had initiated.

Pike made his maiden effort in Indian diplomacy in addressing some Saux at the Des Moines Rapids upon the particular subject of a trading station.[9] They were unwilling or unable to designate a proper place for such an establishment, but they listened respectfully to his remarks upon his mission and accepted his presents, including (sad to say) some whiskey, undistinguishable in quality from the trader's beverage whose prohibition he demanded. Pike found whiskey a most effective diplomatic ally, and honored his own rule by its breach rather than its observance. He early found that among the Indians the Americans had a reputation for vindictiveness, and he hoped by establishing a reputation for justice to change this into one of wholesome respect.[10] Unfortunately he tempered his justice by a doubtful mercy that appealed only to the weaker side of the aborigine.

At Prairie du Chien, Pike held a council with some Winnebagoes, at which a Sioux chief also participated. The latter made a request for American medals. His first notable conference occurred with some Sioux at the mouth of the St. Peters (Minnesota). To these new vassals Pike explained the recent territorial transfer,[11] and by diplomatic representations and presents, coupled with methods decidedly undiplomatic, he succeeded in gaining for a song ($200.00 in presents) some 100,000 acres of land, in the vicinity of the St. Croix River, to be used for a trading establishment. He also explained the liberal policy of the United States in trading with the natives, and urged them to further the desire of the President for peace among the Indians by burying the hatchet with the Chippewas. Inconsistent with his own action, he urged a drastic policy in breaking up the trade in whiskey, by urging his hearers to refuse to pay their debts to traders who continued the practice.[12]

The response of the Sioux to Pike, while not cordial, was

9. Coues, *Pike*, I, 16, 17.
10. Coues, *Pike*, I, 34.
11. Pike erroneously said that it allowed us "to put one foot on the sea in the east and the other one on the sea in the west".
12. Coues, *Pike*, I, 83, 226-240.

fairly satisfactory. They ceded the lands asked for, although protesting against signing the treaty, but were doubtful with regard to peace with the Chippewas. However, they promised a safe conduct for Pike and any of their chiefs that he chose to bring down the river; but wished the United States to assist in chastising them, if they did not keep the peace. With this Pike was forced to be content and to pass on to try his diplomacy upon their immemorial foes. Pike had expected to reach Sandy Lake, the reputed source of the river, in time to return to St. Louis before winter, but he now learned that the source was in Leech Lake, some sixty miles further on, and determined to see this lake.[13] This determination involved an exceedingly difficult winter journey, not contemplated in his instructions.

Sending minor presents to the Sioux up the St. Peters, the young explorer proceeded up the main stream, passing St. Anthony's Falls late in September, and in the course of the following month erected a stockade some 110 miles above, where he left a small party with the large boat. He remained in the vicinity about a month, constructing canoes which he afterwards was unable to use, and providing a supply of meat for the winter. In these tasks Pike worked his men hard, but he in no way spared himself. Menominee Indians gave him occasional bits of information concerning proposed hostilities between the Sioux and Chippewas, and their possible relations to his party. Finally, in the middle of December, the overturning of a canoe caused him to abandon the river route and to undertake an overland journey, dragging his provisions on sledges. The young lieutenant was forced to perform the duties of hunter, spy, guide, and commanding officer, and often at night was too weary to make adequate notes of the day's march. In this fashion the small party pressed on to Lower Cedar Lake, where Pike was entertained at a North-West Company house, and a few days later reached a similar establishment on Sandy Lake. In the latter part of January he pressed on to Leech Lake, from which he also visited Cass Lake, near the Height of Land; and at the former lake, on February 16, held his second important council with the Indians.[14]

13. Coues, *Pike*, I, 83, 240, 241.
14. Coues, *Pike*, I, 88-169, *passim*.

In this conference, attended by the Chippewas in the vicinity of Leech Lake, Pike mentioned the plan of the President to open a pathway to the west and the resulting expedition of Lewis, of whose sojourn at the Mandans the preceding winter, they had doubtless heard. His own presence was due to the desire of the President to bring peace to his warring Red Children, and to persuade them to visit his great war chief at St. Louis. He spoke of the promises of the Saux, Foxes, Winnebagoes, and Sioux to observe a mutual peace, and required his hearers also to bury the hatchet. He demanded the surrender of British flags and medals, and spoke of future measures to break up the trade in whiskey.[15] To this speech the Indians responded with becoming submission, but were evasive in making definite promises. The proposition to visit St. Louis aroused considerable opposition, and showed the Indians to be fertile in plausible pretexts. Finally Pike made a direct challenge of their courage, and this aroused the grudging assent of two of the younger chiefs. Most of the conferees appeared to welcome the prospect of peace, while they likewise accepted the change in sovereignty by delivering their British flags and medals. The conference ended, Pike began to retrace his steps. In the course of his journey his young Chippewas left him upon pretense of joining him later, but, of course, failed to do so. On March 5, he arrived at his temporary post on the Mississippi, where he found the misconduct of the sergeant in charge made his presence indispensable.[16]

While awaiting the opening of the river, Pike received a number of visits from the Menominees, who had expected to find some Chippewas with him. Although disappointed, they promised to meet him later at the mouth of the St. Peters. Before he left the spot, Pike succeeded in holding a minor conference with the Menomonees, at which a Chippewa and Winnebago were present. Leaving his post on the 6th of April, he made the portage of St. Anthony's Falls a few days later, in much better spirits than during the previous fall, for his journey now promised to be fairly successful. At the mouth of the St. Peters he held a preliminary conference with the Sissetons and other Sioux, but owing to a

15. Coues, *Pike*, I, 171, 254.
16. Coues, *Pike*, I, 172-180.

poor interpreter was not very successful. Some of those present were recalcitrant about smoking the Chippewa pipe which he bore as a token of peace from those treacherous savages, and others threatened to break their agreement; so the hot-blooded young officer was obliged to threaten future punishment if their actions were not satisfactory. At Lake Pepin he refused to await a few hours beyond the agreed time to meet with some other Sioux, believing that this peremptory course was the only safe one to employ with the savages.[17]

When he reached Prairie du Chien, the young diplomat, in his conference of April 20, 1806, addressed himself to the difficult task of compelling the Winnebagoes to deliver up certain murderers of their tribe, and also certain British flags and medals. In their reply of the following day they stated that they would deliver one of the criminals up to him, or all of them later to General Wilkinson at St. Louis, and also bring with them any British tokens. Pike took them at their word, but warned them not to deceive him. On the same day he held a conference with some Sioux, and reported the peaceful message of the Chippewas. The Sioux agreed to this peace, but doubted the faith of their enemies. They also appeared to be jealous of the fact that Lewis and Clark the previous year had omitted them in distributing medals and flags. Pike assured them that he would provide them with these tokens. They were also perplexed with regard to the liquor traffic. This was forbidden on the western bank of the river, but openly permitted upon the eastern, where American sovereignty had been longest established. Pike assured them that for the future no liquor was to be sold upon either bank. Pike ended his career of Indian diplomacy by regretting, in company with a fellow officer, that his compassion prevented them from making an attack upon some towns of Saux and Foxes who were beginning to exhibit an ugly temper towards the Americans.[18]

The most obvious result to be expected from Pike's Indian policy was peace between the Chippewas and the Sioux; but neither he nor subsequent Indian agents, for many decades, were able to accomplish this desired result. Pike found that the Chip-

17. Coues, *Pike*, I, 180-205, *passim*.
18. Coues, *Pike*, I, 205-210.

pewas had a wholesome respect for the Americans, whom they styled "White Indians," but he distrusted them, and felt that they were in every way inferior to the Sioux. Of the latter he was able to give a much better account than Lewis and Clark did, and he seemed proud of this fact. In general, one gains the idea that the native shrewdness of Pike's conferees was more than a match for his straightforward demands or occasional indirect dealings; while his (to them) officious meddling served only to intensify the bitterness of intertribal warfare. He certainly made some impression, but it was followed by no effective governmental action.

In his task of asserting American sovereignty over the British trading establishments that dotted the region in surprising numbers, Pike was reasonably successful. Soon after leaving St. Louis he began to meet evidences of British trading influence, and with the increase of these he naturally began to emphasize that feature of his mission. The results of the policy of some of the traders appear also in the journals of Lewis and Clark, and show how widespread were their operations. With a few unimportant exceptions, they showed Pike every courtesy and made possible the measure of success he achieved.

Some distance below the Minnesota, Pike fell in with the trader, Murdock Cameron, "a Scotchman by birth and an Englishman by prejudice," whose unscrupulous use of the deadly "firewater," complained of by Lewis and Clark, led Pike later to prefer serious charges against him. Yet he made some use of him in distributing medals to the Indians, while he himself accepted some trifling presents from his partner. The subject of the liquor traffic was a different one for the young officer, as he was not consistent with his principles. He did succeed in getting a promise from one trader to abandon the practice, but others persisted, in open defiance of his attempted regulation, or demanded with ill-concealed insolence a written order to abandon it.[19]

One of the traders, whose clerk had aroused Pike's suspicion, was Colonel Robert Dickson. When Pike arrived at the point on the Mississippi where he erected his stockade, from Indian accounts he formed the opinion that Dickson was spreading false hopes among the natives concerning the objects and resources of

19. Coues, *Pike*, I, 88, 204, 243, 262.

his expedition. The explorer believed that Dickson did this in order later to arouse their prejudices against him, should he fail to realize their expectations. A few days later Pike met Dickson, and was led to correct his opinion of the latter, whom he found not only a man of splendid traits, but likewise willing to furnish substantial help and valuable information.[20]

Above the Falls of St. Anthony, it is difficult to see how Pike, without this aid from the British traders, would have been able to accomplish anything worth while. It was the number of these traders and of their establishments upon the lakes of Northern Minnesota, coupled with the cordial reception and hearty aid of Dickson and his associates, that enabled Pike to move any distance at all from his stockade, or to gain the very faint idea he possessed of the lakes that fed the mighty Father of Waters. Pike may justly have felt his anger rise at the sight of the British flag waving from the North-West establishment at Lower Red Cedar Lake, and he may not have felt much better when informed that the flag belonged to the Indians; but it was the director of this establishment that received him and his followers after a most fatiguing march through the midwinter snow, assisted him in constructing sleds for the remainder of the journey, and aided his explorations of the surrounding region. A few days later he arrived at the Leech Lake establishment late at night, and found the gate was barred; but once making himself known, he was welcome with more than ordinary cordiality. Pike, who had preceded his men, was so impressed by the sincerity of his reception that he raised no objections to the reception of his companions by a display of the British flag.[21]

Sitting by the fireside of the Leech Lake house, reading and nursing his swollen feet while awaiting the approach of his equally miserable companions, Pike must have appeared more in the guise of a recipient, rather than a bestower of favors; but he never forgot the dignity of his mission. On the 6th of February he addressed to his host, Hugh McGillis, a letter[22] explaining the position of his government toward foreign companies. The right,

20. Coues, *Pike*, I, 119.
21. Coues, *Pike*, I, 133-152, *passim*.
22. Coues, *Pike*, I, 247-250.

under the Jay treaty, to trade with Indians did not exempt the traders from duties, licenses, or the laws for the regulation of the trade. The circle of British posts along Lake Superior, the Mississippi, the Red River, and extending far into the interior of Louisiana, was a menace to the interests of American traders, for the latter had to pay duties upon the goods they used in the trade. It was doubtful, therefore, if this new territory, acquired since the treaty of 1794, would continue open freely to the British traders. In addition, he complained of such reprehensible practices as furnishing British flags, medals, and whiskey to the Indians; and expressed the fear that in time of war the company's establishments would afford convenient places for the distribution of arms to be used against the United States.

Although these facts, in Pike's opinion, justified the confiscation of all the North-West Company's property within the limits of the United States, such a course was hardly worthy of himself or of his government, for the British traders probably intended no disrespect in continuing the policy, to which they had become accustomed through Spanish and American neglect. However, in view of the importance of the trade, as shown by his own personal observation, he would demand the following changes for the future. First, that an annual statement of the probable amount of goods to be introduced through the various factories be made out in time to enter these goods at the Michillimackinac custom house. Second, that at no time should a British flag be displayed within the limits of the United States—the American flag should be employed, if any were necessary. Third, that the British should present no flag or medal to the Indians, nor enter into any political relations with them; but they should refer all such questions to the American authorities. Fourth, for all other points involved in the trade, including the sale of liquors, they should observe the laws of the United States upon the subject.

These demands of Pike were certainly in harmony with national interests and honor, and although the condition of Pike and his party hardly permitted them to make their demands with due dignity, the British traders evidently looked beyond the meagre expedition and its impetuous leader, to the wider movement for which they stood. The reply of McGillis, dated Feb-

ruary 15, 1806,[23] is certainly not lacking in respect, either for Pike or the government he represented. He diplomatically began by expressing his appreciation of Pike's moderation. With reference to the payment of duties upon goods used in the trade, he suggested that for this year, when the goods were already distributed among the factories, a mere statement of their value, based upon the personal honor of the traders, should be taken, instead of a formal entry at Michillimackinac. The British traders, as a whole, he declared, rejoiced at the prospect of at length receiving adequate protection, and would willingly contribute their share (in the form of duties) toward this expense. He disclaimed any military purpose in the erection of stockades, which were designed merely for their own defense against the Indians, and which would in no sense serve as forts. Five days before McGillis delivered his reply, the American standard replaced the British flag.

Later, upon Pike's arrival at the Mississippi, he very properly refused to permit one of Dickson's agents to introduce among the Menomonees certain goods upon which no duties had been paid. These goods came into competition with dutiable American goods, and thus worked an injustice to the American trade. Despite this refusal, the agent brought a Chippewa chief to hold conferences with the American explorer, and his principal showed him every attention in his power.[24] It is true that British traders were present in every important conference with the Indians, but apparently Pike, even in their presence, did not spare his criticism of some of their methods. What impression this compliance had upon the savage minds it is impossible to say, but it certainly smoothed the way for the young explorer to make a good impression. Pike, himself, could establish no definite charge of underhand dealing with the Indians against the principal traders, while he acknowledged the material assistance they afforded him.

In his letters of April 18 and July 2,[25] Pike gave Wilkinson his own estimate of the importance of his journey. He had penetrated (as he mistakenly thought) to the source of the Mississippi, and had explored the region bordering upon that river and the

23. Coues, *Pike*, I, 251-254.
24. Coues, *Pike*, I, 176, 189, 196, 261.
25. Coues, *Pike*, I, 265, 271.

Red River of the North. For British sovereignty, he had substituted that of the United States. He had established peace between the Sioux and the Chippewas; and had prepared an Indian report, differing in its characterization of the Sioux from Lewis and Clark's, but, in his estimation, better founded upon personal observation, backed by the testimony of those who had dwelt among them. He had composed a geographical report, vitiated to a certain extent, it is true, by poor instruments and a lack of time to arrange notes, but rendered as accurate as personal inspection and contemporary information could make it. In addition, he urged the importance of an early settlement of the northern boundary upon the basis of a due west line from the Lake of the Woods, in order to forestall a possible British claim to two-fifths of Louisiana. The catalogue of services rendered by the young explorer was a fairly long one, and as already pointed out, its importance was somewhat exaggerated; yet it is a list of which he might well feel proud. Apparently it impressed his General with the possibility of using him to advantage upon a more extensive field of operations.

## CHAPTER XI.

### WILKINSON, PIKE, AND THE SOUTHWEST.

It was on the last day of April, 1806, that Lieutenant Pike arrived at St. Louis, and thus completed his important journey up the Mississippi. During the following weeks he began the preparation of his various reports, and this task was hastened by receiving from Wilkinson a proposal for a more serious undertaking—a tour to the far South-West. This would involve visits to unknown and possibly more treacherous Indians than those of the Upper Mississippi; long journeys through inhospitable deserts and uncertain mountains; and possibly hostile collisions, upon a disputed frontier, with a jealous, vigilant and resourceful neighbor. The last qualification is well attested by the fact that Captain-General Salcedo, at Chihuahua, knew of Wilkinson's plan, before the expedition left St. Louis.[1] Pike, ambitious for the laurels of exploration, if not those of the battlefield, and confident in his own well-tried powers, eagerly accepted the proffered mission, and began preparations for his departure.

The inside history of the life of General James Wilkinson during the year 1806, if known in its entirety, would form a chapter surpassing in interest the most lurid passages in the careers of Benedict Arnold, Aaron Burr, or other similar worthies. Not one of the least of the enigmas of his career during this period is that presented by Pike's second journey. We have already noted that Wilkinson had written to the Secretary of War in August, 1805, regarding the expeditions then being pursued under Peter and Pike.[2] In view of a later communication from Dearborn to Pike we may take it for granted that these expeditions were in the interim, tacitly, if not openly approved—certainly they were later. Yet after the explorer's death, the General apparently lost favor with his whilom supporters, Jefferson and Dearborn, for on No-

1. See page 72.
2. See page 92.

vember 6, 1818, the latter wrote the former[3] that "Pike's expedition was planned and directed entirely by General Wilkinson * * * and no expedition was sent up the Arkansas under your direction."

Some of the Osage chiefs visited by Peter and Chouteau had been prevailed upon to go to Washington, and had returned to St. Louis on their way to their native habitat. For some reason Lieutenant Peter does not appear prominently upon the scene, so what could be more natural than to entrust the task of their further return to the young officer who had acquitted himself so creditably upon the Upper Mississippi. So far everything appears reasonably straightforward and open, and Wilkinson's published instructions to Pike, although unauthorized by Washington authorities, for the most part do not run counter to this impression.

The first instructions were issued June 24, 1806,[4] and directed Pike, as his opening task, to escort the returning Indians to the Osage River. Having accomplished this, what was more fitting than to bid the man who had brought about peace between the Chippewas and the Sioux, to attempt the same with the Kansas and the Osages, and to extend his diplomatic mission to include conferences as well with the Comanches, some of whom he should try to persuade to visit Washington. It was likewise fitting that the author of a valuable geographical report upon the Upper Mississippi should be requested to make similar observations upon the country watered by the Arkansas and Red Rivers. If his geographical survey should in a measure become a military reconnaissance of the important Spanish and Indian positions within striking distance of the United States, this object would not be very reprehensible, especially when accompanied by the injunction, when near the New Mexican frontier, to keep clear of Spanish parties, and to avoid giving any offense.

Nothing in the above instructions would lead one unfamiliar with Wilkinsonian duplicity to suspect the young explorer or his principal; nor, in later instructions,[5] when Wilkinson told Pike

3. See *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 2, Vol. 29, No. 90.

4. Pike, *Account of Expeditions, etc.*, 107-109; Coues, *Pike*, II, 562-565.

5. Coues, *Pike*, II, 565, 566.

that Dr. J. H. Robinson would join the expedition as a volunteer, and would render medical services in return for such accommodations as the party afforded, would this mere statement suggest underhand dealings. That Wilkinson should take this occasion to bid Pike arrest all unlicensed traders found among the Indians, was only in keeping with the law he was bound to enforce. That he should later warn him to break up the plan of a certain company to resort to the Pawnees and Comanches, and through these Indians to open up a clandestine trade with Santa Fé, might seem evidence of his desire to remain on peaceful terms with the Spaniards.[6] Up to this point, then, the course of Wilkinson seems a frank and open attempt to advance, even if without direct orders from the President, the latter's plan to explore the Louisiana Purchase.

Although Wilkinson succeeded as well as usual in covering up his crooked aims, his young subordinate did not, in this particular, give him material aid. We have seen that as early as September, 1805, Pike was ready to take part in some service, not stated, but which may have been explorations in the South-West.[7] When apologizing for the incomplete condition of his Mississippi journal, he urged in excuse[8] that he had scarcely returned from the north before his new journey was proposed to him. Pike reached St. Louis April 30; his first formal instructions were not issued until June 24. The interval may have been employed in personal discussion of matters not formally incorporated in the written directions. At least it is certain that Spanish spies had an inkling

6. A less charitable assumption would be that Wilkinson aimed at self appropriation, either direct or indirect, of the profits of this trade. In the printed instructions, the name of the trading company is left blank. Dr. Coues (*Pike*, II, 574) believed that the leading spirit in this company was the Indian trader, Manuel de Lisa, but he did not state his reason for this belief. A comparison of Wilkinson's letter with the Biddle edition of Lewis and Clark (Coues edition III, 1210, 1230), would lead one to infer that this was the scheme of Captain Robert McClellan, did not that officer bear a letter from Wilkinson to the Indians. The Captain was connected with the Baltimore firm; Wilkinson came originally from Maryland. It would thus be easy to suggest a reason why the latter should oppose Lisa's plan. Cf. Chittenden, *History of the American Fur Trade*, I, 126.

7. See page 92.

8. Coues, *Pike*, I, 273.

of Wilkinson's extensive, but supposedly secret plan, and had communicated it to Captain-General Salcedo before the Malgares expedition left New Mexico in the middle of June, and that the receipt of this information gave an additional motive to the latter expedition. So it is reasonable to suppose that Pike and Wilkinson had a secret understanding upon points not mentioned in the formal instructions, and that this understanding became known to Spaish spies. It was probably this secret mission that later aroused so greatly the suspicions of the Spaniards when Pike attempted to explain his presence on the Rio Grande, and caused them to suspect even Wilkinson's astronomical directions.[9]

Pike had been but a week from St. Louis when, from La Charette, he directed to Wilkinson a letter[10] which revealed more of the true purpose of his mission than the General probably desired. In part Pike wrote:

"With respect to the Tetans (Comanches), the General may rest assured, I shall use every precaution previous to trusting them; but as to the mode of conduct to be pursued towards the Spaniards, I feel more at a loss, as my instructions lead me into the country of the Tetans, part of which is no doubt claimed by Spain, although the boundaries between Louisiana and New Mexico, have never yet been defined, in consequence of which, should I encounter a party from the villages, near Santa Fé, I have thought it would be a good policy to give them to understand that we were about to join our troops near Natchitoches, but had been uncertain about the headwaters of the rivers over which we passed; but that now, if the commandant approved of it, we would pay him a visit of politeness, either by deputation or the whole party, but if he refused, signify our intention of pursuing our direct route to the post below; but if not I flatter myself, secure us an unmolested retreat to the Natchitoches. But if the Spanish jealousy and the instigation of domestic traitors[11] should induce them to make us prisoners of war, (in time of peace) I trust to the magnanimity of our country for our liberation and a due reward to their opposers, for the insult and indignity offered their national honor."

It is somewhat difficult to say just what Pike meant by every sentence of the above extract, but the general meaning is plain enough. Pike's objective point was Santa Fé, and by direct or

9. See Chapter XIV. Coues, *Pike*, II, 412.

10. Pike, *Account of Expedition, etc. App. to Pt.*, II, 49; Coues, *Pike*, II, 570, 571, Note 6.

11. By "domestic traitors" Pike probably refers to the double dealing fur traders of St. Louis and vicinity.

indirect means he was determined to reach it and trust his government to save him from any unpleasant results. He would not have thus written so quickly and so boldly to Wilkinson, if the latter had not given this as the main task of his difficult journey.

Another link in the chain of evidence in favor of the Santa Fé destination is afforded by the presence in the party of Dr. John H. Robinson, the volunteer recommended by Wilkinson. In after life Robinson was an inveterate enemy of Spain, and enjoyed an influential reputation as a filibuster upon the Florida and Texas frontiers. His connection with Pike forms his opening appearance. He bore papers establishing the claim of William Morrision, of Kaskaskia, Illinois, against a certain Baptiste Lalande, an absconding employe. Pike explains at length the details of the case, but admits that Robinson's demands "were in some degree spurious in his hands," and were utilized as a "pretext for Robinson to visit Santa Fé." "Our views," Pike continues, "were to gain a knowledge of the country, the prospect of trade, force, etc."—in short, to spy out the land; "while at the same time our treaties with Spain guaranteed to him, as a citizen of the United States, the right of seeking the recovery of all just debts or demands before the legal and authorized tribunals of the country."[12] The claim was in itself just enough, but the time and circumstances of its employment show that it was to serve as a second string to Wilkinson's bow of intriguing exploration.

Enough has been said to prove that the main purpose of Pike's expedition was to make a military reconnaisance of New Mexico. Although such a movement implied a course of deception contrary to private morality, it by no means equalled the underhand system of espionage that Spanish authorities then employed at Natchitoches, New Orleans, St. Louis, and even at Washington. If the motive that inspired this double dealing was honorable and dictated by national policy, it would in a measure justify those who employed it against their culpable rivals. The question of motive then is the next important one to examine.

As far back as the days of Philip Nolan, Wilkinson had cast longing eyes toward the provinces of Mexico. In June and in September, 1805, Wilkinson held long interviews with Aaron

12. Coues, *Pike*, II, 497-502.

Burr,[13] and by the latter was thought to be firmly resolved to take part in his Mexican filibustering scheme. In view of this fact, his letter of November 26, 1805, to the Secretary of War[14] is interesting. He spoke of the prospect of war with Spain, of conditions of defense in New Orleans and vicinity, favored the mounting of all our troops employed west of the Mississippi, and added:

"If anything should be done from this quarter direct (i. e. from St. Louis), and I might be indulged to recommend my officers, to plan & lead the expedition, if I do not reduce Mexico at least in one campaign, I will forfeit my head."

On the 27th of the next January, Senator Adair, of Kentucky, wrote Wilkinson[15] a letter in which occurs the significant question: "Pray, how far is it, and what kind of a way from St. Louis to Santa Fé, and from thence to Mexico?" The reply of Wilkinson,[16] to a man whom he then trusted, was equally significant and explicit:

"Do you know that I have reserved these places for my own triumphal entry, that I have been reconnoitering and exploring the route for sixteen years; that I not only know the way, but all the difficulties and how to surmount them? I wish we could get leave, Mexico would soon be ours."

Aside from customary exaggeration, this reply well illustrated the plan and purpose that the General had in view. Pike's expedition was but another of his "reconnoitering and exploring" attempts in the direction of Mexico, and one destined to prove unusually successful. In further confirmation of this opinion, it is well to note the affidavit of Judge Timothy Kibby, as printed in the Mississippi*Herald*, September 15, 1807:[17]

"The affidavit sets forth—

"'That in confidential conversation the General (Wilkinson) speaking of Pike's Expedition, upon inquiry, replied, smiling, that it was of a *secret nature* and that Lieutenant Pike himself was not apprised of the ultimate object of the expedition, but that his destination was Santa Fé, treating with the Indians as he advanced.

"'He (Wilkinson) intimated that Lieutenant Pike had been despatched by *his orders*, that the plan was his own, not emanating from the Government, but assented to'".

13. McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy*, 26, 27, 34.
14. Coues, *Pike*, II, 564, note.
15. Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, II, *Ap.*, LXXVII.
16. McCaleb, *Aaron Burr Conspiracy*, 128.
17. Coues, *Pike*, I, LVI.

The above extracts seem sufficiently definite to justify the assertion that Pike's expeditions, both of which were undertaken without express orders from the President, formed a part of Wilkinson's own private schemes. The question naturally arises: What end were they designed to serve? Wilkinson's interviews with Burr, supplemented by such portions of his private correspondence as are available,[18] seem to establish the supposition that Pike's south-western expedition was designed to obtain information for the use of those arch conspirators in their invasion of Mexico. Wilkinson's conduct during this fateful summer seems to support this view. On the 6th of May, 1806, the Secretary of War forwarded definite orders bidding him to repair without delay to the territory of Orleans, and there repel any invasion of "the territory of the United States east of the River Sabine or north or west of the bounds of what has been called West Florida."[19] These orders reached Wilkinson by the middle of June, for on the 17th he wrote to a correspondent: "I shall obey the military mandate, for there I look for fame and honor."[20] His obedience was not prompt, however, for he delayed his departure some two months, possibly for the purpose, as a recent writer suggests,[21] of allowing Burr to develop his filibustering scheme. An additional reason for his delay may be found in the fact that he wished to see Pike safely started upon his journey, and be assured of a reasonable prospect of his success. In view of his own instructions to repair to Orleans territory, his word to Pike[22] to report at Natchitoches, upon the completion of his reconnaissance, acquires a double meaning.

Wilkinson did not issue Pike's official instructions till June 24, several days after receiving his own urgent orders to leave St. Louis at once. Sickness among the Osages whom Pike was to escort detained that officer till the next month. On July 12 Wilkinson issued additional instructions, urging an immediate depar-

18. Consult McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy*, for a full discussion of the relations of Burr with Wilkinson. The writer errs however, in implying (pages 28, 34) that Pike was employed in the Southwest in 1805, while Burr was holding his two conferences with Wilkinson.

19. Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, II, *App.*, XC.

20. McCaleb, 122.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Coues, *Pike*, II, 575.

ture. Wilkinson himself remained in St. Louis for some weeks after his subordinate left. The final word that he received from the latter, before leaving for the South, was probably the letter of July 26,[23] written near the mouth of the Osage. In this Pike stated that there was a very low stage of water in the Osage, and that his party had poor prospect of ascending the river more than sixty miles. Wilkinson may then have concluded that Pike could not complete his reconnaisance in time for effective use, if at all, and accordingly he may have determined to obey the neglected orders from Washington. His delay allowed the Spaniards to preoccupy, during July and August, the disputed strip of territory east of the Sabine. It likewise caused Jefferson later to review his conduct in a cabinet meeting, but resulted in no action.[24]

It was high time, therefore, for him to attend to his own postponed duties, but he gave his faithful subordinate final instructions[25] concerning his relations with Indians and traders. He coupled these with a more explicit warning to be circumspect and discreet, while in the vicinity of Spanish settlements, "as you will be held responsible for consequences."[26] The General then continued:

"By the return of the bearer you may open your correspondence with the Secretary of War, [General Dearborn]; but I would caution you against anticipating a step before you, for fear of deceptions and disappointments. To me, you may and must, write full and freely, not only giving a minute detail of everything past, worthy of note, but also of your prospects and the conduct of the Indians. If you discover that any tricks have been played from St. Louis, you will give them to me with names, and must not fail to give particulars to the Secretary of War, with names, to warn him against improper confidence and deception. Inclose your dispatch for me to Colonel [T] Hunt and it will follow me by a party which I have [left] for the purpose. It is interesting to you to reach Natchitoches in season to be at the seat of government pending the session of Congress; yet you must not sacrifice any essential object to this point. Should fortune favor you on your present excursion, your importance to our country will, I think, make your future life comfortable."

23. Coues, *Pike*, II, 573.

24. Adams, *History of the United States*, III, 279, 280.

25. Coues, *Pike*, II, 573-576.

26. This warning would imply that Wilkinson had become doubtful about hostilities arising with Spain in proper season for his plans and was determined not to allow his subordinate, by rash actions, to involve him in any responsibility for a border warfare. The suggestion arises that by this time he had determined to abandon his complot with Burr.

The above is significant because of a number of expressions that are suggestive but not clearly explicable. What was the "step" which Pike was cautioned not to "anticipate?" What were the "prospects" that he was to report "in minute detail" to the General, but not to the Secretary? Were the "tricks played from St. Louis" the reports by Spanish spies of Pike's real mission; and if these reports reached Washington, would it perchance be awkward for Wilkinson to have the Secretary of War believe them? Was his suggestion to attempt to be in Washington during the next session of Congress simply a piece of worldly advice to cultivate governmental influence, and possibly supplant Lewis and Clark in public favor, or did it have in view the necessity of counteracting ugly suspicions? What were the "essential objects" that must not be sacrificed to gain this point? By his parting suggestion, did Wilkinson still hope for a successful issue to Pike's mission, or was he merely stimulating him to do his best, despite apparently overwhelming obstacles? The career of James Wilkinson will justify all sorts of suspicious questions about what are apparently the most frank and simple statements. We may, with the utmost assurance, draw the conclusion that Wilkinson had a personal motive in sending Pike to the westward, and that his motive arose from his complot with Aaron Burr. A more interesting point to determine is whether Pike knew of this motive of his chief.

At the very outset we may assume that Pike knew he was to act as a spy upon Spanish territory. His own letters reveal this only too plainly. From a national point of view he would be justified in assuming this role, and his own words do not show that he cherished any other idea of his main purpose. Later, in the preface to his book,[27] he indignantly repelled the insinuation that his expedition was undertaken to further any sinister end of Wilkinson's, or that it had any connection with Burr's conspiracy. One who is familiar with Wilkinson's duplicity is only too ready to believe that the young officer protests too much. When, in the course of his Mexican tour, Pike learned of the exaggerated rumors, published in the Mexican *Gaceta,* of Burr's conspiracy and of the suspicions aroused against Wilkinson, he may, for the

27. Pike, *Account, etc., Introduction* (5).

first time have realized what sort of a construction the Spanish authorities placed upon his own expedition.[28] That the Spaniards were not the only ones so to interpret Pike's movements is shown in a book of travels[29] published contemporaneously with his own; and by certain remarks in Congress which drew from him the following rejoinder, dated February 22, 1808, and directed to Secretary Dearborn:[30]

"The Honorable John Rowan of the House of Representatives from Kentucky has this day made some observations before that Honorable body from which a tacit inference might be drawn that my late tour to the Westward was founded upon views entirely unknown to the government; and connected with the nefarious plans of Aaron Burr and his associates. Had those insinuations arisen in any other quarter I should have conceived that my early choice of the military life, the many arduous and confidential duties I have performed, with the perfect knowledge which the Government must have of my military and political Character; would have been sufficient justification for me to have passed over them in silence; but coming from so respectable a source, I feel it a duty to myself; my family; and my profession; to request of you a testimonial which may shut the mouth of Calumny—and strike dumb the voice of slander."

In answer to this request for a testimonial to be used upon members of Congress or to be given to the public, as the young Captain (for such Pike had become on his second journey) might determine, Dearborn two days later replied:[31]

"I with pleasure observe that although the two exploring expeditions you have performed were not previously ordered by the President of the United States, there were frequent communications on the subject of each between General Wilkinson and this Department of which the President of the United States was acquainted from time to time, and it will be no more than what justice requires to say that your conduct in each of these expeditions met the approbation of the President; —and you may rest assured that your services are held in high estimation by the President of the United States; and if opinion of my own can afford you any satisfaction, I can very frankly declare that I consider the public very much indebted to you for the enterprising and judicious manner in which you have performed them."

This communication officially exculpated Pike, but in no sense

28. Coues, *Pike*, II, 500, 652, 836.

29. Christian Schultz, Jr., *Travels on Inland Voyage, etc.*, II, 154. N. Y., 1810.

30. Coues, *Pike*, I, LVI.

31. Coues, *Pike*, I, LVII.

cleared Wilkinson, whose shady reputation so seriously compromised that of his subordinate and of every one else who ever had intimate dealings with him. However, a careful perusal of Pike's writings in connection with other available data, can hardly fail to establish the opinion that he was guilty of nothing more than a sincere friendship for the man who had given him his opportunity for advancement; that he was the unwitting agent of the latter in a certain filibustering scheme, which, because of Wilkinson's official station, involved a serious demeanor, if it did not border upon actual treason; and that in pursuit of this scheme he assumed a policy of deception, reprehensible from the standpoint of personal morality and international courtesy, but justifiable in view of the equivocal dealings of contemporary Spanish colonial authorities. Pike's course throughout, with this one exception, was heroic, and judged by the times and circumstances, sincerely patriotic. His subsequent career would belie any other interpretation.

## CHAPTER XII.

### OPENING THE SANTA FÉ TRAIL.

In the region upon which Pike was about to enter he had been preceded by scattered Spanish and French explorers, and more immediately by representative fellow-countrymen, whose careers illustrated the fact that the westward movement did not await the ambitions of generals or of presidents. The departure of these men from the country of their birth, or adoption, was noted only in the books of some obscure fur-trader, and in a few instances only have their names even been recorded by the special historian; but they were objects of unwelcome solicitude in their new country, and in a wholly unconscious measure they doubtless added to the feeling of bitterness with which the authorities of the Internal Provinces regarded Pike.

In July, 1805, Captain-General Salcedo learned from the governor of New Mexico[1] that the Cuampa Indians (Comanches?) had brought to Santa Fé two Frenchmen and an American, whom they had found near the River Chato (Platte?). According to Salcedo's summary, all three reported themselves to be the employees of a certain Lauselle (Loisel or Louiselle) who had erected a fort called "de la Cuesta Azul" (literally "of the Blue Mount"), among the tribes on the Missouri,[2] and who had sent them to trap beaver. They had been captured by the Cayguas (Kiowas), and by them turned over to the Cuampas (Comanches?), who in turn had brought them into New Mexico. Salcedo advised the governor to detain them, and give them something to do. At the same time he should make peace with the Indians, and endeavor to keep them from trading with these American and French trappers.

We are not told the names of these involuntary additions to

1. Salcedo to Gov. of N. Mex., July 19, 1805. *New Mexico Archives.*

2. The fort was situated upon Cedar Island, in the Missouri, below White River, Presho County, S. D., and was occupied by Louiselle and party as early as the winter of 1803-04. (Thwaites, *Orig. Jour., Lewis and Clark*, I, 160).

the New Mexican population, but from the similarity of the Indians involved, we may hazard the surmise that the American was James Pursley. Pike is our authority for the details of Pursley's journey before reaching Santa Fé.[3] This pioneer was born in Bardstown, Kentucky, but left his native town in 1799. In 1802 he left St. Louis for a year's hunt on the Osage. While returning to St. Louis, after a variety of adventures and misfortunes, Pursley met a trader (probably Louiselle), bound up the Missouri, and embarked with him. With some companions (nationality not stated, but very likely French), Pursley's employer sent him, with a small stock of merchandise, to trade among the Kiowas and Padoucas (Comanches). In the spring of 1805 these Indians were driven by the Sioux to the mountains in which the Platte and Arkansas rise, and here Pursley claimed to have discovered gold. Knowing that they were near New Mexico, the Indians, in June, sent Pursley and his companions to Santa Fé to learn if the Spaniards would trade with them. Governor Allencaster's reply was favorable, but Pursley preferred to remain among the Spaniards, rather than return to the savages. Here he was when Pike visited Santa Fé, making money at the carpenter's trade, but restive under the conditions imposed upon him and longing for the country with which he was forbidden to communicate; and here he apparently remained for nineteen years.[4]

On the 9th of September, 1805, there presented themselves before Salcedo, in Chihuahua, two Frenchmen from Illinois, named Juan Bautista (Jean Baptiste) Lalande and Lorenzo Durocher.[5] These individuals had been sent forward to His Excellency by the same governor, in order that he might pass upon their petitions to become citizens of New Mexico. After an examination which convinced him of the "integrity and sincerity" of their motives, he sent them back to Allencaster for final determination, at the same time giving him discretion to act in applications of this sort. We do not have Lalande's petition before us, but we wonder what arguments he used to convince Salcedo of his

3. Coues, *Pike*, II, 756-758.

4. Cf. Chittenden, *Fur Trade*, II, 493, note 1.

5. Salcedo to Governor of N. Mex., Sept. 9, 1805. *New Mexico Archives*.

integrity; for he was the man sent by William Morrison, of Kaskaskia, in 1804, on a trading expedition to Santa Fé; and whose failure to account, either in person or by remittance, for the goods entrusted to him, constituted the basis of the claim which Pike later used, through Robinson, to obtain an entrance into that city.[6]

Lalande passed up the Missouri and Platte, and sent forward Indian emissaries to Santa Fé. These returned with some merchants to conduct him to that town, where conditions of life appeared so attractive that he determined to remain. His former employer, Morrison, in the vain hope that Pike, in his explorations on the Red River, might fall in with some Spanish merchants with whom he could negotiate his claim on Lalande, empowered Pike to collect the debt. This fact afforded a very convenient pretext for visiting Santa Fé, and Robinson was selected as the agent to make use of it, when the occasion later presented itself.

Lalande and his companion, Durocher, who, by the way, is never mentioned in the American accounts, were apparently well received by the New Mexican authorities, although they appear to have suffered a certain amount of espionage. Some months after their reception, Governor Allencaster registered a formal complaint against them.[7] It appears that they accompanied the unsuccessful expedition of Lucero and Vidal to the Pawnees.[8] In the course of their journey they drew some unfavorable comparisons between the Spanish and the American Indian trade, and asserted that the Spaniards would never become successful rivals of the Americans, because they could not pay their trappers and interpreters enough. They themselves were dissatisfied with the meagre ten *pesos* a month which they earned in New Mexico, and contrasted it with the twenty-five dollars which they had formerly received from the Americans. The governor wrote that after the cordial reception given these two Frenchmen, such talk savored of base ingratitude. He believed that they desired to return to the United States, but that they and the two Frenchmen and American brought in by the Cuampas (Comanches) should not be permitted to do so, because they now knew the province so well that they might be able to do great future damage.

6. Coues, *Pike*, II, 500-502.
7. Allencaster to Salcedo, Jan. 4, 1806. *New Mexico Archives.*
8. See pages 65 and 66.

Lalande, then, apparently did not prosper because of his dishonest change of nationality. When Robinson later appeared in Santa Fé and presented his claim, the Governor reported that Lalande possessed no property.[9] Lalande, when attempting to sound Pike, himself told the latter that he had been for three years a prisoner in the country, and could not get out.[10] It is likely that there was more truth than fiction in both statements. At best any one coming from the United States would be regarded with suspicion, while there was hardly any limit to the barbarity of Spanish treatment toward those whom they received with hostile intent.[11] Accordingly, when later in 1806, these were joined by three more Frenchmen from Louisiana, or possibly by two Frenchmen and an American named Nicolas Cole, captured among the Pawnees, the ordinary living and traveling expenses of these semi-prisoners, even at the modest sum of two *reales* (25 cents) a day, threatened to become a serious burden, to say nothing of what it suggested of future unlawful irruptions.[12] Under these circumstances we may imagine with what feelings the officials upon the threatened border made ready to receive our young lieutenant, at the head of a small detail of the American army, engaged in some uncertain mission for its commander-in-chief, whom they knew as a former discredited and despised Spanish pensioner.

On the afternoon of July 15, 1806, the South-Western Expedition of Pike began at Bellefontaine Landing, near St. Louis. The *personnel* of the expedition was composed of two lieutenants (Pike and James B. Williamson, son of the General), one surgeon (John H. Robinson, a volunteer), one sergeant (William Meek), two corporals, sixteen privates, and one interpreter, a total of twenty-three whites. They were accompanied by fifty-one savages returning to their homes on the Osage and Republican rivers.[13] The details of Pike's journey need not detain us long.

9. Coues, *Pike*, II, 624.

10. *Ibid*, 601.

11. Witness the treatment of Nolan's men; the imprisonment of McKnight and of others; and the confiscations suffered by Chouteau and De Mun.

12. *New Mexico Archives*, Sept. 1; Oct. 8, 1806. The records do not make it certain whether one or two parties are meant.

13. Coues, *Pike*, II, 358-360.

Manuel de Lisa, the fur-trader, attempted to detain the expedition by arresting its interpreter for debt. From La Charette Pike, on July 22, directed his famous letter outlining his plan to reach Santa Fé. On the 28th, they reached the mouth of the Osage, up which they were to proceed, but of which they received report that the stage of water was discouragingly low.[14] August 16 they passed the site where Pierre Chouteau had formerly erected Fort Carondelet, of which no vestige remained. Two days before Pike had sent to Wilkinson a report[15] that the Little Osages were on the warpath against the Kansas, and that the Grand Osages were beginning hostilities against the whites on the Arkansas. To Manuel de Lisa, Pike ascribed the responsibility for the action of the Little Osages, while he seemed to feel that the whole incident showed how little dependence could be placed upon Indian, and particularly Osage, friendship, despite the exertions of Chouteau the previous year. The event also made him more determined to carry out the General's warning against Lisa's trading venture, when, a few days later, he met three of his hunters without a passport.[16]

On August 19 the expedition was received at the Grand Osage village by White Hairs and his people. On the 21st the Americans held with representatives of the Great and Little Osages a conference, at which Pike presented medals and other trinkets, and made a request for horses and Indians to accompany him to the Pawnees and Kansas, and perhaps further on his proposed journey. Pike found that the Indians were not very quick to respond, a fact which caused him again to suspect Lisa's underhand influence; nor, at first, could he get the regular government interpreter, despite Wilkinson's explicit orders, to agree to accompany him to the Pawnees. The Osage chiefs appeared to lack authority, owing to a schism in their people some twelve years before. This schism had been effected by Pierre Chouteau, because his rival, Lisa, had secured from the Spanish government the exclusive privilege of trading up the Osage River, after the Chouteau family had enjoyed it for a score of years. This schism had brought into being a new group on the Arkansas, made up of the younger, more lawless

14. Coues, *Pike*, II, 573.
15. Coues, *Pike*, II, 576-577.
16. For details of the journey; Cf. Coues, *Pike*, II, 357-387.

elements. It was this group that had interfered with Jefferson's plan to explore the Arkansas and Red.[17] After chafing under these unfavorable conditions for more than a week, and returning once after starting, owing to the arrival of the trader, C. Chouteau, Pike, with twenty-three whites and goodly Osage delegations, set out with his three Pawnees for the latter's country.

Pike's journey over the plains of Kansas was of no particular interest. The leader's greatest care seemed to be to keep together his savage allies, whom he generally styled "a faithless set of poltroons." On September 22, a Pawnee hunter doubtless caused Pike's heart to beat faster in thought of the possibility of a border war, by telling him that a party of three hundred Spaniards, for some unknown reason had lately advanced as far as the Sabine. The same hunter also spoke of the hostilities between the Comanches, Pawnees, and Kansas, thus showing additional difficulties in the path of his Indian negotiations. Two days later they began to encounter numerous Pawnees, and on the following day struck the trail made by Malgares on its return, the grass being still beaten down in the pathway. On this same day they arrived near the Pawnee villages, where the leader with his white and Indian companions met with an elaborate reception, after which the main party, under Lieutenant Wilkinson, passed on above the village and encamped upon the Republican River. Pike devoted himself to a chief who gave him particulars concerning the recent visit of the Spaniards under Malgares.[18]

As a result of this visit Pike, at the time of his entrance into this village, found both Spanish and American flags flying in salutation. This was in itself a sign that a difficult negotiation was before him. On October 28 Pike held a council with a few of the Kansas and Osages, and forced these enemies to smoke the pipe of peace, although he was uncertain how permanent this friendship would prove. The Kansas also promised to send two of their tribe to accompany the party, either down the Arkansas or Red; but as usual they failed to come up to their agreement.[19]

17. Coues, *Pike*, II, 388, 392, 529, 530, 572-582. See also Chapter IV.

18. Coues, *Pike*, II, 393-410. This village of the Pawnee Republicans—so-called—was on the Republican River near the present Kansas-Nebraska boundary.

19. Coues, *Pike*, II, 414, 584, 585.

The grand council with the Pawnees occurred on September 29, and afforded one incident indicative of Pike's determination and diplomacy. The Spanish flag was still flying in front of the tent where the council was being held. Among other demands, Pike stated that this Spanish flag should be given up and an American one run up in its place. At first no response was made to this rather audacious proposal, but Pike repeated it with greater insistence. Finally one of the old chiefs complied with his demand, to the great satisfaction of the Kansas and Osage present, but with the disfavor of all the Pawnees. Perceiving this, and apprehensive that his action might cause them some difficulty with the Spaniards, should the latter return, Pike gave back the Spanish standard, upon condition that it should not again be displayed during the stay of the Americans. This apparently mollified the savages, although it did not make them any more willing to aid the American officer in his explorations.[20]

At this conference Pike distributed medals, presents and merchandise as a preliminary move to the requests that he made. He wished horses, an interpreter familiar with the Pawnee and Comanche dialects, and some volunteers to accompany the expedition and then to visit Washington. After some days of anxious waiting, Pike learned that the Pawnees not only refused his requests, but that they threatened to prevent the further progress of the party. The Indians claimed that they had induced the Spaniards to forbear marching nearer the Missouri, and that in return for this concession, they promised to prevent Pike's party from passing beyond their villages. The occasion was one for prompt decision, in which our young lieutenant was not lacking.

After detailing to the Pawnee chief the purpose for which he had been sent and what he had already accomplished, Pike stated in his interview that:[21]

"He must know that the young warriors of his great American father were not women, to be turned back by words: that I should therefor proceed, and if he thought proper to stop me, he could attempt it; but we were men, well armed and would sell our lives at a dear rate to his nation: that we knew our great father would send his young warriors there to gather our bones and revenge our deaths on his people, when our spirits would rejoice in hearing our exploits sung in the war-songs of our chiefs."

20. Coues, *Pike*, II, 415, 587.
21. Coues. *Pike*, II, 417.

This exhibition of American courage apparently outweighed the obligations of a promise half-heartedly given to the Spaniards, for the chief simply said that it was a pity, and remained silent.[22] However, the Pawnees did make it difficult for Pike to procure horses to transport his baggage, and their opposition prevented Kansas Indians from accompanying him. As hostilities were then existing between the Pawnees and Comanches, Pike could not hope to reach the latter through the former. This was a disappointment, for he understood that the Comanches were then at war with the Spaniards, and believed that he could make favorable terms with them, if he could reach them and make them understand his message. Notwithstanding the difficulties in the way, he determined to press into their country and do the best possible.[23]

It was on October 4 that the arrival of two French traders gave him the information of the safe arrival of Lewis and Clark at St. Louis, and afforded an additional incentive to make his own journey a success. Apropos of his main purpose and significant of the future highway to the South-West, he wrote General Wilkinson[24] (not the Secretary of War, to whom, upon Wilkinson's advice, he also wrote) that:

"Any number of men who may be reasonably calculated on would find no difficulty in marching by the route he came, with baggage, wagons, field artillery and all the usual appendages of a small army; and if all the route to Santa Fé should be of the same description, in case of war, I would pledge my life, and what is infinitely dearer, my honor for the successful march of a reasonable body of troops into the province of New Mexico."

The threatened opposition of the Pawnees made Pike's departure from their vicinity, on October 7, an occasion of more than ordinary interest. However, nothing more serious occurred than the stealing of horses (soon returned), after which the little party of twenty-six, including four Osages, took up its march for the Arkansas. They followed the trace made by Malgares' party on its return, and in doing so Pike and Robinson became separated from the main party, and did not reach the Arkansas till the 18th of October, three days after the others. After a few days spent in the construction of canoes Lieutenant Wilkinson, Sergeant Ballenger, and four privates, and the Osages started, on the 28th, to make the descent of the Arkansas, while Pike, Robinson, and fourteen others turned their faces toward the mountains.

22. *Ibid*, 587.
23. Coues, *Pike*, II, 587-588.
24. Coues, *Pike*, II, 418, 588.
25. Coues, *Pike*, II, 418-432.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## PIKE ON THE MEXICAN BORDER.

In the letter sent General Wilkinson[1] by his son, Pike stated that Robinson was sanguine of the success of the expedition, and that he, as leader, would exert himself "so far as lies in the compass of human exertions," but he said nothing about reaching New Mexico. Rather, he sought to excuse the expense of the expedition up to this point, and to compare his task and the results with the work of Lewis and Clark. Perhaps he realized that his little party was not really in condition for such a mountain journey as was still before them, and that with the advance of the season he might be compelled to give up his New Mexican reconnaisance and be content with the rewards of the ordinary explorer. His proposed itinerary now was to ascend the Arkansas till he reached the mountains or found the Comanches. Thence he should pass to the head of the Red River, "where we shall be detained some time;"[2] after which he should proceed as quickly as possible to Natchitoches.

Wholly undaunted by the fact that the clothing and provisions for his men were wholly inadequate for a winter journey in the Rockies, Pike started to trace the Arkansas to the mountain barrier, which he afterwards described as the natural boundary between Louisiana and New Mexico. On November 15, within the limits of the present state of Colorado, the leader got the first glimpse of the "Mexican Mountains." A week later he and his companions encountered a war party of Pawnees, returning from an unsuccessful foray against the Comanches, and endured an uncomfortable, if not quite dangerous, interview. On the 24th, upon the site of the modern city of Pueblo, they constructed what was probably the first American structure within the State of Colorado. During the latter part of the month Pike and a few com-

1. Coues, *Pike*, II, 589-594.

2. This might mean to prepare canoes for the descent, or to spy out the neighboring territory.

panions made a fruitless excursion in the direction of the peak that now bears his name, but returned, stating his belief that no human foot could ascend its "pinical."[3]

For the next two and a half months Pike, in his travels along the headwaters of the Arkansas and Platte, was hardly out of sight of the peak wrongly named after him. He passed up the Arkansas as far as the present site of Canon City, and then by a detour, to its source, near Leadville. Thence he descended the stream, imagining that he was on the Red, until he reached one of his former encampments. Pike was unaware of the fact that it was the Canadian that rises near Santa Fé, and not the Red, for which he was searching. He consoled himself for his failure by reflecting that he had learned much of the headwaters of the Arkansas and Platte, and as he mistakenly supposed, of the Yellowstone.[4] Passing up Grape Creek, a branch of the Arkansas, the party crossed the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, both leader and men suffering intensely, and several of the latter being left behind. Upon the River Conejos, a western tributary of the Rio Grande, about five miles from its mouth, on the 1st of February, Pike began the erection of a stockade He claimed that it was to serve as a protection for the survivors of the party from the Indians, while game was being killed and help was sent back to those in the mountains.[5]

That Pike had an idea of defending himself against other enemies than the Indians is shown by the care which he bestowed upon the construction of his stockade, and by his own statement that, "thus fortified, I should not have the least hesitation of putting the 100 Spanish horse at defiance until the first or second night, and then to have made our escape under cover of the darkness; or made a sally and dispersed them, when resting under a full confidence of our being panic-struck by their numbers and force."[6]

Pike, by his own claim, believed himself to be upon a tributary of the Red River, but he knew that he was a few miles beyond its right bank and within disputed territory, if not upon actual Span-

3. Coues, *Pike*, II, 433-459.
4. Coues, *Pike*, II, 479.
5. Coues, *Pike*, II, 479-494.
6. Coues, *Pike*, II, 498.

ish soil. Apparently he expected an attack from the force under Malgares, and was determined to give as good an account of himself as possible. He may have conceived it his duty to construct a strong fort within disputed territory and to raise the American flag, in order to counteract, by this sort of military demonstration, the effect of Malgares' incursion into what he regarded as undisputed American territory. His true motive, in absence of further documentary evidence, must remain uncertain, but his quiet submission, much to the relief of the Spaniards, who had a wholesome respect for his stockade, would seem to prove that he intended simply to make a demonstration that would secure him an entrance into Santa Fé. In view of this demonstration, his subsequent treatment by those whom he thus rashly challenged, may be regarded as unusually forbearing.[7]

It was from this stockade that, on February 7, Robinson started out upon his hazardous mission to collect Morrison's claim upon Baptiste Lalande, and incidentally to learn whatever he could of New Mexico. Proceeding up the Conejos, on the second day he fell in with some Ute Indians, who conducted him to a frontier village, whence he was sent to Santa Fé. From these Indians Robinson claimed that he first knew that Pike was on the Rio Grande, rather than the Red, and for a time he was uncertain whether to return and inform Pike or to push on; but as he distrusted the Indians, he determined to proceed at once to the nearest settlement. The governor, Allencaster, distrusted Robinson's alleged motive for being in his capital, but treated him well and sent him farther into the interior—a policy that, as long as he was kindly treated, accorded only too well with the American's wishes. Meanwhile, alarmed by the latter's presence, Allencaster took immediate steps to apprehend Pike and the survivors of his party.[8]

On the 16th of February, Pike experienced the first results of Robinson's mission, in the form of a visit from two Spanish spies, who were entertained at the stockade and informed of the reason for his presence. After they left, Pike took measures to bring up his stragglers and strengthen his defenses. On the 26th of Feb-

7. For a discussion of Pike's situation at this juncture, see Coues, *Pike*, II, 499, 504, notes 44 and 46.

8. Coues, *Pike*, II, 498, 624, 625.

ruary a party of fifty dragoons and fifty mounted militia arrived before the stockade, and from its leaders Pike first learned (so he states) that he was upon the western bank of the Rio Grande, and consequently within undoubted Spanish jurisdiction. He immediately lowered his flag, and after some argument with the Spaniards, who promised him safe conduct without using the least restraint, he made the best of an awkward situation by promising to accompany them to Santa Fé. In view of all his preparations up to this point, we can not but regard this reluctance as largely feigned. He was running a risk, it is true, in trusting the Spaniards, but he doubtless believed the end he had in view fully justified all that he and his men incurred.

The Spanish view of Pike and his party is of interest. Aside from the documents already cited in the preceding chapters, the report of Governor Allencaster to Salcedo, dated at Santa Fé, April 1, 1807,[9] is worthy of extended notice. After giving a resumé of the appearance of Robinson and the apprehension of Pike and his men, who, however, were not treated as prisoners, he wrote:

"From all which circumstances, from what I gathered from Robinson and from the above named officer (whom he styles "Mungo-Meri-Paike") I concluded distinctly that the expedition of July [July, 1806], was especially designed to conciliate two Indian tribes in behalf of the U. S. Goverment, to make them liberal presents, and drawing them into friendship, treaty and commerce, to place them under the Anglo-American protection—all this referring especially to the Comanche tribe, the most powerful of our allies.

Furthermore, that the Anglo-American government considers as included within the boundaries of Louisiana, all the rivers that empty into the Mississippi; and all the territories that extend to the headwaters of the Rio Colorado [meaning the Canadian, according to Meline] which rises a few leagues from the Pueblo of Taos further to the north in this province; that it is their intention this year or the next to establish fortes or settlements on all these rivers, in order to monopolize all the trade and commerce carried on by a large number of tribes in the province."

9. Coues, *Pike*, I, XLVI, XLVII, quoted from Meline, *Two Thousand Miles on Horseback*, 243-245.

10. The journey ends at this time for Pike, Robinson on part of the men. On May 3, 1808, Pike reported eight men as still detained in Mexico. (Coues, *Pike*, II, 855, note 5). *The Louisiana Herald*, May 5, 1821, mentions the arrival at Fort Smith of Sergeant William Meek, who had been released the preceding September, after 14 years detention.

Underhand dealings with the Indians and unfounded territorial claims! These constitute the burden of the Governor's report, as well as of almost every Spanish border communication of this period. Yet Pike and his men were treated with undeserved moderation as they passed on their enforced Mexican tour, which finally, by a roundabout course, ended July 1 at the American encampment at Natchitoches, where Wilkinson, a year before, had bidden him repair.[10] It is not within the province of this study to consider the details of this valuable journey. Suffice it to say that Pike, by somewhat questionable practices, collected a vast mass of information, which for the first time presented in an alluring light the attraction of the South-West for the prospective trader and adventurer. By his cleverness and assiduity, aided by a good memory, Pike succeeded in making good, in a measure, the loss of his papers at the hands of Captain-General Salcedo.

Meanwhile, how had it fared with Pike's former associate, Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson? After leaving his superior officer, Wilkinson essayed the navigation of Arkansas, but the low stage of water caused this to be simply a dragging of the canoes through the sand and ice. Naturally this first day's navigation caused the party the utmost discouragement, and when, two days later, after the river froze completely, the water ran off from under the ice, Wilkinson determined to take to the land. This step caused the abandonment of most of their clothing and provisions. The march over sand hills and river bottoms, with an inadequate supply of provisions, soon became tiresome, and on the 15th of November he halted to construct some new canoes, and to lay in a supply of meat. By the 25th of this month he again attempted the river navigation, but with little better success than before. On the 30th he met with some of the Grand Osages, and visited one of their chiefs, who complained of the dealings of Chouteau with his tribe, and charged him with being unfriendly towards the Americans. This gave young Wilkinson opportunity to make some remarks about the government policy of distributing medals, which had been carried on so as greatly to cheapen the value of these tokens in savage eyes.[11]

The remainder of the unfortunate journey contains little that

11. Coues, *Pike*, II, 550-552.

is worthy of attention. Lieutenant Wilkinson recommended the location of a factory on the Verdigris River, and described the Osages living upon its banks. But he seems to have had few qualifications for taking observations, and the circumstances of the journey, coupled with his own indisposition during part of the time, did not permit him to add any valuable results to the general store of western knowledge. He did, however, prepare a chart of his course, which he hoped the President, as well as his father, would find satisfactory. It was doubtless utilized in making the later maps of this region, particularly those published in Pike's work.

When Pike reached Natchitoches, he found awaiting him there a letter from General Wilkinson,[12] congratulating him upon his safe return, and giving directions regarding his future movements. It is suggestive to note that he mentioned the reports connecting him with Burr, and then cautioned the young explorer to be careful about breathing a word concerning the information he had acquired, "because publicity may excite a spirit of adventure adverse to the interests of our government, or injurious to the maturation of those plans which may hereafter be found necessary and justifiable by the government." He asked Pike to make up his reports in duplicate and transmit them to him at Washington. He was also to furnish the proposed Arkansas expedition[13] with such information as he judged favorable. He mentioned the President's approbation of his work on the Upper Mississippi, and gave him permission to repair to Washington as soon as his reports were ready.

Immediately upon his arrival Pike answered his patron's letter,[14] giving a very full description of the seizure of his papers at Chihuahua, and of the way he had been able to repair this loss, to a measurable extent, and add other notes of the journey through Mexico. This material would, in his opinion, afford results which he conceived "to be immensely important, and which open a scene for the generosity and aggrandizement of our country, with a wide and splendid field for harvests of honor for individuals." He mentioned the fragmentary character of his notes, which would

12. Coues, *Pike*, II, 825-828.
13. See page 90.
14. Coues, *Pike*, II, 828-836.

prevent him from complying immediately with Wilkinson's request for duplicate copies of his report. He spoke of taking distances and courses on his journey to St. Louis, which would complete his tour of the greater part of Louisiana. "I am certain," he added, "that from the survey of the Missouri by Captains Lewis and Clark, my own of the Mississippi, Lieutenant Wilkinson's of the Lower Arkansas, which river I surveyed to its sources, and Mr. Dunbar's of the Red River, can be formed the completest survey of Louisiana ever yet taken." He spoke well of his men, especially his interpreter, and recommended his companion, Dr. Robinson for a commission.

As Pike was uncertain of Wilkinson's exact whereabouts, he likewise reported his arrival to Secretary Dearborn[15] in a letter, less personal in tone, but of more general interest. After bitterly criticizing the action of Captain-General Salcedo toward himself and command, he fiercely charged him with violation of our territories, oppression of our citizens, and tampering with our Indians. The "unreasonable ideas" of this official and the Viceroy upon the subject of the "line of demarkation" was such as, he thought, would preclude amicable adjustment. Upon this line he had some information, as well as some knowledge of New Spain, that would be useful in case of a rupture with the United States. He closed his epistle with the following significant summary of recent Louisiana exploration, in which his own part was not belittled:

**"The surveys of Captains Lewis and Clark; mine of the Mississippi; Osage; upper Arkansas; Platte and Kansas rivers, with Lieutenant Wilkinson's and Mr. Freeman's of the lower parts of the Red and Arkansas rivers, together with the notes I intend taking on my route from hence up the Mississippi; will I presume form a mass of matter, which will leave but three[16] more objects to be desired in forming a complete chart of Louisiana."**

Pike immediately began the task of arranging his notes, but in the course of a month he realized that the seizure of his papers by Salcedo was a more serious loss than he at first thought. Accordingly, on August 20, 1807, he addressed to that official[17] a futile request for these papers, not merely as a personal favor to him-

15. Coues, *Pike*, I, L, LI.

16. Pike does not mention the three objects, but the writer ventures to suggest that he had in mind the Red, the Platte, and the Yellowstone.

17. Coues, *Pike*, II, 837-839.

self, but because his notes of the Arkansas would be of value to his government in determining the important question of limits. He also remonstrated vigorously against the detention of his remaining men long after the time promised by Salcedo. Furthermore, Pike took occasion to publish in the Natchez *Herald*[18] an account of the survivors of Nolan's expedition, and of his own intercession with Salcedo in their behalf.

As in the case of the Mississippi voyage, Pike prepared a geographical dissertation[19] on the portion of Louisiana that he traversed on his second expedition. This comprised some description of the rivers he crossed, and the general character of the intervening territory. He mistakenly made the assertion that he could take a position in the mountains from which, by a day's journey, he could reach the sources of the Arkansas, the Yellowstone, the Platte, the Colorado, or the Rio Grande. He not only made this assertion in print, but drew his maps to correspond. Pike was likewise the discoverer of the great American Desert, which he believed would afford the advantage of keeping our population more compact. Furthermore, Pike gave a fairly complete and accurate picture of the Osage, Pawnee and Comanche Indians—the latter, of course, not from personal observation. In general, one would safely characterize Pike's geographical and ethnological work in the South-West as interesting, rather than highly important. But this is partly due to the seizure of his papers by the Spaniards.

Shortly after the arrival of Pike at Chihuahua, Captain-General Salcedo directed a letter to General Wilkinson,[20] in which he spoke of the representations made by the Spanish minister at Washington, and by Casa Calvo at New Orleans, against any exploring expeditions into territories unquestionably belonging to His Majesty. He mentioned the reasons given by Pike and Robinson for their presence in New Mexico, but stated that their papers showed an offense against the Crown of Spain that would justify their being held as prisoners. With a desire to preserve harmony and good understanding, however, he had merely kept

18. Coues, *Pike*, I, LII ff.

19. Coues, *Pike*, II, Chapter IV.

20. Pike, *Account, etc., App. to Pt.* III, 86, 87. Coues, *Pike*, II, 815-817.

their papers, while he afforded the persons themselves every opportunity to return to their native country. When this letter, forwarded by Wilkinson, reached Washington, Jefferson suggested to Dearborn a conciliatory answer.[21] He was to mention the fact that although the United States considered itself entitled to the country to the Bravo (Rio Grande), it carefully abstained from making any advances beyond the Sabine, until its claims should be amicably settled. With the Red River the case was different. That river unquestionably belonged to France; for that nation had made several settlements upon it, while Spain, on the contrary, had none. Consequently our government, as successor to the French, took measures for the exploration of the river, by sending Mr. Freeman from its mouth upwards, and Lieutenant Pike from the source downwards. The object of these expeditions was merely scientific, and Pike's orders to confine himself to the Red were so strict that it could be only an unfortunate mistake that carried him to the headwaters of the Rio Bravo. The letter should close with a request to excuse his misfortune, and with an expression of thanks for the courtesies already extended to him, in the hope that these would include the return of his papers. The letter was probably dispatched in accordance with the President's suggestions, but evidently without the wished-for result.

In addition to the annoyance caused by the loss of his papers, partially made good, Pike had to suffer from the fact that his trip was authorized only by a general under public, if not official, suspicion; that no one high in office bore the same personal relation to him that Jefferson bore to his former secretary, Lewis; and that his task did not appeal to the popular imagination in such a way as did the opening up of a new route to the South Sea. A committee of the House of Representatives twice reported in favor of his services.[22] General Dearborn wrote him a personal letter, in which he spoke of the high appreciation held by the President of his political, geographical, and historical information, and of his own personal belief that the public was much indebted to him.[23] He also wrote to the President, urging special com-

21. Jefferson to Dearborn, June 22, 1807, Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, IX, 85, 86.

22. *Am. State Papers, Misc.*, I, 719, 942-944.

23. Coues, *Pike*, II, 844; *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 3, Vol. 11, No. 72.

pensation. Yet there was something sinister connected with the whole expedition that created a distrust of its chief actor; and this distrust has remained to the present day. Even the committee that on March 10, 1808, reported strongly in favor of compensation for him and his men, mentioned the connection of a Joseph Ballenger with the expedition as due to the furtherance of some Spanish project, and stated that Pike may or may not have had knowledge of it, but forebore to discuss it, as foreign to its report.

With this insinuation of double dealing, in addition to Robinson's presence and subsequent career, and Wilkinson's duplicity, Pike certainly carried a load of suspicion and intrigue that would have overburdened a far more prominent figure than himself. Even his modest literary laurels are tarnished by the fact that he used too freely and without due acknowledgment the contemporary publications of the Baron Von Humboldt.[24] These facts, however, and the greater glamour accompanying the Lewis and Clark expedition, should not lead us to withhold from him due credit for his bravery, and for what he actually accomplished. His journey proved the feasibility of an overland trading route from Missouri to Santa Fé, from which later traders were to reap a rich reward, and over which another finally led an American army of conquest. His description of the mineral and agricultural wealth of New Spain stimulated the appetite of every adventurous American spirit; while his report of the desire of the native Mexicans for independence doubly stirred some of these to campaigns in which the emancipation of an oppressed people and personal gain and glory were both controlling motives. During the decade after the appearance of his published journal, it formed the guide book of the southwestern filibuster.

24. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, IX, 432; Coues, *Pike*, I, XLI-XLIII.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF LOUISIANA EXPLORATION.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the subject of Louisiana exploration presents little of importance, and that is principally concerned with the results of Pike's unauthorized incursion into New Mexico. Yet, for the sake of completeness, this phase of the subject should receive brief treatment. Certain correspondence already mentioned, such as Casa Calvo's communications to his home government and to the officials of the Internal Provinces; Jefferson's application for a passport for the Red River Expedition; Salcedo's complaints of Lewis, Freeman, and Pike; and his spirited missives to Claiborne and Wilkinson,[1] bear a semi-diplomatic stamp. In addition, during these critical years of mutual recrimination, these exploring expeditions served too well as pretexts for regular diplomatic communications, to remain unused.

Early in the year 1805 the Secretary of State, Madison, felt called upon to protest to Casa Yrujo, the Spanish minister, against certain movements upon the Louisiana frontier, which he regarded as hostile in character. In his reply of March 12,[2] Casa Yrujo gave what seemed a satisfactory explanation of these movements, and then proceeded to inquire upon what grounds the American government justified the expeditions of Lewis and Clark, and of Hunter and Dunbar. Madison had expressed himself as especially anxious, while the territorial claims were in dispute, that both nations should maintain the *status quo* upon the Florida and Texas frontiers. While the Spanish authorities had in no way assented to this proposal, in Casa Yrujo's opinion they had observed it. He wished to avoid the appearance of recrimination, yet he felt compelled to state that when American officials, without knowing the limits of Louisiana, authorized the exploration of a

1. See pages 23, 56, 58, 59, 87-89.

2. Casa Yrujo to Madison, March 12, 1805. MSS. *Spanish Notes*, I, Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

region in the undoubted possession of His Catholic Majesty, as he regarded the territory bordering upon the Missouri and its tributaries, they were violating the very *status quo* upon which they insisted. These expeditions were without the consent of the Spanish authorities, who had received no previous notice of them.

Although his note remained unanswered, it probably influenced Jefferson to seek a passport for the Dunbar expedition.[3] Madison also took occasion to inform Armstrong, in Paris, and George W. Erving, our Chargé at Madrid,[4] that these exploring expeditions in no measure justified Spanish hostilities on the frontier. The object of the expedition under Lewis had been communicated to Casa Yrujo, and the latter had vouchsafed no reply to show that the Spanish government was not satisfied with the explanation. The American officials had assumed that the other expedition was as little objectionable, and, moreover, Governor Claiborne had been ready to enter into explanation with Casa Calvo or Folch regarding it.

After this first protest there was little in the succeeding expeditions that called for diplomatic intervention previous to Pike's famous Mexican tour. The accompanying circumstance of this journey offered much to justify such intervention. Casa Yrujo had departed, but had left a worthy successor in the Chargé d'Affaires, Valentin de Foronda. We have already noticed Salcedo's denunciation of Pike's intrusion and Jefferson's suggested reply,[5] which, however, as Madison speedily learned, failed to appease Spanish resentment. On August 22, 1807, Foronda directed to the State Department a note,[6] in which he mentioned Salcedo's letter to Wilkinson announcing Pike's arrest, and then proceeded to laud the generous treatment of the latter by the Captain-General as another proof of the friendship which the King felt for the American government. Continuing, he uttered this significant comment upon Pike's mission:

3. See page 56.

4. Madison to Erving, March 15, 1805. Bureau of Indexes and Archives, *Instructions*, 6.

5. See pages 131, 132.

6. Foronda to Madison, Aug. 22, 1807, *Spanish Notes*, II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

"According to the law of nations Dr. Robinson and the officer Pike should have been treated as spies; they were apprehended in a country concerning which there was not the least dispute, the least doubt, but that it belonged to my August Sovereign. It is true that the officer alleged *that he lost his way*. The statement may be true, but it may also be a pretext, and the latter is more probable. You know that if such excuses are satisfactory a spy could never be condemned. You ought to know that Pike contradicted himself in his declaration, for at first he declared that Dr. Robinson was not connected with him, and later that he was.

The suspicions against this official were increased by discovering a small sketch upon torn paper, of the territory situated between Missouri and Santa Fé, with information, obtained in the latter villa, of its population, commerce, etc.

[Consider?] this fact, that Dr. Robinson had penetrated to Santa Fé, upon the specious pretext of collecting an account. Grant that he was French, and that he departed the 15th of June, for the country of the Pawnees to receive what was due him. Your perspicuity will lead you to agree with me that although the assertions may be true, they have all the appearances of a mere pretext, since the Doctor belonged to Pike's party, and penetrated to Santa Fé.

Nevertheless, the General Commandant has raised to such a point his generosity, out of consideration for these States, that instead of punishing them according to the full rigor of the laws and of making an example, so that in the future no one should dare to place a foot in the dominions of the King, my Master, unless with previous license, he not only permitted Pike and his soldiers to return to their country, but he also advanced them a thousand dollars for their expenses. This sum he enters as a claim and I hope that this government will be pleased to reimburse it, placing it at my disposition."

Foronda's letter certainly did not mince matters regarding the conduct of Wilkinson's emissaries; and Jefferson, to whom Madison referred the matter, evidently felt that something must be said to remove the implied censure of his government, without at the same time incriminating the protégé of his favorite general. Accordingly, he advised Madison[7] to arrange through the War Department for the repayment of the money actually advanced to Pike. At the same time he should assure Foronda that this government never employed a spy for any purpose; and that Pike's mission was to ascend the Arkansas and descend the Red, to ascertain their geography. So far as the administration knew, he entered the waters of the North River (Rio Grande) believing them

7. Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 30, 1807, *Jefferson Papers*, Ser. 1, Vol. 12, No. 250.

to be those of the Red. Although our claim extended as far as the former river, together with the privilege of navigating it, yet Pike's voyage was not intended to assert that right; and it was merely mentioned because the Spanish minister has chosen to deny it.

Following the President's suggestion Madison, on the 2nd of the following month, informed Foronda that the Secretary of War had been instructed to repay the thousand dollars loaned Pike. Evidently he made the rest of the President's letter the subject of a verbal communication to the Spaniard, for the subject does not now appear in the files of the Department.

By the following February Foronda received from Salcedo detailed accounts of the expenses incurred by the Captain-Generalcy of the Internal Provinces because of the entrance of Pike and his party, and notified Madison of this fact.[8] These expenses amounted to 21,655 *pesos*, 3 *reales*, 7 *granos* (about $21,655.44), more than double the sum appropriated by Congress for all the exploring expeditions so far employed.[9] The Spaniard proceeded upon the principle that the party causing unnecessary expenses should be responsible for them. Pike had no business in New Mexico; and as he was an officer in government service, the United States was answerable for the expenses growing out of his incursion. His government might allege that he had mistaken his route, but that was no fault of Spain. As a proof of the moderateness of the charges, he cited an item of $37.50 for seventy-five days maintenance of two of Pike's disabled soldiers. He did not doubt the fact that when the President's attention should be called to the account, he would give the necessary order for its payment.

When Foronda charged the American government with the responsibility for Pike's actions, he placed the administration in the awkward position either of repudiating Wilkinson or of assuming a moderate claim for damages. This advantage he lost by presenting such an unreasonable bill. After allowing two

8. Foronda to Madison, Feb. 7, 1808, *Spanish Notes*, II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

9. These amounted to $2500 for Lewis and Clark, and $8000 for the various attempts under Dunbar. The enlisted officers and men were, in addition, paid by the War Department.

weeks to elapse without deigning a reply, Madison wrote asking for the Captain-General's itemized accounts. Meanwhile Foronda, stirred up from Madrid, became impatient and sent a second long dunning note,[10] in which, by elaborate explanation of Pike and Wilkinson's duplicity, he sought to justify Salcedo's preposterous claim. Since his note of the preceding August, various documents had come into His Majesty's possession which aroused still graver suspicions that Pike's entrance was premeditated. Accordingly, the Minister of State brought the matter to the attention of the American Chargé at Madrid, and wished him likewise to make another vigorous representation to the President.

Foronda quoted his letter of August 22, 1808, concerning Salcedo's generosity towards Robinson and Pike, and then proceeded to give other proofs of the malevolent designs of these Americans upon New Mexico. In one of the documents seized by Salcedo, Wilkinson had written to Pike of Jupiter, of telescopes, and of sextants. This fact in itself Foronda thought suspicious; but in another document, where the General again spoke of the planet and its satellites, he suddenly introduced the name of Miranda. The mention of this restless revolutionist caused the Spanish minister to believe that Wilkinson's astronomical instructions formed simply a new filibustering code. If Pike knew how to take observations, he needed no such suggestions; if he did not, such superficial instruction would avail him nothing. Other similar signs also appeared suspicious, especially in the hands of a military officer, at the head of an armed force, and in foreign territory.[11]

In another document, Foronda continued, Pike mentioned the weakness of the Pawnee Republic, in connection with the Red River. This led him to fear that he alluded to Spain. It was the same language employed by insolent hack-writers who forgot the days when Roman senators spoke of the Spaniards with respect, or who ignored recent events, such as the humbling of British pride before Buenos Ayres.

He also complained of other subjects which displayed Pike's

10. Foronda to Madison, Feb. 22, 1808, *Spanish Notes*, II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

11. Cf. Wilkinson to Pike, Aug. 6, 1806, Coues, *Pike*, II, 576.

conduct in a suspiciously hostile light. That officer persuaded the Indians to exchange their Spanish flags for American, an act which, according to Foronda's logic, signified a desire to draw them away from Spanish friendship. This impression was further heightened by the impudent and boastful assertion that after the following year the Spanish officials would not be permitted to regale the Indians with flags and medals. In this particular his conduct among the Pawnees was especially reprehensible. Still more insulting to Spain was Pike's assurance, upon which he staked his life and honor, that he could successfully conduct a military force into New Mexico.[12] The premeditated, hostile spirit evidenced by these acts was confirmed by the testimony of one of Pike's soldiers. When some of them inquired of him where they were going, and if they were not already upon Spanish soil, his only reply was an order to advance.

Foronda forebore to mention other complaints of the Spanish government against Pike's conduct, but again emphasized its generosity in dealing with him. He closed this portion of his missive by stating that His Majesty would not extend the same clemency to future acts of this sort, but would proceed against the delinquents with all the rigor of the laws.

The gist of the Spanish Minister's communication, however, was found in the enclosure which contained Salcedo's itemized accounts. It is needless to say that they evidence all of the customary minute accuracy to be found in Spanish official documents. The most captious critic could criticise little in the regularity and precision with which the Captain General showed the cost, to the royal treasury, of Pike's unwelcome visit. It was not the form but the content of this carefully-itemized, duly-attested account that raised an insuperable difficulty in its reception.

The most important single division of the account was that furnished by Governor Allencaster of New Mexico. This included the expenses of the party that arrested Pike and conducted him and his men to Chihuahua, together with a minute detail of all articles furnished either the Americans or their captors, and repairs to their necessary equipments. This in itself would not have amounted to a very large sum, but in addition Allencaster

12. See pages 122, 123.

included the expenses of eight additional parties, ranging in number from 33 to 205 men, who at various dates between April 18 and August 12, 1807, scoured the frontier in search of other possible intruders. At least the Governor states that they did. The account appears absolutely correct—on paper—and Allencaster added to its credibility by crediting Pike with $41 from the sale of his wornout horses. But one is tempted to entertain a few doubts regarding accounts so very accurately rendered. Experience with Spanish colonial documents, especially of a monetary character, leads one to doubt mere paper evidence. He naturally wonders, if all of those parties were absent, who were left at home to carry on the ordinary occupations of life and guard the settlements of the Rio Grande valley against the ever-hostile Apaches. If these scouting expeditions actually took place, one may infer that nearly every able-bodied man in the province had the opportunity to take a holiday excursion in the mountains, with the expectation that the United States would pay the cost.

Evidently a long silence on the part of Jefferson and Madison followed the presentation of Salcedo's claim. Jefferson believed that Foronda was simply using Pike, as well as Miranda, to justify Spanish intrigues in the Mobile and Sabine region. In May he wrote Madison[13] that the truth concerning Pike's mission might be so simply stated as to show that his presence on the Rio del Norte was a mere error which should call for setting him right instead of forcing him through the interior of Mexico. This did not imply a censure of Madison's way of expressing this truth, so much as impatience at Foronda's frivolous complaints and arguments. There was certainly enough that was serious in the circumstances of Pike's expedition, but the Spanish minister had failed adequately to follow up his first presentation of this fact.

By June 3, 1808, Foronda became impatient and broke the silence of two months by requesting[14] a reply to his itemized statement. On November 26, he intimated[15] that he did not wish to keep asking for this, but that he should consider no reply to himself as no reply to His Sovereign, and so notify his court. Two

13. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, IX, 24, 195, 196.

14. Foronda to Madison, June 3, 1808, *Spanish Notes*, II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

15. *Ibid*, Nov. 26, 1808.

days later, however, he had to break his self-imposed silence by submitting some additional accounts from Salcedo.[16] The previous claim had included Pike's expenses only to San Antonio, Texas. The Captain General now forwarded the duly attested itemized accounts incurred in conducting Pike from that place to Natchitoches, and also the cost of maintaining the interpreter and four soldiers still remaining in the interior. Accompanying this was a statement of the proceeds from the sale of the personal effects of Robinson and Pike. From the papers it appeared that their belongings, remaining in New Mexico, were carefully valued by a committee of three, and then offered for sale. The proceeds were only some $47, and this added to the result from the sale of the wornout horses, with their trappings, gave the American side a credit of $109, but left the total on the Spanish side at $22,064.38, with other items to be added for the expenses, since May 8, of the men still detained in Mexico.

In the sale of Pike's effects his theodolite was found to be broken and attracted no purchasers. The astronomical instruments that so greatly aroused Spanish fears met with the same fate. Salcedo took occasion to justify his expense account, which he understood had met with opposition from the American authorities, on the ground that he feared other incursions, and that those who contributed to it were called away from their usual occupations. Aside from these items, after deducting the money received from selling Pike's effects, there still remained a balance of $1,470.37 representing the money and goods actually furnished Pike and his party on their return to the United States.

As we have already seen, Jefferson was willing to pay the last sum mentioned, and had already given orders to that effect.[17] It was, however, simply out of the question for him to consider the payment of the rest of this preposterous claim; and we have no evidence that the Spanish minister persisted in urging it. Foronda later mentioned Pike's boasting in a letter of recriminations, directed to Madison's Secretary of State, Robert Smith.[18] The explorer's journey in western Louisiana likewise formed one of the

16. *Ibid*, Nov. 28, 1808.

17. See page 136.

18. Foronda to R. Smith, Sept. 26, 1809, *Spanish Notes*, II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State.

items of a Spanish memoir,[19] charging the United States with bad faith in its dealings with Spain. One of the specifications of Article 4, of the Treaty of February 22, 1819, was to the effect that Spain waived all claims growing out of Pike's unauthorized incursion. This apparently constituted the final diplomatic word relating to the Jeffersonian period of Louisiana Exploration.

19. The memoir is dated Dec. 23, 1814, and was evidently intended for Ferdinand VII. A translation is found in the volume entitled *Letters in Relation to Burr's Conspiracy*, Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.

## CHAPTER XV.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

The task of summarizing the results of four years of Jeffersonian exploration need not be a lengthy one. The main features of each separate expedition have been given in the appropriate chapters, so that there remains merely the grouping of some of the more significant of these features under the headings suggested by Jefferson's instructions.

In a scientific way the results of these various explorations were disappointingly meagre, even when judged by the modest standards of the day. Lewis and Clark, it is true, did not obtain full credit for what they actually accomplished in this particular. In the first place, eight years passed before the appearance of the summarized edition of their journals, prepared by Paul Allen and Nicholas Biddle, and usually bearing the name of the latter. Then from this edition all botanical and zoological details were omitted, with the idea of incorporating them in a separate study to be prepared by Dr. Barton. But the Doctor died before this was completed, and the scientific details of the most important of these expeditions thus remained unknown to the general public until the recent publications of Dr. Elliot Coues and Dr. Reuben G. Thwaites. Dunbar very frankly wrote the President that the scientific results of the Washita tour were almost *nil*. They did discover a new variety of the wild cabbage, but the season was unfavorable for botanical research. Still his journal and that of Dr. Hunter abound in the results of accurate scientific observation; but this has largely remained hidden in their original journals or in the government report which summarized their contents. However, the naturalist Nuttall afterward testified to the importance of their work.

Pike was hardly fitted for a scientific explorer, while his many commissions and resultant duties prevented him from making the best of his limited natural abilities. The result of his work was rather to arouse general public interest in his field than to satisfy the demands of scholars. The summarized journal of the Free-

man and Custis expedition abounds in botanical details, but it is doubtful if these ever became current. Hunter and Dunbar seem to have accomplished the best results in a mineralogical way, although the region they visited was far less important than the upper waters of the Missouri and of the Arkansas, where Lewis and Pike operated. All of the explorers seem to have taken detailed meterorological observations, those of Dunbar being particularly noteworthy. All likewise took observations of the latitude and longitude of the important places; but the accuracy of their observations is often open to reasonable doubt.

From a geographical standpoint the expeditions accomplished more, for their work constituted the basis of western cartography for the next two decades. It is true that the statements and conjecures of the explorers, such as those embodied in the so-called "Lewis map of 1806,"[1] were often founded upon insufficient information derived from Indians or irresponsible traders. It is equally true that imagination, ambition, or inexact reports sometimes led them to make extravagant claims, such as Pike's contention that he had penetrated to the source of the Mississippi, or that by the Arkansas and the Rio Colorado could be found the best communication between the Atlantic and Pacific, this side of Darien.[2] Lewis and Clark were equally astray in emphasizing the importance of Marias River, and in locating the sources of the Multonomah near those of the Rio Grande and the Missouri. This caused another popular misconception regarding a possible waterway to the Pacific and later perplexed the negotiations of John Quincy Adams with Don Luis De Onis.[3] These explorers may also have been slightly mistaken in indicating the point of highest white exploration on the Missouri; and their commentators, until recently, certainly were in assigning to them the credit of first using the English term, "Yellowstone." They probably criticised too severely the previous explorations of Fidler and of David Thompson.

The Washita and Red River explorers operated in a limited

1. Coues, *Lewis and Clark*, I, 222, note 4. Map in pocket of Index. The atlas of the Thwaites edition will also contain the map.

2. Coues, *Pike*, II, 522.

3. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV, *passim; Am. State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, *passim*.

field and recorded little beyond personal observation. As a result of the explorations of the whole period, we may say that the President and his advisers, and later the reading public, secured a very satisfactory survey of the upper Mississippi, the Missouri, the Osage, the Arkansas (through Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, as well as through Pike), the Red for some 600 miles (its source remaining undiscovered until near the middle of the century), and the Washita. In addition they had secured information, of not very great reliability, concerning most of the important tributaries of these rivers. On the whole they had secured a reasonable amount of data, for use in compiling the President's "skeleton map" of our new territorial possession.

From an international standpoint Jefferson's early Louisiana exploration accomplished much both favorable and unfavorable. Whether this exploration, except in the case of Oregon, extended the limits to which the United States might justly lay claim, is doubtful, but it certainly strengthened its sovereignty within territory which a reasonable interpretation gave it. Lewis and Clark on the Missouri, and Pike on the Upper Mississippi, held very agreeable relations with the British fur traders who frequented this region, and drew from them unqualified expressions acknowledging the American right to sovereignty over the soil and regulation of the Indian traffic. Jefferson in his annual message commending Pike, was at first inclined to state that his mission strengthened our claim to the 49th parallel as the northern boundary of Louisiana; but he desisted upon the advice of Madison that by so doing he might unnecessarily arouse British ire.[4] By 1807 the North West Company abandoned its Missouri trade, and in 1816 the British fur traders, except in a subordinate capacity, were excluded from the American soil.[5] Lewis and Clark and Pike certainly contributed to this result.

It is hard to say just what effect Pike's Southwest tour had upon international affairs—at least from a diplomatic standpoint. His detention and the ensuing expenses certainly aroused diplomatic mention, which might have become serious, had the Spanish

4. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson*, VIII, 484.

5. Chittenden, *Hist. Am. Fur. Trade*, I, 310; Coues, *Jour. of Alex. Henry*, I, 345, note.

representative handled the matter more skillfully. His raising of the American flag on the Rio Grande may have served, in some manner, to neutralize the effect of the Malgares raid; while his very audacity in so acting may have secured from the Spaniards more respectful treatment than they were wont to bestow upon authorized intruders. But the motives of Wilkinson, Pike's principal, were of such a mixed commercial and political nature, and withal so sinister, that it is impossible to give a proper international interpretation to this expedition. We are certainly safe in saying that the filibustering element of the Southwest, whether directed in aid of Mexican revolution or for personal aggrandizement, was greatly stimulated by Pike's publications. Wilkinson clearly foresaw this and warned Pike against a premature publication of the results of his journey, because of the danger of exciting "a spirit of adventure adverse to the interests of our government."[6]

The Hunter-Dunbar expedition had, of course, little international importance. This element, in the Freeman expedition, might have been highly significant, had not the prudent retreat of that leader, when confronted by a Spanish force, removed such a possibility. This encounter provoked a vigorous protest from Governor Clairborne and an equally vigorous rejoinder from Salcedo; but there is no evidence at present extant to show that their respective superiors followed up their correspondence in any adquate manner. Doubtless Jefferson was then too interested in bringing to a successful issue his purchase of the Floridas, through Napoleon's aid, and the settlement of other important diplomatic questions with Spain, to imperil these affairs by a vigorous protest against the stopping of even one of his cherished exploring expeditions. His efforts at home, as shown by his annual message, seem directed toward concealing the real failure of the expedition.

If one were to judge from the amount of space devoted to our prospective savage allies, both in the instructions and in the journals, it would seem that the work of these early explorers should have greatly influenced the Indian policy of the American government. That the contrary result was true was due to the inaction of the Washington authorities, rather than to any lack in the efforts or recommendations of the explorers themselves. Both Lewis

6. Coues, *Pike*, II, 826.

and Pike composed worthy memoirs upon the Indian trade. Some of their suggestions regarding the exclusion of foreigners from its enjoyment were adopted years after, but no efficient means were taken to prevent unauthorized trading on the part of American citizens. Pike, too, preached far better than he practiced in the matter of giving whisky to the natives.

Upon certain Indians the explorers seem to have made a definite impression. This was true of Lewis and Clark among the Mandans. Although at first somewhat suspicious, these natives came to regard the Americans in a favorable light, during the course of the long winter sojourn. They appreciated the blacksmith of the party, even if they could not understand the proper use of the corn mill presented to them. They wore American medals and displayed the American flag, even when British traders visited them. Some of the neighboring tribes, however, distrusted the "medicine" of the medals, and were reported by a British trader as disgusted with the high-sounding language of the Americans.[7] Few of the Indians could penetrate the design of the Americans in attempting to record their words, and this practice they regarded with suspicion. In general we may say that Lewis and Clark's stay among the Mandans was beneficial to explorers and Indians alike. These men apparently made a stronger impression than any other of the expeditions made upon a single tribe, with the possible exception of Freeman among the Caddoes and Coashuttas. It is doubtful, of course, if Freeman did not mar this impression by yielding to the Spanish force sent to oppose him. At any rate we later find that the Caddo chief received commissions and medals from the Spaniards, although he volunteered with his warriors for the defense of New Orleans against the British.[8]

Pike's own account of his dealings with the Indians seems to show that he was uniformly successful; yet in the one treaty of this period for which he was responsible, there was a great deal of underhand work, and on other occasions a careful reading between the lines would show that the Sioux and Chippewa chiefs were "working" the ambitious young officer. Pike's course among the Osages and Pawnees was brave, even to rashness, and it is probable

7. Coues, *Journal of Alex. Henry*, I, 349, 350.
8. *Niles Register*, XIX, 133, Oct 28, 1820.

that his bearing went far to counteract the effect of Malgares' incursion. His colleague, Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, attempted to supplement his efforts by recommending a trading house among the Osages. Perhaps the temporary establishment known as Fort Osage was in part due to his policy. Sibley's important work was, of course, among Indians; and if we may believe the reports of his enemies he was reasonably successful in attaching them to the American cause—at least during the period in question.

In one important particular the efforts of all these explorers were, as might be expected, utterly futile. Disregarding natural conditions, Jefferson had conceived the idea that peace was the most desirable state for his untutored savage children. With insufficient military strength to enforce his system, its failure was a certainty. The utmost efforts of Lewis and Clark and of Pike could not bring about a permanent peace between the Sioux and the Chippewas. Lewis and Clark upon their home journey found that the tribes of the Sioux that had less than two years before agreed to bury the hatchet with the Mandans and kindred tribes, again at war with them. Nor was their second attempt to patch up a peace, although accompanied by salutary warnings, more effective than the first. Not merely Indian allies, but also American traders and army officers were finally brought to realize the treacherous and utterly hostile character of the Sioux. Pike's efforts among the Osages, Pawnees, and Kansas were not more successful, for interested traders continually interfered to provoke the mutually hostile spirit of these tribes. Pike never reached the Comanches in his mission to bring about a peace between them and the Pawnees. Possibly if Freeman's expedition had succeeded in its original intention to ascend to the Pawnees and this had been supplemented by Pike's efforts among these same Indians, more substantial results would have been achieved in the Southwest. But no permanent peace could have been maintained without an adequate military force to restrain unscrupulous traders and restive Indians.

If a hollow peace, shortly to be followed by more atrocious hostilities was the only result of their negotiations among the Indians themselves, it is hardly likely that the latter would regard with increased respect the government that brought about this

peace. But little effort was made to follow up these negotiations by an effective military display that would increase the confidence of the Indians in the American government and insure its traders adequate regulation and protection. On the contrary, in many cases, the government had to depend upon the fur traders to further its Indian relations, with the natural restult that its policy was twisted to serve the ends of private individuals. An instance to the point seems to be afforded by the fact that the American government approached the Osage Indians through Chouteau rather than De Lisa. Lieutenant Wilkinson also made the charge that the wrong chief was often selected as the recipient of medals; that these medals were not showy enough in make-up; and that too many of them were distributed to preserve their true value. In general, the policy of the British agents and even of the Spanish colonial officers, appears much more effective than the efforts of Jefferson and his immediate successors.

In brief, it may be said that Jefferson's Indian policy was largely a failure; that these explorations added to awkward international complications; that the geographical data gathered by his agents were fairly complete, but occasionally misleading; and that the store of scientific knowledge acquired by them was neither great nor readily available. In addition, Jefferson's particular plan for the exploration of the Louisiana Purchase was almost a complete failure, although this result was partly due to Spanish opposition. In part only, the writer thinks, for there seemed to be a lack of practical knowledge and of hearty co-opertion among those concerned in this particular phase of the exploration that would have prevented success, even against mere natural obstacles. Consequently the most successful expeditions for Louisiana exploration were the one conceived by the President for another purpose, and those planned without previous consultation by his subordinate Wilkinson, for his own ulterior purposes.

Yet, despite so many discouraging features, there were compensating gains. Lewis and Clark, within the Louisiana Purchase, emphasized, if they did not point out, the great fur trade route to the Northwest. This emphasizing, as has already been shown, was bearing fruit, even upon their return journey. Pike strengthened our claim to Upper Louisiana and pointed out the great commercial route from Missouri to New Mexico—a route

which afterwards became a historic highway in the economic and military conquest of the Southwest. Dunbar, Hunter, Freeman, and Sibley probably hastened the occupation of the region they explored; for within a decade the squatter and more pretentious settler were already firmly established there and encroaching upon the rights of our recently adopted native wards. Thus there were tangible results to show for the modest $10,500 expended in border exploration. But it was the fur trader and the pioneer settler, rather than the casual explorer, who really opened up our great West and made the Louisiana Purchase an important element in our national strength.

The rewards, both immediate and remote, obtained by the explorers varied greatly. Lewis and Clark bore regular army commissions and received the pay due their rank. In addition, through Jefferson's personal influence, they and their followers received land grants. Pike likewise was an army officer, but as his most influential patron was Wilkinson, no land grants were forthcoming to himself and men. Dunbar, Hunter, and Freeman, while actually engaged in work, apparently received a small salary in addition to expenses. But this did not exceed the rate of $1,000 per annum—the amount likewise of Sibley's salary as Indian agent. Of course Dunbar was a wealthy Mississippi planter and Sibley a Louisiana ranchman, while Hunter was a physician with an established practice. Of Freeman little is known aside from the fact that he was a practical surveyor. Lewis and Clark, however, seem to have been the only ones well cared for in a material and political way, although in his military profession Pike was advanced with sufficient rapidity.

In a literary way Dunbar held, and retained, an established reputation as a scientist of more than local reputation, but his work as explorer added little to this reputation. Hunter, Freeman, and Sibley are unknown names in either the scientific or the historical department of letters. Lewis, Clark, and Pike have fared better at the hands of the historical muse. There has been a series of ups and downs in the contrasted careers of the inseparable pair and of their path-breaking rival. The reputations of the former, with such a patron as the President, were assured, and the early meagre reports of their work attracted wide attention. But Pike was first in the literary market with the published account of

his travels, and his book was fortunate in appealing to the public at the proper moment. The age of the combined Mexican revolutionist and of the American filibuster, of which class his colleague, Robinson, was a good example, was deeply affected by Pike's illuminating, even if illogical, pages; and for three decades after the publication of his book—decades during which Mexico became independent, Texas was settled, the Santa Fé trade developed, and California opened to the civilized world—he was easily the commanding figure of this period of early exploration. With the prominence of the Oregon question, and the development, not merely of the valley of the Missouri but of the far Northwest, the inseparable explorers again forged to the front, where they have since maintained their position. The question whether the explorations of Lewis and Clark or of Pike are really the more important is one which future historians only can safely answer. The utimate development of the great Northwest and the great Southwest alone can offer the solution.

To whichever of the subordinates the palm for the greatest American exploration is utimately awarded, it may reasonably be inferred that the greatest credit for the movement must always be assigned to President Jefferson himself. It was he who originally conceived the far-reaching idea, even though in one case his subordinate general made use of it to serve his own particular purpose. He took a personal interest in arranging every detail of the work; and although his suggestions often smacked of his Monticello library, yet he was ready to change and adapt his scheme to fit practical conditions. His personal care was felt by every subordinate engaged in the undertaking, and the latter believed that good work on his part would receive personal commendation, if not more substantial reward. The President never was satisfied until the published results of the expeditions were given the utmost possible publicity, and it is no fault of his that certain journals have not been better known during the intervening century. He was always ready to solve the diplomatic perplexity preceding or following one of his proposed expeditions, or even when arising from an unauthorized incursion. Thus it is only fitting that a study devoted to this important subject of Louisiana exploration, should emphasize the personal influence of the President whose scientific tastes demanded a careful survey of the vast territory that fortunate diplomacy had placed within his grasp.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY.

## I. ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

### A. United States Government Archives.

1. *Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State.* This bureau contains the files of diplomatic correspondence. The subject of Louisiana exploration attracted few diplomatic notes, so this collection has been little used in the preparation of this work. The volumes consulted have been *Spanish Notes,* Vols. 1 and 2, containing the communications from Casa Yrujo and Foronda; and *Instructions,* Vol. 6, containing two dispatches from Madison to Armstrong and Erving.

2. *Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.* In the Library of the State Department, officially designated as above, are to be found the six manuscript volumes of the *Claiborne Correspondence.* The volumes form a most valuable source for the history of the southern portion of the Louisiana Purchase, until 1812. While the collection is largely made up of Claiborne's letters to Jefferson, Madison, Robert Smith, and Monroe, there are many enclosures composed of letters written to Claiborne. The young governor seems to have been somewhat changeable in his interpretation of events, but accurate in reporting them. The volumes also contain valuable miscellaneous documents.

3. *Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior.* While the archives of this bureau contain comparatively little relating to the Southwestern Indians, before 1820, there are a few important letters relating to frontier conditions to be found in the miscellaneous files; and several, some of which have been used in this work, relating to Dr. John Sibley, in the volume entitled *Indian Office, Letter Book B.* These letters throw some light upon the early dealings of our government with the Southwestern Indians.

### B. Spanish Archives.

1. *Bexar Archives.* This valuable collection embraces a wide variety of Spanish colonial documents, relating to the Province of

Texas, and more particularly to San Antonio, from the early years of the eighteenth century to 1836. For the purpose of this work the correspondence of Captain-General Nimecio de Salcedo, of the Internal Provinces (to which group Texas belonged), with the Viceroy of New Spain and the Governor of Texas, and of the latter with the officials on the Louisiana-Texas frontier, was especially valuable. These letters give the Spanish interpretation of events that have usually been reported only from the American standpoint. The collection is in the process of arrangement and classification, so the separate documents are referred to by name and date only.

2. *New Mexico Archives.* A much less extensive collection than the previous one, and far less valuable in character, probably owing to the pilfering of the more important documents. Most of those now found in it relate to the local history of Santa Fé. At present the collection is in the Library of Congress, where it is readily accessible. For the years covered by this work I found a few documents that were suggestive, rather than very important, while with reference to Pike himself, I discovered but an inconsequential reference. These documents serve, however, to supplement certain other collections.

3. *Archivo General, City of Mexico.* A good description of this vast collection is contained in the *Nation* for May 30, 1901. Doubtless there is buried within it a great deal of material relating to Louisiana exploration, and amongst this some future investigator may possibly discover the confiscated journal and papers of Pike. For the present work I have made slight use of *Volume 43, Ramo de Historia.*

### C. Official Correspondence, Etc.

1. *Wilkinson Papers.* Four volumes of letters to and from General James Wilkinson are now in possession of the Chicago Historical Society. The letters are valuable in so far as they supplement his published *Memoirs*, but they do this to a limited extent only. The greater part of the letters are written to Wilkinson, but those from Pike are conspicuous by their absence.

2. *Jefferson Papers.* This collection of 137 volumes, now housed in the Library of Congress, and thoroughly calendared in Nos. 6, 8, and 10 of the *Bulletins of the Bureau of Rolls and*

*Library,* is the most important and most available manuscript source used in this work. The details of the arrangements for Louisiana exploration can be found nowhere else. While the collection as a whole reveals the versatility of Jefferson's genius, his instructions to the various explorers and his correspondence with them display a minute knowledge of the practical details of wilderness life and of the results to be expected from systematic exploration. Occasionally it is necessary to discount Jefferson's report of results obtained from the explorations he planned, but his statement of details is reliable.

3. *Manuscript Journal of George Hunter up the Red and Washita Rivers with Wm. Dunbar, 1804, by Order of U. S. and up to Hot Springs.* This is one of the two important sources for the Hunter-Dunbar Expedition of 1804-05. The MSS. is in possession of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia. Dr. Hunter was a shrewd and well-trained observer, with the power to comment with interest upon what he saw. His journal admirably supplements that of Dunbar, and is far more readable.

Such of these manuscript collections as are to be found at Washington are described briefly in the *Guide to the Archives of the Government of the United States in Washington,* prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Institution by C. H. Van Tyne and W. G. Leland. This pioneer *Guide,* however, is in many cases little more than a catalogue, compiled from office indexes or from the designated titles of the volumes. Even with these necessary limitations, it is very helpful and suggestive; but a personal examination of individual volumes often discloses unexpected material. This is particularly true of the volumes in the Library of the State Department, where the binder's titles and the partial tables of contents are often misleading. For the *Bureau of Indexes and Archives,* Professor A. C. McLaughlin has prepared a brief preliminary *Report on the Diplomatic Archives of the Department of State, 1789-1840,* also published under the auspices of the Carnegie Institution.

*A Report on the Public Archives of Texas,* published in the *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* for 1901,

page 353, makes brief mention of the *Bexar Archives*. A more complete description, prepared by the late L. G. Bugbee, was published in the *University of Texas Record* for October, 1899. A brief notice is likewise to be found in the *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, VIII., 277, 278.*

In addition to the six volumes of the *Claiborne Correspondence* in the *Bureau of Rolls and Library* at the State Department, Washington, there is in the possession of the *Department of Archives and History of the State of Mississippi*, the manuscript journals of Governor Claiborne from 1803 to 1816—a much more complete set than the one in Washington. The various documents are listed in the *Third Annual Report* of the Director of the Department.

Although the present work is largely based upon manuscript sources, yet references have been made to printed material, wherever possible. In the case of the Lewis and Clark and Pike expeditions, the references have been almost entirely of this character. The well-known sources will be listed without extended comment.

## II. ORIGINAL PRINTED SOURCES.

### A. United States Government Documents.

1. *American State Papers.* (*a*) *Foreign Relations II.* A few military and Indian reports from the Louisiana frontier. (*b*) *Foreign Relations IV.* Casual reference to negotiations between J. Q. Adams and De Onis. (*c*) *Military Affairs I.* Letter of Salcedo to Claiborne. (*d*) *Miscellaneous I.* House report in favor of Pike.

2. *Annals of Congress.* (*a*) *8 Cong. 1.* House report in favor of Louisiana exploration. (*b*) *8 Cong. 2.* Information concerning Louisiana. (*c*) *9 Cong. 2.* Message transmitting Dunbar's Report and Lewis's Mandan Letter. Summary of Dunbar's Journal. Sibley's letter describing the Red River, Sibley's Indian Report. Second House Report, favoring Louisiana exploration.

## B. Works of Travel and Exploration.

1. Thwaites, R. G. *Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition* (five volumes consulted), New York, 1904-05. Contains a few general points not clearly brought out in the abridgment of Nicholas Biddle. Valuable chiefly for the scientific data now made available, and for the footnotes.

2. Coues, Elliot. *History of the Expedition of Lewis and Clark*, New York, 1893. The Biddle abridgement, illustrated by a wealth of footnotes derived from the *Original Journals* (Mss.) and other sources.

3. Gass, Patrick. *A Journal of the Voyages and Travels of a Corps of Discovery*, Pittsburg, 1807. Interesting for occasional comments which have been generally utilized in the footnotes of the two preceding works.

4. Dunbar, William. *The Exploration of the Red, the Black, and the Washita Rivers*, in *Documents Relating to the Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana*, Boston, 1904. In this volume Dunbar's journal first appears in print in complete form. It is the first accurate scientific description of the region traversed.

5. Freeman, Thomas, and Custis, Peter. *Account of the Red River in Louisiana, Drawn up from the Returns of Messrs. Freeman & Custis, to the War Office of the United States, Who Explored the Same, in the year 1806*, found in Library of Congress, *Miscellaneous Pamphlets, Vol. 861, No. 8*. This pamphlet is apparently based upon the original journals of the explorers, which, if still extant in the archives of the War Department, are not now available. A manuscript copy of the pamphlet is also in possession of the Library of Congress. The scientific description of the lower Red River is an excellent supplement to Sibley's cursory account. The Indian relations of the expedition and the encounter with the Spaniards are graphically described.

6. James, E. J. *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky Mountains, etc.*, Philadelphia, 1823. Volume II. contains a brief summary of the Freeman Expedition, apparently based on the above pamphlet, although the author states that he saw the original journals of Freeman and Custis in the files of the War Department.

7. Pike, Z. M. *Account of Expeditions to the Sources of the Mississippi and Through the Western Parts of Louisiana, etc.,* Philadelphia, 1810. The first complete edition of Pike's journals, prepared under the personal supervision of the author, but in a most confusing and perplexing manner. The author states that on account of the seizure of his papers by the Spaniards, he had to supply part of the notes for his Southwestern tour from memory.

8. Coues, Elliott. *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike,* New York, 1895. A more satisfactory edition of the above, rearranged, annotated, and indexed. Preferable for reference.

9. Coues, Elliot. *The Journals of Alexander Henry,* New York, 1899. Affords some light on the Lewis and Clark Expedition.

10. Jefferson, Thomas. *The Limits and Bounds of Louisiana,* in *Documents Relating to the Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana,* Boston, 1904. Contains Jefferson's views upon the extent of the Louisiana Purchase, but largely based upon obsolete authorities

11. Robin, C. C. *Voyages dans L'Intereur de la Louisiane, etc.,* Paris, 1807 (?). Volume II. contains an important memoir upon the limits of Louisiana. There are some interesting observations upon the events of early American possession of that territory.

12. Schultz, Christian. *Travels on an Inland Voyage, etc.,* Philadelphia, 1810. Makes an interesting comment on Pike's journey.

13. Hutchins, Thomas. *Historical, Narrative, and Topographical Description of Louisiana and West Florida,* Philadelphia, 1784. Casual reference only.

14. Romans, Bernard. *A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida,* etc., New York, 1775. Casual reference only.

15. Gould, George. *A General Description of ——— Province of West Florida,* 1769. MSS., American Philosophical So-

ciety, Philadelphia. Although not in printed form, it is mentioned at this point in the bibliography because not meriting a fuller description among the manuscript sources.

### C. Memoirs and General Correpondence.

1. Wilkinson. *Memoirs of My Time,* 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1816. Volume II., Appendix, contains some references to the Southwest. Volume I. has several important letters relating to Nolan.

2. Adams, J. Q. *Memoirs,* 12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-77. Volume IV. has been castually noticed, with reference to the Multonomah and the negotion with De Onis.

3. *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association,* Vol. VII., 308-317. Contains some correspondence relating to Philip Nolan.

4. Ford, P. L. *Writings of Jefferson,* 10 vols., New York, 1898-1902. The most important printed collection of Jefferson's writings.

5. Washintgon, B. *The Writings of Jefferson,* 9 vols., Washington, 1853-54. Practically superseded by the above.

6. *Memorial Edition, Works of Jefferson.* A few letters not found elsewhere in print.

### D. Periodical Literature.

1. *Literary Magazine and Annual Register.* Vol. VI., 173-174. Contains a letter of Sibley.

2. *Baltimore Telegraphe and Daily Advertiser,* March 22, 1806. Casual references to frontier conditions.

3. *Niles Register,* October 28, 1820. Mention of the Caddo Indians.

4. *Louisiana Herald,* May 5, 1821. Mention of return of William Meek, a member of Pike's party.

### E. Atlas.

Jeffery. *American Atlas,* etc., London, 1776. Used to identify certain tributaries of the Mississippi and Missouri.

## III. SECONDARY SOURCES.

1. Adams, Henry. *History of the United States,* 9 vols., New York, 1889-91. Important for the period, but little used for this particular subject.

2. McCaleb, W. F. *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy,* New York, 1904. Important for the relations between Wilkinson and Burr.

3. Gayarré. *History of Louisiana, American Domination,* New Orleans, 1885. The most important history of Louisiana for the period, making good use of the documentary sources. The use of the *Claiborne Correspondence* largely removes the necessity of citing Gayarré.

4. Chittenden. *History of the American Fur Trade,* 2 vols., New York, 1898 (?). A valuable study based largely on manuscript sources. Little used, however, in this work.

5. Wheeler, Olin D. *The Trail of Lewis and Clark,* 2 vols., New York, 1904. A valuable popular contribution to Louisiana Centenary Literature.

6. Thwaites. R. G. *Rocky Mountain Exploration,* New York, 1903. A brief, concise summary of western exploration—a scholarly synopsis, yet written in a popular vein.

7. Dellenbaugh, F. *The Breaking of the Wilderness,* New York, 1904. An interesting popular account of western exploration. The literary style is good, but occasional details are inaccurate.

# ERRATA

Page 9, "contient" should read "continent".

Page 16, "igominiously" should read "ignomimously".

Page 18, "betnween" should read "between".

Page 18, "anthentic" should read "authentic".

Page 21, "approapriation" should read "appropriation".

Page 60, "suah" should read "such".

Page 73, "Commanches" should read "Comanches".

Page 90, "rmaining" should read "remaining".

Page 100, "different" should read "difficult".

Page 101, "welcome" should read "welcomed".